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Abstract 
This is a study of law and language; in particular an investigation into the language of 
judgments. The focus is on judgments as texts authored by judges. The main thinkers 
chosen as the theoretical basis are not experts in law – Michel Foucault, Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Norman Fairclough and Hayden White, for example. The reason for this 
choice is to consider the language of law from insights outside of law. Topics such as 
rhetoric, narrative, critical discourse analysis, intertextuality, interpretive 
communities, the monologic voice, oppositional reading, and power relations are 
seldom found in mainstream legal literature. 
 
The position taken is that judgments are texts which are no more privileged (simply 
because they are legal texts) than any others that a society creates. However, 
judgments are viewed by some as being special societal texts, coated with a patina of 
mystique because they are dealing with inviolate legal principles. The patina is 
removed enough to suggest that judges use various linguistic processes to shape their 
judgments in ways no different from other authors, notwithstanding that they are 
writing about ‘the law’. Judges are rhetoricians who use rhetoric to shape the facts, 
choose the most expedient legal principle, and incorporate views of society expedient 
to their opinion. 
 
The thrust of this study is to locate rhetoric at work within a specific sphere. The 
corpus consists of forty-four cases over a seventy-five year period dealing with sexual 
orientation. This area of law was chosen for a number of reasons. It is self-contained 
and lends itself to detailed examination. The topic is emotive which means more 
rhetorical techniques are at play than in a fairly technical area of law. There have been 
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significant changes in the way sexual orientation has been treated in law over the 
years. It is interesting to trace how rhetoric facilitated that change. Lastly, we see how 
a judicial hegemony deals with an apolitical, splintered minority. 
  
Any categorical conclusions are impossible in an exploration of this kind. The 
findings, however, indicate that judges are not as restricted as is generally considered 
and that their judgments are shaped by employing linguistic techniques available to 
writers of both fact and fiction. The intention is to provide a fresh way of reading 
judgments, where observations gleaned in one area can be applied to other areas of 
law.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
‘The directing impulses of judges will not so readily appear from analyses of their 
rationalizing words …. Which is not to say that … it will not be valuable to make 
studies, from the outside, of the motives and biases of judges … based on … shrewd 
surmises as to the buried meanings obliquely expressed in their language’.1
 
In its broadest sense, this is a study of law and language. In particular, it is an 
investigation into the language of judgments. I take the position that judgments are 
texts which are no more privileged – simply because they are legal texts – than any 
others that a society creates. Judgments are written by judges; complicated by the 
notion that judges are expected to recycle previous texts, for example in keeping with 
the doctrine of stare decisis.2 Are they not then a combination of mixers of texts and 
original authors? But judges are not original authors in the manner of a novelist who 
can indulge in flights of fancy. They are constrained by certain factors – the facts of 
the case, the legal principles at issue, and the current views held by society, to name a 
few. In fact, it seems that the position of a judge leans towards the mechanistic. Are 
they then tabula rasa, clean slates waiting to be informed of the facts after which they 
will rule? 
 
On close inspection one finds that the slate is not clean but cluttered with ideologies. 
                                                          
1 Frank, J., Law and the modern mind, p. 114.  
2 The principle that precedent decisions are to be followed by the courts. When a point of law 
has been settled by decision, it forms a precedent which is then usually not departed from. 
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Each judge falls somewhere in the continuum between highly original and very 
mechanistic and that position can change depending on the case at hand. A judge 
wanting to depart from the law as it stands may adopt a novel approach in interpreting 
that law. A judge wanting to enforce that same law might apply a narrow 
interpretation and ignore any opposition. Judges, then, use various linguistic processes 
to shape their judgments to support their worldviews. Judges are rhetoricians. They 
use rhetoric to shape the facts, apply the most expedient legal principle, and decide 
how far they want society’s opinion to permeate their judgments. 
 
These are claims which need backing, and rhetoric is an evasive term which needs 
instantiations. The thrust of this study, therefore, is to try and locate rhetoric at work 
within specific judgments. To do this, I analyze forty-four cases over a seventy-five 
year period dealing with homosexuality. This corpus covers sodomy and other so-
called unnatural acts not only between males, but also between males and females. 
Yet this is not a study of homosexuality per se. I chose this area of law for a number 
of other reasons. It is self-contained and lends itself to a detailed examination. The 
topic is emotive and so one finds more rhetorical techniques at play than in a fairly 
technical area of law, such as company law. There have been significant changes in 
the way the subject has been treated over the years. We see how a judicial hegemony 
deals with an apolitical, splintered minority. 
  
This study has certain delimitations. Only cases reported in the South African Law 
Reports (SALR) from 1926 to 1999 have been included. The last case is from the 
Constitutional Court brought against the Minister of Justice by the National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality. By far the majority of cases are reported in English. 
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Essential cases reported in Afrikaans, and relevant extracts from textbooks written in 
Afrikaans, have been included and an approximate translation provided. Judges are 
only referred to in the masculine because all judges in the cases reviewed are males. 
(Justices Kate O’Regan and Yvonne Mokgoro presided on the Constitutional Court 
National Coalition of Gays and Lesbians but the opinions were delivered by Justices 
LWH Ackermann and Albie Sachs.) 
 
If I suggest that judges are not tabula rasa, then I need to acknowledge that neither 
am I since we cannot help but write from a certain viewpoint. Before starting to 
research, I anticipated what language I would expect to find. These preconceived 
ideas changed later. I thought that judges would use vitriolic, homophobic language in 
the 1920s. This would soften over time until an epiphany would occur when, in 1996, 
the constitution ushered in acceptance of all sexual minorities. Those cases would be 
flagship judgments steadily demolishing prejudice and bias. History would be 
matched to teleology. I found the opposite. True, there is a good sprinkling of mean-
spirited, bigoted judges but not enough to alter history. There are no flagship cases by 
which I mean consensual adult males contesting their rights. There is no evidence of a 
subordinate minority using the courts to steadily work away at toppling the dominant 
majority. In fact, if the cases were strung together in date order and turned into a story 
it would be incoherent, contradictory, utterly confusing and rather humorous. Finding 
that there is no grand narrative, I treat each case as it arises with no expectations and 
explore what it adds to our understanding of judicial rhetoric. As Jerome Frank 
suggests, the most we can do is make shrewd surmises as to the buried meanings 
obliquely expressed in the language judges use. 
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These speculations are explored by posing the following questions: 
How restricted were judges? 
Are judgments rhetorical constructions?  
How is sexuality constructed in the corpus? 
 
Law is constituted through language and yet legal sources seldom mention the 
mechanics of language or how different meanings are created through language 
choices. This lack of reference to language usage is surprising and one which I hope 
to contribute towards in this study. It seems as if lawyers and judges are more 
interested in the outcome – what is said or written – and ignore the variety of 
ideological choices that get made prior to this outcome. To redress this focus to 
language itself, the next chapter provides comprehensive overviews of the main 
aspects of language chosen as the theoretical basis for what is to follow. To this extent 
it is more than a mere literature review. Subsequent chapters provide instantiations 
from judgments to illustrate the importance of focusing on language in a legal context. 
 
The theoretical chapter begins with ‘law and literature’ which movement first 
presented me with the idea that there could be a connection between the two. As is 
explained more fully in that section, I came to agree with the critics that the term 
‘movement’ is too broad to adequately do justice to the various divisions it covered. 
This led me to further research what specific areas might contribute meaningfully 
towards an understanding of how judgments in particular are constructed.  
 
Next is a note on rhetoric, not in its pejorative sense – the art of persuasion – but how 
meaning is shaped by the choice of language. Rather than being a pipe through which 
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meaning is channelled, language constitutes meaning. A comprehensive overview of 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) follows. CDA contributes by providing a structure 
in which we can look at language issues from a contextual point of view down to a 
close analysis of the text itself. It provides, then, a structure upon which to hang a 
specific topic; in this case the language used to construct sexuality.  
 
CDA is a praxis informed to a large extent by Foucault, especially his thoughts on 
how knowledge comes to be legitimated within a society. Foucault also critiques the 
traditional dominant/subordinate view. It is for these reasons that I include a section 
on Foucault. Following that is a note on queer theory which would do away with the 
dominant/subordinate binary altogether. The review ends with a section on narrative. 
This theoretical basis is applied in a later chapter where I write the narrative of 
sodomy as based on the cases. All of these areas, therefore, assist in treating 
judgments as texts which are influenced by the authors and by the period in which 
they were written.   
 
Chapter Three examines the society and culture over some seven decades between the 
1920s and the 1990s with a particular emphasis on the legal culture in South Africa. It 
is in two sections and draws on examples from the corpus. The first section discusses 
apartheid as a backdrop and then analyses cases such as those dealing with police 
entrapment, cases where the police raided male sex-on-premises venues, and a case 
about a man dressed in drag. Under the 1996 constitution the intolerance diminishes, 
at least in public discourse. The second section considers the position of judges in 
society. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report provides an excellent 
starting point as it contains an extensive review of this period. Both the 
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‘establishment’ and ‘anti-establishment’ views of the judiciary are presented before 
the TRC makes a final conclusion. Its conclusion is of a judiciary which strongly 
favoured maintaining the status quo, primarily by relying on positivism. I elaborate on 
the TRC’s findings by sketching a profile of a ‘typical’ judge and the influence which 
positivism had. 
 
Reading a case as a stretch of text and not taking into account its context has its merits 
in that one concentrates on the text itself, but this affords no reliable way for 
criticizing the cultural context in which these texts occur, their ‘unstated premises, 
their enacted but implicit values, their relation to their larger world’.3 J B White 
acknowledges the need for an ideological criticism which pays attention to the social 
and cultural context of the text, to the ‘unsaid’. In a celebrated article, Robert Cover 
proposes that law cannot exist apart from the narratives that locate it and give it 
meaning. Believing with Max Weber that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun’, Cover draws on Clifford Geertz’s coinage of ‘thick 
description’.4 Whereas a ‘thin description’ is merely what the person is doing, ‘thick 
description’ assigns significance to that action.5 For Cover, narrative assigns that 
significance. ‘Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning,’ 
he says, ‘law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in 
                                                          
3 White, J. B., Heracles’ bow, p. 122. 
4 Geertz, C., The interpretation of cultures, p. 5. 
5 Cover, R. M., Nomos and narrative, p. 7. 
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which we live’.6 He calls this world a nomos, a meaningful order, a normative world. 
The aim of this section is to provide a ‘thick description’ to locate judgments and 
judges within a specific cultural context. 
 
The final two chapters analyse the text of the judgments in detail. There are a number 
of methods of textual analysis and I have chosen a particularistic approach. By this I 
mean that I analyse each case individually and avoid combining several cases and 
abstracting general points. The reason for this is that each case is an instance of 
rhetoric at work. The judge works with the particular facts, precedents and law to 
fashion his text. My hope is to reveal the textual properties at work in each instance. 
 
Chapter Four begins by building a case that a judgment is a distinct literary genre, a 
rhetorical narrative which the judge constructs based on his interpretation of the facts 
and the legal issues in dispute. It is also a narrative which may be silent in areas where 
an oppositional reader would expect to hear something. For example, the silence of 
the defendant’s side of the case is a sustained gap over all the cases studied. The 
chapter draws on legal academics who all view judgments textually. To them, all who 
are involved in legal discourse – mainly judges and lawyers (practising or academic) – 
do not give due regard to judgments as textual artefacts created within a specific 
society.  
 
                                                          
6 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The balance of Chapter Four focuses on certain linguistic techniques used in the 
production of the text. It begins with looking at the names used to describe the people 
who perform the acts, for example, homosexuals or gays. Following this is an analysis 
of the words and metaphors which are used in relation to homosexuality. The words 
and metaphors used are an outward manifestation of the different perspectives 
different judges hold. These perspectives are discussed under abnormal sex vs. normal 
sex, essentialism vs. constructivism, and choice vs. immutability.  The section ends 
with an examination of speech acts used in judgments. 
 
Chapter Five explores the rhetoric used to construct sexuality. It is a lengthy chapter 
which begins with a detailed examination of the common law of sodomy and other so-
called unnatural acts. An analysis of S20A of the Sexual Offences Act follows. A 
discussion of sexual abuse of minors strengthens the argument that it is the person 
who is being punished and not the act. The chapter concludes with an overview of all 
cases pertaining to lesbians.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical basis 
The law and literature movement 
There are essentially two different strands to ‘law and literature’: ‘law in literature’ 
and ‘law as literature’. ‘Law in literature’ is the depiction of lawyers and legal 
institutions in literature, particularly trials. It considers literary texts for what they say 
about law, how legal issues form part of the plot, or what the text and the characters 
say about what law is and what it should be. This approach also considers how 
literature views empathy in legal decision-making and the meanings of justice and 
mercy. An example is Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. The ‘law as literature’ 
strand is ‘a system of texts’, an inquiry ‘into the use of literary devices and strategies 
in legal texts’, and ‘rhetorical and stylistic methods’.7 It applies literary analysis to 
legal discourse and texts and demonstrates how literary strategies can participate in 
legal interpretation. This approach analyses examples from an actual text. These 
concrete examples can then be related back to theory or abstraction. Thomas 
Morawetz acknowledges the difficulty in defining ‘law and literature’ because the 
definition of literature is not as definitive as, for example, ‘economics’ in the ‘law and 
economics’ movement. 
 
Some suggest that by studying law and literature, society will produce virtuous 
citizens. Brook Thomas suggests that legal scholars turning to literature for this reason 
run the risk of using literature to advocate values representative of some groups but 
                                                          
7 Morawetz T., Law and literature, p. 452. 
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not others: ‘To make the values constructed by great works of literature the 
foundation from which to criticize legal inequities is to grant those works a normative 
function’.8 To grant this normative function presupposes that there is certainty as to 
what constitutes a canon of ‘great works’, itself an elitist sense of literature. It also 
assumes that authors of literature have access to a truth not found in other discourses. 
 
Richard Posner – a judge, proponent of the law and economics movement and critic of 
law and literature – seeks to disconnect law and literature.9 One would be better off 
learning about the law from a law textbook than reading Bleak House, and one does 
not have to be a lawyer to read Bleak House, he says. I find myself reluctantly 
agreeing with Posner. Reluctantly because I cannot agree with his formulaic 
alternative. Law, for Posner, is merely a ‘technique of government’, a science of 
economics not the art of literature.10
 
I only agree with Posner to the extent that much of the discussion on the law and 
literature movement favours one dictionary entry of ‘literature’ – ‘that kind of written 
composition valued on account of its qualities of form or emotional effect’ – over an 
equally valid, but more prosaic one – ‘the body of books and writings that treat of a 
particular subject, printed matter of any kind’.11 I favour the humdrum. Stripped of its 
value content, literature becomes synonymous with text. Considering the nature or 
                                                          
8 Thomas, B., Reflections on the law and literature revival, p. 510. 
9 Posner, R. A., Law and literature: a misunderstood relation. 
10 Posner, R. A., Law and literature: a relation reargued, p. 1392. 
11 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed.). 
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quality of a text is, for me, a far more worthwhile and rewarding exercise than 
studying the literary qualities of legal texts. ‘Studying the literary qualities of legal 
texts will invariably be an unrewarding undertaking, not least because the quality of 
judicial and legislative prose is so poor …. [It is] a demoralizing experience to live in 
a legal culture which still regards Lord Denning as a supreme stylist’.12
 
A leading light in the early stages of law and literature is James Boyd White. His 
work is discussed shortly under ‘rhetoric’. After a spate of articles between the late 
1980s and 1990s, three books13 were published approaching law and language in a 
more varied way. 
 
Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, as editors, put together papers presented at a 
symposium on narrative and rhetoric held at Yale Law School in 1995. In his review 
of Law’s stories, Richard Posner acknowledges the importance of narrative in a legal 
context.14 His observation of the book is that although it contains over twenty papers, 
many of them are too short to develop into anything substantial; it is ‘spotty’.15 His 
main criticism of the book is that ‘conspicuous by its absence ... is any sustained 
consideration of the methodological issue – by what means is one to study the story 
                                                          
12 Julius, A., Dickens the lawbreaker, p. 44. 
13 Amsterdam, A. G. & Bruner, J., Minding the law; Binder, G. & Weisberg, R., Literary 
criticisms of law;  Brooks, P. & Gewirtz, P. (eds.), Law’s stories. 
14 Posner R. A., Legal narratology, p. 737. 
15 Ibid., p. 742. 
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element in law?’, for example.16 This is a fair criticism and for this, it is better to turn 
to books dealing exclusively with narratology.17
 
Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner’s Minding the law is another example of 
examining a variety of law and literature topics. Recently written by two respected 
scholars, it shows that the concern with law and text is current. In addition, it does not 
trot out the common ‘law as literature’ associations; rather it yokes together topics 
such as categories, narrative, rhetoric and culture to bring fresh insights into the role 
of text in legal discourse. 
 
Written in the same year, Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg’s compendium is a 
tome. It did not get favourable reviews. Anne Couglin believes that the authors have 
anticipated too wide an audience, ‘The result? Exactly what you’d expect when 
authors try to bite off something for every reader to chew: the fare is tastefully 
presented, bland, and there is an awful lot of it’.18 In Richard Posner’s review, his 
answer to a question he poses – What has modern literary theory to offer law? – is: 
‘Nothing’.19 This book of ‘inordinate length and promiscuous breadth … contains 
nothing that could be used to understand or improve the law’.20 And yet elsewhere in 
the review he calls the chapter on narrative ‘first-rate’ and extols the value of 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p. 741. 
17 For example, Bal, M., Narratology, and Prince, G., Narratology. 
18 Coughlin, A. M., I’m in the mood for law, p. 209-210. 
19 Posner, R. A., What has modern literary theory to offer law?, p. 195. 
20 Ibid., pp. 208 & 196. 
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understanding narrative in a legal context. In his review of Law’s stories,21 he also 
mentions the benefit of studying narrative in a legal context. To Posner this book is ‘a 
compendium of the authors’ thoughts rather than a disciplined analysis of a subfield 
of law and literature’.22
 
Jane Baron questions whether ‘law and literature’ deserves the designation 
‘movement’, fractured as it is: ‘Any theme broad enough to tie all the strands together 
can be found and stated only at a level of abstraction so high as to threaten banality 
…. This is a movement of many methodologies and conclusions. The multiplicity of 
approaches and concerns that leads some to see literature as a source of nearly endless 
possibilities may lead skeptics to dismiss law and literature as an empty vessel, a 
phrase devoid of content’.23 Mark Kingwell asks whether law is like literature, and 
answers, ‘Law is utterly like literature because it consists of written texts that are 
subject to interpretation … divining meaning from written artefacts. But law is utterly 
unlike literature in that the practices governed by its texts have quite different 
goals’.24
 
These comments cause me to consider my own views on ‘law and literature’. I agree 
with Baron that it is too splintered to warrant being referred to as a movement. Within 
‘law and literature’, the ‘law in literature’ strand is, for my purposes, the least 
                                                          
21 Posner R. A., Legal narratology, p. 737. 
22 Posner, R. A., What has modern literary theory to offer law?, pp. 203-204. 
23 Baron, J. B., Law, Literature, and the problems of interdisciplinarity, pp. 1061-1062. 
24 Kingwell, M., Let’s ask again: is law like literature?, p. 35. 
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productive since I wish only to study factual narrative in the form of judgments and 
not fiction such as a novel which has law as its theme. The ‘law as literature’ avenue 
is of more interest to me because it considers the rhetoric of law, the use of how 
literary devices and strategies in legal texts might in fact constitute law. James Boyd 
White introduced the concept of constitutive rhetoric, particularly in Heracles’ Bow. 
Another useful view which ‘law as literature’ exponents have highlighted is the value 
of narrative in a legal context. Even Posner, a sustained critic of law and literature, 
saw the benefit of studying narrative in a legal context. I take from ‘law and 
literature’, then, the ideas of rhetoric and narrative. 
 
However, the champions of ‘law as literature’, such as J B White, provide no further 
guidelines on how to identify rhetoric and narrative at work. (Perhaps this was never 
their intention.) This is where critical discourse analysis proves useful by providing a 
framework to place a text first within its sociocultural context, and then analyse the 
text using techniques common to, and understood by linguists. After this next section 
on rhetoric, therefore, I consider how critical discourse analysis provides a structure to 
analyse rhetoric and narrative in specific contexts. 
 
Rhetoric 
Rhetoric is an extremely slippery term to define. Amsterdam and Bruner define it as: 
‘to denote the various linguistic processes by which a speaker can create, address, 
avoid, or shape issues that the speaker wishes or is called upon to contest, or that a 
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speaker suspects (at some level of awareness) may become contested’.25
 
This definition is explained more fully in James Boyd White’s essay ‘Rhetoric and 
law’. White dispenses with the prevailing pejorative view of rhetoric in favour of 
what he terms ‘constitutive rhetoric’. Rather than being ‘a second-rate way of dealing 
with facts that cannot really be known … a “failed science”’, White places law as a 
branch of rhetoric, not science.26 Rather than being a failed science, rhetoric is ‘what 
we do when science doesn’t work’.27 By ‘constitutive’ White means that judges work 
with the language they have at hand and remake and rework their judgments – ‘The 
legal speaker always acts upon the language that he or she uses; in this sense legal 
rhetoric is always argumentatively constitutive of the language it employs’.28 White 
shows how the starting point in rhetoric is always with the language at hand: ‘rhetoric 
invents … out of something. It always starts in a particular place among particular 
people …. Rhetoric always takes place with given materials. One cannot idealize 
rhetoric’.29
 
Richard Weisberg’s comments fit with White’s view on rhetoric. The ‘reality for 
judges … [is that] rightness in a legal decision derives from an imaginative and 
intuitive process within the adjudicator. This process results in the opinion, and the 
                                                          
25 Amsterdam, A. G. & Bruner, J., Minding the law, p. 165. 
26 White, J. B., Heracles’ bow, p. 32. 
27 Ibid., p. 31. 
28 Ibid., p. 34. 
29 Ibid., p. 39. 
 22
way in which the adjudicator explains the case determines the rightness or wrongness 
of the decision. Rhetoric, in other words, does not assist an argument to march to a 
conclusion; rhetoric is the argument, and the perceived rightness or wrongness of the 
conclusion may be as much based on style and form of the argument as on the 
extrinsic application to it of the observer’s notion of what the law of the case “should 
have been”’.30
 
A more exact analysis is necessary to examine the linguistic processes by which 
judges shape their judgments. Judges can only work with the language they have at 
hand. Rhetoric always starts in a particular place among particular people; one cannot 
idealize rhetoric. In order to observe rhetoric at work, I examine actual court 
judgments by using discourse techniques suggested by the linguist Norman 
Fairclough.31
 
Critical discourse analysis 
Fairclough popularized critical discourse analysis (CDA), especially in Language and 
Power, but he is not the only advocate. Later I draw on Teun van Dijk to introduce 
Foucault. CDA works on the premise that no discourse can occur outside of language: 
‘language signifies reality in the sense of construing meaning for it, rather than that 
discourse is in a passive relation to reality, with language merely referring to objects 
                                                          
30 Weisberg, R. H., Poethics, and other strategies of law and literature, p. 16. 
31 Fairclough, N., Language and power; Fairclough, N., Discourse and social change; 
Fairclough, N., Critical discourse analysis.
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which are taken to be given in reality’.32 What is needed is a technique to undertake 
an analysis of the text in order to see this discourse at work. In Language and Power, 
Fairclough explains his system by way of a diagram which has three circles within 
each other. The outer circle focuses on the society and culture where the text is found. 
The middle circle focuses on how the text is produced, distributed and consumed. In 
the inner circle is the text itself. Appropriating his system in terms of this study, a 
review of each aspect follows with an emphasis on the judges who operate within a 
particular society, and on the judgments they produce. At the end of each section I 
explain how these ideas are expanded in further chapters. 
 
The outer circle – society and culture 
The society in which the cases in the corpus take place is divided into two broad 
periods – from the 1920s until the constitution of 1996, and the period under the 
constitutions.33 In terms of the period I have chosen to review, the pre-constitutional 
period is by far the longer of the two and takes place in the backdrop of apartheid 
where there is a police presence in the form of entrapment, sexual policing, and 
general police intolerance to sexual ‘deviance’. The constitutional period is only in 
place for six years before the study ends. Nevertheless, there is a perceivable break 
with the past even in this short time. Judges are part of the hegemony of a society, no 
matter what dispensation they rule in. Being in this position of authority, the type of 
                                                          
32 Fairclough, N., Discourse and social change, p. 42. 
33 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, including cases heard under 
the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). 
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judgments they hand down can confirm the status quo or transform society. The 
direction which they take depends to an extent on the ideology they hold. 
 
Chapter Three examines these sociocultural aspects in two sections and draws on 
examples from the corpus. The first section discusses apartheid as a backdrop and 
then analyses cases such as those dealing with police entrapment, cases where the 
police raided male sex-on-premises venues, and a case about a man dressed in drag. 
Under the 1996 constitution, the intolerance diminishes, at least in public discourse. 
The second section considers the position of judges in society. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Report provides an extensive review of this period. Both 
the ‘establishment’ and ‘anti-establishment’ views of the judiciary are presented 
before the TRC makes a final conclusion. Its conclusion is of a judiciary which 
strongly favoured maintaining the status quo and relying on positivism as one of the 
reasons. I take this conclusion further by sketching a profile of a ‘typical’ judge and 
the influence which positivism had. 
 
The middle circle – how the text is produced, distributed and consumed 
In between considering the society in which a text is produced and the text itself lies 
the discourse practice ‘circle’ (the middle ‘circle’) which concentrates on how the text 
is produced, distributed and consumed. 
 
The primary text which this study focuses on is the judgment which is produced by a 
judge within a court system. Multiple voices which are heard during the court case – 
counsel, witnesses, etc. – are subsumed by the judge. In addition, when the text is 
being produced, the judge incorporates other texts such as extracts from previous 
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judgments, references to academic books and articles etc. Fairclough calls this 
‘intertextuality’. Mikhail Bakhtin is relevant when exploring both the multiplicity of 
voices and intertextuality. I accessed Bakhtin through Michael Holquist’s work34 for 
general information, and Robert Rubinson’s article35 for how Bakhtin might apply in 
a legal context. I turn to Bakhtin next, therefore, to provide further thoughts on how 
judgments are produced. 
 
With few exceptions, judgments are a ‘paradigm of closed discourse’, perfunctorily 
dismissing or diminishing alternative analyses.36 They are ‘typically monologues 
which reject exploration of complex issues of meaning in favor of the simple exercise 
of justifying a result’.37 This closed view of judgment-writing hides how the judging 
process ‘often entails hard choices among multiple perspectives, each of which might 
have a vital, independent force’.38
 
Yet for all this multiplicity, judges seldom take into account all voices. Bakhtin offers 
a useful framework here. One of Bakhtin’s concerns is an ‘extraordinary sensitivity to 
the immense plurality of experience’.39 Bakhtin introduces two terms: the mode 
judges are most prone to which he calls ‘monologic’, while his ideal is ‘polyphonic’. 
According to Rubinson, a monologic view rejects the open-ended dialogic nature of 
                                                          
34 Holquist, M., Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world. 
35 Rubinson, R., The polyphonic courtroom, p. 3. 
36 Ibid., p. 4. 
37 Ibid., p. 4. 
38 Ibid., p. 4. 
39 Holquist, M., Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world, p. xx. 
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meaning in favor of a unitary and finalized sense of the world. Monologism reduces 
multiple perspectives to a single ideological common denominator. The monologic 
mode operates under the fiction that there is a single, all-encompassing perspective. 
The polyphonic mode, however, embraces the dialogic nature of meaning and seeks to 
intensify the elaboration of meaning through intimate contact with another person’s 
discourse.40
 
To Bakhtin, the consequence of monologism is that ‘All that has the power to mean, 
all that has value, is everywhere concentrated around one center – the carrier. All 
ideological creative acts are conceived and perceived as possible expressions of a 
single consciousness, a single spirit .… Everything capable of meaning can be 
gathered together in one consciousness and subordinated to a unified accent; whatever 
does not submit to such a reduction is accidental and unessential .… Semantic unity of 
any sort is everywhere represented by a single consciousness and a single point of 
view’.41
 
In the context of a court case, this means that the judge speaks the words of all parties 
to the case. To Bakhtin this is an act of expropriation: ‘Language is not a neutral 
medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker’s 
intentions; it is populated – overpopulated – with the intentions of others. 
Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult 
                                                          
40 Rubinson, R., The polyphonic courtroom, pp. 10 & 12 (paraphrased and quotes omitted). 
41 Emerson C., Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics, pp. 81-82. 
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and complicated process’.42
 
The judge, then, works to ‘appropriate all other voices into his own monologue’.43 
This act of expropriation validates or authorizes ‘one form of life – one kind of 
reasoning, one kind of response to argument, one way of looking at the world and at 
its own authority’.44 In doing so, the judge is saying not only is this the ‘right 
outcome for this case’, but the ‘right way to think and talk about this case, and others 
like it’.45 Even when one judge speaks for concurring judges, the ‘language and tone 
are his own, and his personal investment is clear’.46 Favouring one form of life over 
another is an ethical and political performance, and can be seen as such.47
 
There is the risk that judges become ‘boastful of powers’ they do not have, and do not 
realize the possibility that there are ‘other ways of seeing the world, organizing 
experience, and making a future’.48 A trial consists of ‘a plurality of discourses’, for 
example counsel-witness, counsel-counsel, counsel-judge, party-counsel, judge-
witness, each of which is structured in accordance with a particular pragmatic 
context.49 The trial brings together people who are normally not placed together and 
                                                          
42 Holquist M., The dialogic imagination, p. 294. 
43 Ferguson, R. A., The judicial opinion as literary genre, p. 205. 
44 White, J. B., Justice as translation, p. 101. 
45 White, J. B., What’s an opinion for?, p. 1366. 
46 Ferguson, R. A., The judicial opinion as literary genre, p. 205. 
47 White, J. B., Justice as translation, p. 215. 
48 Elkins, J. R., The stories we tell ourselves, p. 55. 
49 Jackson, B. S., Law, fact and narrative coherence, p. 36. 
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among whom ‘severe tensions or contradictions can be found’;50 where not all 
participants are ‘welcome … [or] equally valued’.51
 
Not only is the judge’s voice the only voice in the judgment, the reader has to rely 
solely on what the judge chooses to say. Often there is an inadequate explanation as to 
the judging process itself – ‘judges … deliver so-called opinions in which they 
purport to set forth the bases of their conclusions. Yet you will study these opinions in 
vain to discover anything remotely resembling a statement of the actual judging 
process’.52 Only the judge himself can tell you ‘what facts counted for him, or did not 
count; what paradigm or template he applied to it; or how he resolved the tension, 
present in nearly every case, between the claims that can rationally be made on one 
side and those that can be made on the other’.53 But as Bernard Jackson explains, 
even the judge’s account of his own decision-making process is futile, because there 
can be ‘no real correspondence between the rational, linguistic discourse of judicial 
exposition on the one hand and the emotions, operating often at the sub-conscious 
level, which are necessarily implicated in the actual decision-making process’.54
 
A judge will not readily admit to the freedom of choice he has. Instead, he must 
appear to be forced to an ‘inevitable conclusion by the logic of the situation and the 
                                                          
50 White, J. B., Heracles’ bow, p. 114. 
51 Sarat, A & Kearns, T. R., The rhetoric of law, p. 12. 
52 Frank, J., Law and the modern mind, pp. 102-103. 
53 White, J. B., What’s an opinion for?, p. 1366. 
54 Jackson, B. S., Law, fact and narrative coherence, p. 15. 
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duties of office, which together eliminate all thought of an unfettered hand’.55 White 
agrees, calling this non-admission a vice: ‘[o]ne great vice of theory in law is that it 
disguises the true power that the judge actually has, which it is his true task to 
exercise and to justify, under a pretense that the result is compelled by one or another 
intellectual system’.56 As Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy shows, a judgment 
cannot contain everything that was spoken at the hearing. However, ‘it is the measure 
of the excellence of a judicial opinion how far it recognizes what is valid or valuable 
in each side and includes that within itself’.57 The judicial opinion should be 
‘profoundly against monotonal thought and speech, against the single voice, the single 
aspect of the self or culture dominating the rest’.58
 
Both White and Rubinson call for more openness. ‘What we should demand … is that 
the judge give to the case attention of a certain sort and make it plain in writing that 
he … has done so, for there, in the attention itself, is where justice resides. We are 
entitled … to the full merits of a case … to the fair-minded comprehension of 
contraries, to the recognition of the value of each person, to a sense of the limits of 
mind and language’.59 A ‘judicial opinion is part of a continuing dialogue whose 
hallmark is exploration, not simplification …. [O]pinions should embrace dialogue 
and complexity, and recognize the independent validity of multiple perspectives. Such 
                                                          
55 Ferguson, R. A., The judicial opinion as literary genre, p. 207.  
56 White, J. B., Heracles’ bow, 123. 
57 Ibid., p. 116. 
58 Ibid., p. 124. 
59 Ibid., pp. 133-134. 
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opinions would elaborate, not restrict and reduce, meaning’.60
 
Bakhtin also proves useful when considering intertextuality. According to Bakhtin, 
‘our speech … is filled with others’ words, varying degrees of otherness and varying 
degrees of “our-own-ness”, varying degrees of awareness and detachment. These 
words of others carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, 
which we assimilate, rework, and reaccentuate’.61 Drawing on Bakhtin but 
substituting ‘text’ for ‘speech’, Fairclough asserts that texts are inherently intertextual, 
constituted by elements of other texts: ‘[T]he text absorbs and is built out of texts 
from the past (texts being the major artefacts that constitute history) …. [T]he text 
responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks past texts, and in doing so helps to make 
history’.62 Judgments, for example, contain quotes from previous cases, ‘old 
authorities’, statutes, textbooks and articles, to name the most common. 
 
Roland Barthes puts forward the possibility that there is no Author-God. A text is not 
‘a line of words releasing a single “theological” meaning (the “message” of the 
Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of 
them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
innumerable centres of culture …. His only power is to mix writings’.63 Because of 
this intertextuality, Barthes claims that ‘[o]nce the Author is removed, the claim to 
                                                          
60 Rubinson, R., The polyphonic courtroom, p. 5. 
61 Emerson C. and Holquist M., Speech genres and other late essays, p. 89. 
62 Fairclough, N., Discourse and social change, p. 102. 
63 Barthes, R., The death of the author, p. 146. 
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decipher a text becomes quite futile’.64 For me the conclusion is not quite so nihilistic. 
I agree with Barthes that the ‘true’ meaning will never be arrived at, but suggest that 
the text can be analysed rhetorically. In other words it is possible to consider how the 
various texts are appropriated by the judge, and what new, constitutive meanings 
arise. 
 
Full transcripts of cases in the superior courts are made but these are not freely 
available. The judge relies on this transcript when he is writing up the judgment.65 If a 
judgment from a superior court is thought to have precedential value, it is published, 
for example in the South African Law Reports.66 The editors of the SALR add a 
flynote and headnote and generally edit the judgment. These published cases could be 
used in future cases or be incorporated into other kinds of texts such as publications in 
the media or in academic textbooks or journals. Fairclough refers to these as 
‘intertextual chains’. 
 
Text consumption refers to the way texts are received and interpreted within a society. 
How texts are interpreted depends on how they are read and in which interpretive 
community the reader belongs. Some readers agree with what they read whilst others 
oppose the text. Such oppositional readers read against the ‘hegemonic grain’, says 
                                                          
64 Ibid., p. 147. 
65 Even though his clerk may draft the judgment, this does not absolve the judge from 
accepting full responsibility for what is written. 
66 This study only considers reported judgments. 
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Ross Chambers.67 There are two types of reading – unopposed and opposed. There is 
always room for maneuver in discourse because discourse ‘always has the potential, 
realized by reading, to mean other than it says (it is always open to interpretation)’. 
The act of reading has the power to produce an ‘emergence of otherness’.68 Those 
who would not oppose a reading of a judgment punishing consensual male sex, for 
example, would belong to a different interpretive community to those who would 
oppose this. 
 
The idea of interpretive communities is a way of viewing not only different kinds of 
readers, but also writers. The term ‘interpretive community’ refers to ‘a body of 
closely affiliated writers and readers whose shared assumptions and mutual interests 
identify them as a group that claims interpretive authority’.69
 
For J B White, the community is established between kindred writers and readers: 
‘[W]henever we speak or write we define ourselves and another and a relation 
between us, and we do so in words that are necessarily made by others and modified 
by our use of them’.70 ‘The written “text” … reduces to permanence a process that is 
otherwise ephemeral and renders public … what is … private’.71 The reader of a 
judgment sees how the judge uses resources such as statutes, common law and 
                                                          
67 Chambers, R., Room for maneuver, p. xi.
68 Ibid., p. xi.
69 Leedes, G., Cross-examining the narratives of law and literature, p. 195.  
70 White, J. B., When words lose their meaning, p. 276. 
71 Ibid., p. 280. 
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precedent to define values. For White, this textual community is ‘a species of 
friendship’.72
 
William Page provides a useful commentary on White’s view of interpretive 
communities but I believe he is not critical enough. He alludes to how certain voices 
are entirely excluded from the community – ‘White’s view assumes that the nonverbal 
individual cannot be just or harmonious’73 – but does not follow through with how 
significant this point is. Excluding the voices of an ‘outside’ gender or race, for 
example, undermines the legitimacy of the community. A community of like voices 
will naturally result in the friendship White speaks of, but beyond that there is an 
enmity he seems blind to. Robin West is more critical: ‘[T]hose who are not included 
in the “textual community” as either readers, writers, or critics occupy an unbreakable 
circle of objectivity: because they are outside the community, they do not speak; 
because they do not speak, they are objects; because they are objects, they do not 
speak, and as nonspeakers they are outside the community’.74
 
Stanley Fish holds that the source of interpretive authority derives not from the text 
nor the reader, but from the writer: ‘Interpretive communities are made up of those 
who share interpretive strategies not for reading, but for writing texts, for constituting 
their properties. In other words these strategies exist prior to the act of reading and 
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73 Page, W. H., The place of law and literature, p. 415. 
74 West, R. L., Communities, texts, and law, p. 140. 
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therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually assumed, the 
other way around’.75 In the context of this study, Fish is suggesting that judges write 
their judgments with a specific kind of reader in mind who would agree with what has 
been written. 
 
Fish asks, ‘Why, if the text contains its own meaning and constrains its own 
interpretation, do so many interpreters disagree about that meaning?’,76 and ‘Why, if 
meaning is created by the individual reader from the perspective of his own 
experience and interpretive desires, is there so much that interpreters agree about?’.77
 
By way of an answer, he says that a certain point of view or ‘way of organizing 
experience’ attracts individuals who form a group around that point of view.78 These 
individuals cohere around ‘assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and 
stipulations of relevance and irrelevance’.79 Disagreements arise not from the text 
itself but from the ‘interpretive “angle” from which the text was to be seen and in 
being seeing, made’.80 ‘[G]iven the notion of interpretive communities, agreement 
more or less explained itself: members of the same community will necessarily agree 
because they will see (and by seeing, make) everything in relation to that 
community’s assumed purposes and goal; and conversely, members of different 
                                                          
75 Fish, S. E., Is there a text in this class?, p. 14. 
76 Fish, S. E., Doing what comes naturally,  p. 141. 
77 Ibid.,  p. 141. 
78 Ibid.,  p. 141. 
79 Ibid.,  p. 141. 
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communities will disagree because from each of their respective positions the other 
“simply” cannot see what is obviously and inescapably there: This, then, is the 
explanation for the stability of interpretation among different readers (they belong to 
the same community). It also explains why there are disagreements and why they can 
be debated in a principled way: not because of a stability in texts, but because of a 
stability in the makeup of interpretive communities and therefore in the opposing 
positions they make possible’.81
 
Fish responds to criticism that his view of interpretive communities does not explain 
how change occurs within such communities. The critics, Fish says, mistakenly 
assume that an interpretive community is a ‘monolithic’82 object whereas it is not an 
object but something created through language: ‘the object to be described cannot be 
sharply distinguished from the descriptive vocabulary’ that constitutes it.83 In other 
words, an interpretive community is a ‘way of organizing experience’.84 To Fish 
change, then, is ‘understood as a change in description’.85 Rather than an 
impenetrable monolithic tower, an interpretive community is permeable, an ‘engine of 
change … [with] no status quo to protect’ in that it is a mechanism for organizing the 
world.86 The community is willing to accept that presently-held beliefs can be 
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‘redrawn from the inside’ when challenged by a source external to it.87 The change is 
not for ‘change’s sake’ but to improve ‘perceived deficiencies’ of the interpretive 
community.88
 
Chapter Four begins by building a proposition that a judgment is a distinct literary 
genre, a rhetorical narrative which the judge constructs based on his interpretation of 
the facts and the legal issues in dispute. It is also a narrative which may be silent in 
areas where an oppositional reader would expect to hear something. For example, the 
silence of the defendant’s side of the case is a sustained gap over all the cases studied. 
Within the text, rhetoric develops as form and content combine. The balance of 
Chapter Four examines examples from the corpus to identify how judges use speech 
acts, words and metaphors as rhetorical devices. 
 
The inner circle – the text itself 
The innermost circle in Fairclough’s diagram is an analysis of the text itself. The text 
used in this study comprises a corpus of forty-four reported judgments. Textual 
analysis can be on a macro- or micro basis. Examples of macro analysis include an 
analysis of how categories are constructed, identifying gaps or silences in the text, and 
focusing on presuppositions, storytelling techniques and the use of tropes such as 
metaphor. Examples of micro analysis include the choice of words, key word clusters, 
sentence adjuncts (for example, ‘obviously’), modality, the use of private verbs, 
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speech acts, and transitivity. Examples of these occur in Chapters Three and Four but 
mostly in Chapter Five. 
 
This concludes the section on the CDA framework and how it is used to shape the 
forthcoming chapters. Whilst Fairclough provides a useful structure, a broader 
theoretical basis is needed in the areas of power and minorities, and in the use of 
narrative. This chapter proceeds with exploring Foucault’s view of power. I then 
consider the impact this view of power has on the way minorities are constructed. The 
note on queer theory aims to demonstrate that the dominant and subordinate can be 
conflated so that one does not have to invoke subordination rhetoric. The chapter ends 
with a section on historiography. Here I draw on historiographers who propose that 
history is a narrative with the historian as the narrator. I suggest that this view lends 
itself to law where the judgment is the narrative and the judge is the narrator. 
 
Michel Foucault 
One of the main purposes of critical language studies is to ‘denaturalize everyday 
language’89 by focusing on the role of discourse in the ‘production and challenge of 
dominance’.90 By ‘dominance’ Teun van Dijk means ‘the exercise of social power by 
elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including … racial and 
gender inequality’.91 In a judicial context, the institution would be the courts and the 
                                                          
89 Luke, A., Text and discourse in education, p. 12. 
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91 Ibid., pp. 249-250. 
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elites would be the judges. Discourse analysis is therefore a fitting approach because 
it deals primarily with the discourse dimensions of power abuse, and the injustice and 
inequality that result from it. This focus on dominance and inequality implies that 
critical discourse analysis is ‘primarily interested and motivated by pressing social 
issues, which it hopes to better understand through discourse analysis’.92
 
Van Dijk stresses that critical discourse analysis needs to be based on an 
understanding of the nature of social power and dominance. Social power is based on 
‘privileged access to socially valued resources, such as wealth, income, position, 
status, force, group membership, education or knowledge’.93 Although power and 
dominance are usually organized and institutionalized, they are never total and are 
always contestable – ‘in local events and sites …. discourse often unfolds in uneven, 
contested, and unpredictable social configurations’.94
 
Van Dijk also offers useful insights into discourse and access. He notes a ‘parallelism 
between social power and discourse access: the more discourse genres, contexts, 
participants, audience, scope and text characteristics they (may) actively control or 
influence, the more powerful social groups, institutions or elites are’.95 Based on this 
‘management of discourse access’, those who dominate can stipulate ‘who is allowed 
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to say/write/hear/read what to/from whom, where, when and how’.96 In effect, this is 
a control of context. The court system is a good example of this. Through court 
procedure, and because of the leeway judges have when writing their judgments, 
some voices are suppressed, ‘some opinions are not heard, some perspectives ignored: 
the discourse itself becomes a “segregated” structure’.97
 
For Michel Foucault, objects of knowledge are not present before discourse; they are 
constituted in discourse. He refutes a prevailing Western view that an objective body 
of knowledge exists outside of discourse, neutral or value-free, as a ‘pre-existing 
reality’.98 Similarly, he rejects ‘unexplained notions’ and ‘unexamined concepts’99 
such as ‘tradition’ and the ‘spirit of the times’100 which imply an underlying unity. 
Instead, discourse should ‘emerge in its own complexity’101 of ‘heterogeneous 
statements’.102 Foucault’s approach is that discourse emerges according to rules of 
formation. 
 
These rules of formation centre around statements, ‘those linguistic performances in 
which subjects are empowered to make serious truth claims because of their training, 
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institutional location and mode of discourse’.103 Foucault is interested only in 
statements that are accepted as ‘serious claims to truth by particular societies and 
communities at different points in time’ and his aim is to describe the ‘appearance, 
types and relations between statements, as well as their regulated historical 
transformation’.104
 
Statements are made within a set of social relations, about particular practices or 
symptoms. These then become objects of knowledge for investigation, which 
Foucault terms ‘surfaces of emergence’.105 These practices or symptoms get to be 
placed in particular discourses by authorities who are empowered to make these 
decisions, whom he calls ‘authorities of delimitation’.106 In this way knowledge is 
constituted and located on ‘grids of specification’107 that classify and relate objects (of 
knowledge) according to the ‘properties they possess, or the symptoms they 
exhibit’.108
 
Not all subjects can enunciate statements in a way that they are incorporated into the 
prevailing discourse. Subjects are only given the right to speak because of their 
‘recognized training and specialization …, [the] institutional sites from which they … 
speak …, and the subject positions from which legitimate and binding statements are 
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made’.109 In a legal context, only a properly trained and authorized judge, sitting in a 
court room and occupying the subject position of judge can enunciate statements 
which find their way into the prevailing discourse. 
 
In this way, various themes emerge within discourses, rather than being introduced 
with purpose or intention. The discourse is contingent upon what practices or 
symptoms authorized subjects are enunciating. The events that form objects are 
unpredictable, borne out of political clashes. He does not try to explain away 
inconsistencies nor ‘discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, and lacunae’.110 By meeting 
discourse on its own complex, messy terms, Foucault ‘discloses new possibilities 
foreclosed by existing interpretations’:111 ‘we must conceive discourse as a series of 
discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable …. [W]e 
must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and 
excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated; but as a 
multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies’.112
 
It does not follow that subjects who are authorized to introduce objects of knowledge 
into discourse also have the power to maintain the status quo: 
‘Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it …. 
We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse 
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can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse 
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, 
renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’.113
 
Foucault rejects a ‘“zero-sum” view of power by which power on one side always 
means the other side lacks power or is powerless’.114 Power is not something held by 
one agent and lacking in another. Power is present in all forms of social relations, 
something that is at work in every situation. From this perspective, power ‘is not 
something possessed or held in reserve, it is always in circulation creating the 
possibilities of resistance that further invoke it’.115 Much emphasis is placed on who 
has power and what their ends are. To Foucault this emphasis on the agent is a 
‘wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power …. [Power] needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much 
more than as a negative instance whose function is repression’.116 He emphasizes ‘not 
the what or who but the where and how of power’ and that one asks even of the state, 
how it exercises power.117
 
Steven Winter suggests that so-called subordinated groups should deconstruct power 
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along the lines of Foucault’s perspective.118 Adopting this more contingent view of 
power is, for him, more empowering. He criticizes certain feminists for clinging onto 
concepts like power, domination, and subordination when they challenge a hierarchy. 
 
Conventional metaphors on power, unreflectively and widely used, form the basis of 
the current view of power, Winter contends. Metaphors such as power is an object, a 
location (or container), a force, and that control is up give rise to statements so 
commonplace that the metaphors are not challenged.119 In terms of this schema, 
‘power is understood as compulsion grounded in force used by the powerful to 
promote their interests’.120 Accepting this schema gives rise to a concept of power 
where certain groups will forever be marginalized and dominated; concepts such as 
that power ‘is an external force that operates on a passive victim; that it is a property 
of an actor who exercises domination over another; that it is expressed through 
hierarchy; and that power and agency are synonymous’.121
 
Foucault makes no attempt to explain how power emerges, who has it and how it was 
acquired – ‘If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to view 
it as emerging at a given place and time and hence to deduce it, to reconstruct its 
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genesis’.122 He broke with what he terms the ‘juridico-discursive’ model because it 
presents power as negative and repressive laws being brought to bear on obedient 
subjects, coming from a legislative authority. He did not accept that ‘power acts by 
laying down the rule’.123 The model has an ‘all-or-nothing quality …. built upon the 
dualism of an active agency (the legislative authority) and a passive subject (the 
obedient subordinate)’.124
 
Foucault advised that we ‘not ... ask why certain people want to dominate, what they 
seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of 
on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes 
which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other 
words, ... we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, 
really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, 
materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material 
instance as a constitution of subjects’.125
 
This view places the dominant and subordinated at the same level. It is then no longer 
possible to ‘skirt the fact that the powerful, too, are subjects produced by the 
operations of power’.126 Power ‘is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s 
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hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate 
between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power’.127 To the extent that ‘power diminishes the agency of the 
dominant, it amplifies the agency of the subordinated. What it subtracts from one part 
of the network, it necessarily redistributes to the other’.128
 
By de-reifying power and wresting it from the ‘dominant’, Foucault introduces a way 
so-called subordinated groups can resist the status quo: ‘there are no relations of 
power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they 
are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to 
power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably frustrated 
through being the compatriot of power. It exists all the more by being in the same 
place as power’.129 Power can be ‘exercised only over ... subjects who are faced with 
a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and 
diverse comportments may be realized’.130
 
Foucault, then, dismantles the dominant/subordinate binary. My study began as a 
critique on dominant groups from a subordinated point of view but now I amend these 
descriptors to take into account his views. The terms ‘subordinated’ and ‘subaltern’ 
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have the connotation of being irreversible, yet as Foucault shows, outsiders can 
exploit linguistic indeterminacy: ‘linguistic indeterminacy makes it possible to 
generate opposing arguments with equal force and convictions’.131 Based on Foucault, 
Ross Chambers explores the idea that outsiders are not powerless. No dominant power 
is so absolute that it is not susceptible to challenge. Minorities start from their given 
situation and use any forms of legitimate resistance they can. Between the ‘possibility 
of disturbance in the system and the system’s power to recuperate that disturbance 
there is “room for maneuver”, and that it is in that space of “play” or “leeway” in the 
system that oppositionality arises and change can occur …. changes local and 
scattered that might one day take collective shape and work socially significant 
transformations’.132
 
To move away from the connotations attached to subordinate and subaltern, Robin 
West uses the phrase ‘the textually excluded’.133 It is a more neutral term and brings 
in the critical discourse notion that those in power get to decide which voices should 
be included in social texts. Benita Ramsey expresses a similar view – ‘The dominant 
group enjoys a privileged and highly advantageous position. Those in this group have 
the power to shape the world and promote their interests by creating a body of 
language and knowledge, and a system of beliefs that “lock out” minority groups. By 
manipulating language to create self-serving labels for social conditions, the elite 
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ignore the repressive conditions under which society’s less influential groups suffer 
…. The dominant language defines what is acceptable in any given situation’.134
 
Queer theory 
Queer theory is an attempt to dismantle the dominant/subordinate dichotomy 
altogether. Queer theory originally arose from sexual minority opposition to 
compulsory heterosexuality. It counters from a consciously minority perspective the 
‘traditionalist assumptions and cultural practices of majoritarian self-interest across 
multiple categories of identity’.135 In order for heterosexuality to be the norm, there 
has to be a sexuality abnormal to it: its existence is dependent on differentiation from 
the ‘other’.136 A binary division is thus established between heterosexuals and others. 
Since most of the population is (nominally) heterosexual, all ‘others’ are sexual 
minorities. In that act of juxtaposing, a hierarchy is created where the heterosexual is 
‘superordinate’ to an array of other sexual minorities – lesbians, gays, bisexuals (male 
and female), transvestites (pre-op, post-op, and non-op) transsexual/transgendered 
people, people living with AIDS/HIV, and ‘other sexual and gender dissidents of 
various, always changing, descriptions’.137
 
Queer theory critiques this binary division by questioning the identity of the norm-
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giving category, heterosexual. Deconstructing heteronormativity exposes 
incoherencies which render obsolete the assumption of a fixed category against which 
all other sexualities are measured. All other identities of sexuality can be similarly 
deconstructed and exposed for what they are, ‘arbitrary, contingent and ideologically 
motivated’.138 Queer is, therefore, an unfixed site with no allegiance to either side of 
the dichotomy. 
 
The queer project is not only about sexuality; for example age and race can also be 
queered. It is more about creating a space where the idea of identities can be explored. 
To this extent, it ‘promotes a non-identity – or even anti-identity – politics .… a 
negotiation of the very concept of identity itself’.139 This focus on identity arose from 
within gay and lesbian movements who viewed as problematic even those terms they 
were using, gay and lesbian. Inevitably, if inadvertently, those movements were 
excluding and providing a ‘false sense of universality’.140 Where did race, age, 
disability, poverty etc. fit in, they asked. 
 
As Janet Halley says, sexual orientation movements have the look and feel of identity 
movements, but in important ways, they lack the substance. ‘Identity politics’ is 
usually based on assumptions that identity inheres in group memberships, that group 
membership brings with it a ‘uniformly shared range (or even a core) of authentic 
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experience and attitude’; that the political and legal interests of the group are similarly 
coherent and that group members are therefore able to draw on their own experiences 
to discern those interests and to establish the authority they need to speak for the 
group. Sexual orientation identities do not support those assumptions very well, she 
contends. Sexual orientation movements are perhaps ‘unique among contemporary 
identity movements in harboring an unforgivingly corrosive critique of identity 
itself’.141
 
Queer, then, is an identity category that has no interest in consolidating or even 
stabilizing itself. It maintains its critique of identity-focused movements by 
understanding that ‘even the formation of its own coalitional and negotiated 
constituencies may well result in exclusionary and reifying effects far in excess of 
those intended’.142
 
Historiography and narrative 
The final section of the literature review addresses historiography.143 Historiography 
is used in various senses but here it is taken to mean the study of the way history is 
written – writing about history rather than of history itself. A significant part of 
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historiography focuses on the crafting of historians’ texts in the form of narratives. 
Jurisprudence can draw from these insights since both history and law have in 
common that they purport to tell the truth about past events, and both use narrative as 
the primary form to achieve this. Throughout this section, therefore, I equate judges 
with historians. A major contribution which historiography makes to this study is to 
provide a way to track the distinction which continually takes place between an act 
and the person performing that act. This is a significant part of how rhetoric is 
employed in the construction of sexuality. I use the ideas of historiographers to trace 
the historicity of sexual acts, particularly the historical narrative of sodomy which 
contains the most ambivalence between act and person. 
 
Amsterdam and Bruner’s definition of narrative includes non-fiction as narrative: ‘An 
initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of things that gets disrupted 
by a Trouble attributable to human agency, in turn evoking efforts at redress or 
transformation, which succeed or fail, so that the old steady state is restored or a new 
(transformed) steady state is created’.144
 
Michael Toolan’s views a narrative as two stories in one. The reader must divide his 
or her attention between ‘the individuals and events in the story itself, and the 
individual telling us about these’.145 A judge, for example, retells the facts about the 
case (which retelling can never be value-neutral), and then gives his opinion. Readers 
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should be able to trust the judge as narrator but this a rebuttable presumption because 
this judicial authority can be abused. Toolan’s definition of narrative is wide enough 
to include non-fiction as narrative in that the main features of narratives apply to 
fiction and non-fiction, namely, sequenced and interrelated events, foregrounded 
individuals, and a crisis-to-resolution progression – ‘A narrative is a perceived 
sequence of non-randomly connected events, typically involving, as the experiencing 
agonist, humans, … from whose experience we humans can “learn”’.146
 
Both these definitions easily lend themselves to the cycle of a trial. When a crime is 
committed the former state of peace is disturbed. The court case attempts to either 
return the situation to its former state or to transform the situation into something new. 
In the earlier male sexuality cases the aim was to restore the status quo whereas later 
cases attempted to transform the situation, for example by reducing the sentence. 
Toolan’s definition lends itself to the judicial narrative of judgments by showing that 
there are two stories in one – the facts of the case and then the judge’s commentary 
and ruling on the facts. 
 
For Hayden White, fiction and non-fiction (which he terms factual narrative) are both 
forms of narrative because they both narrate events. Non-fiction narrative purports to 
represent past actuality. It is concerned with events which can be assigned to ‘specific 
time-space locations, events which are (or were) in principle observable or 
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perceivable’.147 Unlike fiction, non-fiction narrative claims to be a true representation. 
Writers of fiction may write about real events but also write about imagined or 
hypothetical events. Although writing about different kinds of events, both types of 
writers wish to provide a verbal image of reality: ‘There are many histories that could 
pass for novels, and many novels that could pass for histories …. Viewed simply as 
verbal artefacts histories and novels are indistinguishable from one another’.148
 
White nuances this unrefined distinction where fiction is held to represent the 
imagined and non-fiction the actual. For him, it is itself a fiction that the non-fiction 
narrator believes he is writing about states of affairs which are all ‘actual’ or ‘real’ 
and that he has merely recorded what happened. All narrative, says White, is not 
simply a recording of ‘what happened’ in the transition from one state of affairs to 
another, but a ‘progressive redescription of sets of events’.149
 
As with historians, there is a widely-held belief that judges do not invent but discover 
actuality. The ‘facts of a case’ is regarded as an untold story. First counsels’ and then 
the judge’s tasks are to discover that untold story and to retell it, albeit in abridged or 
edited form. The judge goes one step further by giving an opinion and then a ruling. 
The presupposition of an untold story is meant to give force of self-evidence to the 
difference between fiction and non-fiction, but Louis Mink suggests that there is a 
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nagging feeling many experience that this difference is as ‘implicitly presupposed as 
widely as it would be explicitly rejected’.150
 
Relating this observation to law, to speak of a court judgment as a narrative is nearly a 
contradiction in terms. That it is not perceived as a narrative reflects the extent to 
which the idea of ‘Natural Law’ is presupposed in, for example, sodomy cases. To the 
extent that the law pertaining to sodomy was regarded as natural law, then in that 
natural law many judges’ dilemmas were appeased. They could just as well suppose 
that it contained the elements of the crime of sodomy upon which they could base 
their ruling. 
 
There are instances in a legal context where narrative (or storytelling) is used in a 
purely fictional way, but I question its efficacy. Richard Delgado, a critical race 
theorist, draws on the fictive use of storytelling. ‘An outgroup creates its own stories, 
which circulate within the group as a kind of counter-reality …. The stories … told by 
the ingroup remind it of its identity in relation to outgroups, and provide it with a form 
of shared reality in which its own superior position is seen as natural’.151 The majority 
of his article is a hypothetical conversation about the reason why a black person was 
not promoted to professor. It explores the viewpoints of the in- and out groups. The 
aim of storytelling, for Delgado, is iconoclastic – ‘[S]tories, parables, chronicles, and 
narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset – the bundle of presuppositions, 
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received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal 
and political discourse takes place’.152
 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry take ‘sharp issue’ with the legal storytelling 
movement.153 They challenge whether the stories told by minorities are representative 
of the experiences of that group, or whether the ‘stories are intentionally atypical’.154 
Storytelling lacks analytical rigor, they say, and ‘storytelling stifles discussion and 
debate when the storyteller claims to be in a better position to understand the issue at 
hand because of his or her background’.155 I side with Farber and Sherry. To me, 
Delgado’s hope that by telling stories about minorities, the majority might become 
more inclined to change its view, is naïve. A stronger way of challenging a majority 
view would be to take cases which have come to court and then demonstrate through 
an analysis of the text, that a minority view has been suppressed or a majority view 
preferred. This would satisfy Farber and Sherry’s critique as to the choice of atypical, 
fabricated stories. 
 
Emplotment is a term associated with Hayden White and refers to the plot structure 
imposed on sequences of events. Emplotment is the ‘encodation of the facts contained 
in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures’, in the same way 
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as fictions are emplotted.156 It is this act which creates the meaning embodied in, for 
example, a comic or tragic narrative. White maintains that without emplotment there 
is no narrative, only a chronicle. A chronicle is a ‘kind of calendar. It lists events (or 
other data) in the order of their dates’.157 For example, the cases used in this study are 
listed in the bibliography in date order. The continuity is based purely on the 
numerical ordering of dates. The chronicle is a sequence but its form is not in itself 
meaningful. Judges, like historians, gain part of their explanatory effect by their 
success in making stories out of mere chronicles; and stories in turn are made out of 
chronicles by emplotment. 
 
To holders of the historical narrative view, events are not the raw material out of 
which narratives are constructed; rather they are an abstraction from a narrative. But 
‘if we accept that the description of events is a function of particular narrative 
structures, we cannot at the same time suppose that the actuality of the past is an 
untold story’.158 There are no untold stories; there ‘can be only past facts not yet 
described in a context of narrative form’.159 To emplot real events as a story of a 
specific kind, such as comic or tragic, is to trope these events, for example by the use 
of metaphors. To White, ‘stories are not lived; there is no such thing as a “real” story. 
Stories are told or written, not found. The notion of a “true” story is virtually a 
contradiction in terms since all stories are fictions. They can only be “true” in a 
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metaphorical sense and in the sense in which any figure of speech can be true’.160
 
For White, then, narrative is not ‘a neutral discursive form’; it is capable of 
manipulation, even back to the past.161 He uses the term ‘willing backward’ by which 
he means that ‘we rearrange events in the past that have been emplotted in a given 
way, in order to endow them with a different meaning or to draw from the new 
emplotment reasons for acting differently in the future from the way we have become 
accustomed to acting in our present’.162 This is a useful point when considering how 
previous cases are used in present cases. If judges wish to move away from a 
precedent, they can ‘rearrange’ the previous case in order to ascribe to it a meaning 
that would allow them to distinguish it. 
 
Some historians acknowledge that they are historians plus storytellers – the historian 
‘creates a plausible story out of congeries of “facts” which, in their unprocessed form, 
make no sense at all’.163 But for White, this acknowledgment of the storytelling 
function of the historian does not take it far enough because ‘no given set of casually 
recorded historical events can in itself constitute a story; the most it might offer to the 
historian are story elements. The events are made into a story by the suppression or 
subordination of certain of them and the highlighting of others’; the same techniques 
                                                          
160 White, H. V., Figuring the nature of time deceased, p. 27.  
161 White, H. V., The content of the form, p. ix. 
162 White, H. V., The content of the form, p. 150 (in an essay on Frederic Jameson entitled 
‘Getting out of history: Jameson’s redemption of narrative’). 
163 White, H. V., The historical text as literary artifact, p. 223. 
 57
employed by the novelist.164 No historical event is intrinsically tragic, for example, ‘it 
can only be conceived as such from a particular point of view or from within the 
context of a structured set of events of which it is an element enjoying a privileged 
place’.165 What is tragic from one perspective might be comic from another. Similarly 
in law, sexual acts, for example, are in themselves value-neutral. It is the law that 
ascribes emplotments such as normal or abnormal. 
 
Historical events, like judicial evidence, are in themselves value-neutral. Whether 
they are placed in a narrative that is tragic or comic depends on the historian’s or 
judge’s decision to ‘configure them according to the imperatives of one plot structure 
or mythos rather than another’.166 This suggests that an historian or a judge brings to 
his consideration of the events a ‘notion of the types of configurations of events that 
can be recognized as stories by the audience for which he is writing’.167
 
Two judges hearing the same case concerning sodomy, for example, will not write 
their judgments in exactly the same way. Neither judge can be said to have had more 
knowledge of the ‘facts’; they simply had different ideas of the kind of story that best 
fitted the facts. These alternatives, perhaps even mutually exclusive, representations 
of the same set of events will be interpreted differently by different readers depending 
on whether the judges share with their readers certain preconceptions about how 
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sodomy might be emplotted. In other words, agreement on a judgment will depend on 
whether both writer and reader subscribe to the same interpretive community. The 
skill used to match plot with events is essentially ‘a literary, that is to say fiction-
making, operation’.168
 
Writers of non-fiction – judges included – would object to their work being called 
fiction because their writing is ‘supposed to correspond point by point to some extra-
textual domain of occurrence or happening’, to ‘confirmable singular existential 
statements’.169 The question whether there can be a reality outside of text is highly 
contestable. Non-fiction writers believe that they are doing something fundamentally 
different from the novelist, by virtue of their dealing with ‘real’ events, while the 
novelist deals with ‘imagined’ events. But neither the form nor the explanatory power 
of narrative derives from the different contents it is presumed to be able to 
accommodate, White maintains.170 Both fiction and non-fiction writers use narrative 
to make the ‘flux of experience comprehensible’.171
 
Judges hold that if they regarded their judgments as fiction, this would mean 
demoting law to a novel. An alternative view is that it could serve as a potent antidote 
to the tendency of judges to embrace one ideology as the correct perception of the 
way things really are. As White says, ‘We are always able to see the fictive element in 
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those historians with whose interpretations of a given set of events we disagree’.172
 
Even if a non-fiction writer’s writings spoke of a reality outside of discourse, White 
says, this would still not be an account of reality because there is nothing connecting 
these ‘facts’. Instead of being ‘fetishistically enamored of the notion of “facts”’,173 he 
suggests that writers of non-fiction acknowledge that facts do not speak for 
themselves, that the narrator speaks for them, speaks on their behalf, and fashions the 
fragments of the past into a whole which is – in its representation – a purely 
discursive one. The process of fusing events, whether imaginary or real, into a 
comprehensible totality capable of serving as the object of a representation is a poetic 
process. Here the historians must utilize precisely the same tropological strategies, the 
same modalities of representing relationships in words, that the poet or novelist 
uses.174
 
When working up an account of an event in the form of a narrative, the seemingly 
logical flow of the story is secured ‘by dint of fraudulent outlines’ – to use Levi-
Strauss’s phrase – imposed by the historian on the record, or by the judge on the 
evidence.175 Historians – and equally judges – construct a comprehensible story of the 
past, according to Levi-Strauss, only by a decision to surrender one or more of the sets 
of facts offering themselves for inclusion in the account. The narratives are 
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determined more by what is left out than by what is put in. It is in this ‘brutal capacity 
to exclude certain facts in the interest of constituting the very constitution of a set of 
events in such a way as to make a comprehensible story out of them, the historian 
charges those events with the symbolic significance of a comprehensible plot 
structure’.176 These fraudulent outlines then, necessarily, turn the historian’s and 
judge’s texts into fiction. 
 
In any field of study which, like history or law, is not a discipline which has a precise, 
definitive terminological system for describing its objects, in the way that physics and 
chemistry has, it is the types of figurative discourse that dictate the fundamental forms 
of the data to be studied, according to White. This means that the ‘shape of the 
relationships which will appear to be inherent in the objects inhabiting the field will in 
reality have been imposed on the field by the investigator in the very act of identifying 
and describing the objects that he finds there. The implication is that historians [and 
judges] constitute their subjects as possible objects of narrative representation by the 
very language they use to describe them’.177
 
Dorrit Cohn challenges how Hayden White, for her, merges fiction and non-fiction.178 
She resists the possibility that insights from the study of narrative assist in 
understanding factual accounts, or that factual accounts can be considered narrative. 
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To explain this stance, she acknowledges that the widely-held bi-level concept of 
story (fabula) / discourse (sjuzet) applies to all narratives. The story refers to the order 
of events in the story told and discourse refers to the order of events in the telling. 
Flashback is an example of such a distinction, the event being told (discourse) is some 
time earlier than the place in the story at which it is told. 
 
To writers of non-fiction, however, this bi-level model of narratology is insufficient 
and incomplete. The concern for such writers is to have access to ‘verifiable 
documentation …. reliably documented evidence of past events’ out of which he 
fashions his story. Cohn thus turns the bi-level model into a tri-level model by 
introducing what she terms a referential level (or database) – reference / story / 
discourse. For Cohn, merely acknowledging that both fiction and non-fiction writers 
can manipulate story/discourse does not render these narratives similar. To her, this 
perspective can lead to the characterization of, for example judgment-writing, as a 
form of fiction making. Yet this is what I explore as a distinct possibility. 
 
Here she specifically refers to White’s view – ‘There are many histories that could 
pass for novels, and many novels that could pass for histories …. Viewed simply as 
verbal artefacts histories and novels are indistinguishable from one another’179 – and 
states that such comments expressly block out the referential level of non-fiction 
narrative. Cohn does not acknowledge that White is already cognizant of this 
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referential level when he said that non-fiction narrative is ‘concerned with events 
which can be assigned to specific time-space locations, events which are (or were) in 
principle observable or perceivable’.180 For Cohn it seems enough that she establishes 
this database of, to her, incontestable facts without considering how they come to be 
incorporated into the text. 
 
For White the incorporation of pre-existing material is always contestable as writers 
endow it with meaning expedient to their ideology. Writers of non-fiction can select 
what to include and exclude, and where to begin and end. We see this happening 
when judges decided which Dutch jurists they should rely on, and over what period, 
in order to support the criminalisation of homosexuality. Critics of historical narrative 
say that the historian ‘whose fascination with the “constructive” capacity of human 
thought has deadened their responsibility to the “found” data’.181 The term ‘found 
data’ applied to law suggests that law is a reified object waiting to be put into 
operation. 
 
The assertion that history deals with the ‘real’ and ‘actual’ derives largely from the 
reliance on historical documents. This equates to what Cohn calls verifiable 
documentation and reliably documented evidence of past events. For White, though, a 
verifiable document does not make the event it speaks of any clearer. In fact, ‘the 
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181 White, H. V., The historical text as literary artifact, p. 222. 
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opaqueness of the world figured in historical documents is, if anything, increased by 
the production of historical narratives. Each new historical work only adds to the 
number of possible texts that have to be interpreted if a full and accurate picture of a 
given historical milieu is to be faithfully drawn’.182 Again, the Dutch jurists illustrate 
this point. Their views on sodomy vary to such an extent that there is no certainty as 
what gender sodomy relates to, or even whether the act needs to be between 
humans.183
 
Michael Lemon considers the idea of how something changing over time relates to 
narrative.184 In an example, he asks whether a car which is yellow and then is 
resprayed blue is a new car of the same model but different colour or whether the car 
has merely changed colour. In the absence of any further information we cannot say 
whether the two things in question are different things or whether it is the same thing 
which has changed. Are we dealing with a different thing, or with a changed thing? 
For example, is male-male sodomy different to male-female sodomy or is it a changed 
act? In Chapter Five I consider this idea in more detail by looking at the history of 
sodomy according to the judgments. 
 
If, as some judges believe, the law is a reified object located extra-textually, then their 
judgments, as factual narratives containing this law, should aggregate. Insofar as 
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judgments are supposed to make objective truth-claims about a selected segment of 
the law, they must surely be compatible with judgments which preceded them. Yet 
while court cases ought to aggregate into a more comprehensive narrative, in fact they 
do not; ‘and here is where conceptual discomfort should set in’.185 The traditional 
explanation, which Mink calls ‘analgesic’, has been to distinguish between 
‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’. Judgments should combine into more comprehensive 
wholes to the extent that they achieve complete objectivity about a certain area of law. 
However, judges introduce their individual idiosyncrasies and values both in the 
selection and in the combination of facts. It is because of the differences in these 
subjective elements that one judge’s judgment does not fit with another’s. 
 
The claim that historical objectivity is possible presupposes what Mink calls the idea 
of ‘Universal History’186 – that past actuality is an untold story and that there is a right 
way to tell it. Universal History equates to ‘Natural Law’. According to natural law, 
the moral standards that govern human behavior are objectively derived from the 
nature of human beings. The authority of legal standards derives from considerations 
having to do with the moral merit of those standards. Natural law is believed to exist 
independently of positive law or society. Some things are as they are, because that is 
how they are. Natural law is particularly influential in the law relating to sodomy 
because of the moral connotations. 
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Objectivity cannot be translated into terms of judgments. A judgment must have a 
unity of its own – it must have a beginning, middle, and an end. And the reason why 
two judgments cannot be ‘additively combined’187 – as one can do with a chronicle – 
is that in the earlier judgment of such an aggregate the end would no longer be an end, 
and therefore the beginning of the next judgment would no longer be a beginning. 
Each judgment has its own unity which does not lend itself to aggregation. Sophocles’ 
trilogy is not itself a play, Mink explains. If it were, its constituents would be not 
plays but acts. 
 
A number of scholars acknowledge the influence of Hayden White in their writing. 
 
Jerome Bruner believes along the same lines as White that ‘human beings make sense 
of the world by telling stories about it – by using the narrative mode for construing 
reality’.188 Bruner’s view remains unchanged when he and Amsterdam define 
narrative in terms wide enough to include real events – ‘A narrative can purport to be 
either a fiction or a real account of events; it does not have to specify which’.189
 
André Brink, drawing on Hayden White, is also of the opinion that history is 
accessible only though text, and that that act of textualization creates a narrative in no 
way different to fiction. ‘[H]istory “as such” is … inaccessible: our only grasp of 
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Waterloo is attained through what has been written about it. “Waterloo” is an act of 
language. And in the process of textualizing the event it is also narrativized: that is, 
the representations of history repeat, in almost every detail, the processes of fiction 
…. history, memory, and language intersect so precisely as to be almost 
indistinguishable: the “origins” of history, as recovered through memory, are encoded 
in language, and each of these three moments becomes a condition for the others’.190
 
L H La Rue endorses the idea that judgments are fictional: ‘judicial opinions are filled 
with “stories” that purport to be “factual” but that are instead “fictional”, and 
furthermore, … these “fictions” could not be eliminated without crippling the legal 
enterprise’.191 He asks, ‘Can we produce stories without using the imagination? And 
is it possible to have stories based solely on facts? If not, then … most discourse is in 
part fictional’.192
 
James Elkins, and Robert Cover bring historiography into the legal context: 
‘[T]here are other ways of seeing the world, organizing experience …. The rich 
possibilities of other “intentions” and forms of life and experience conveyed in 
narrative teach us … that law is incomplete and that students of law must see what has 
been left out, passed over, ignored, and forgotten’.193
and 
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‘We inhabit a … normative universe …. In this normative world, law and narrative 
are inseparably related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in 
discourse – to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation 
and purpose. And every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, 
its moral’.194
 
Not mentioning Hayden White specifically, but in keeping with his sentiments, Pierre 
de Vos also holds the view that the language in the South African Constitution in 
particular, but generally any legal text, does not have a single ‘objective’ meaning and 
cannot always produce one absolute or fixed meaning.195 Judges seem ‘profoundly 
uncomfortable’ with the notion that they are not merely discovering a ‘true’, 
‘objective’ or ‘original’ meaning of the text.196 If texts such as the Constitution do not 
have one objectively determinable meaning, the risk is that the judicial process will be 
open to criticism of arbitrariness and bias.197
 
In order to try and curtail the effect of the indeterminacy of a text such as the 
Constitution, de Vos suggests that the Constitutional Court judges rule in terms of a 
grand narrative. This grand narrative is a metaphor of a bridge bridging the past and 
the present.198 (This is a clear example of what White would call troping.) According 
                                                          
 
 
 
194 Cover, R. M., Nomos and narrative, pp. 4 & 5. 
195 de Vos, P., A bridge too far?, pp. 2 & 3. 
196 Ibid., p. 3. 
197 Ibid., p. 5. 
198 The metaphor is in the Interim Constitution and was highlighted by Etienne Mureinik: E 
 68
to this metaphor ‘one can get to grips with the meaning of the constitutional text if 
one refers to the specific apartheid past to identify all the wicked attitudes and 
practices that existed before commencement of the interim constitution’.199 If 
accepted, the assumption is that the metaphor could assist in solving the dilemma of 
objective adjudication.200
 
However, adopting a grand narrative ‘relies on a rather naïve and outdated view of the 
nature of history’.201 In the above notes on Foucault and historiography we see that 
those presently in power get to write their version of history. However, power is 
always contestable and there is no guarantee that those who adopted the bridge 
metaphor will always be in power. If this view of history is accepted, any attempt by 
the Constitutional Court judges to rely on a metaphor as a device to place distance 
between their personal views and the interpretation of the constitutional text is 
doomed to failure: ‘Because historical determinacy is itself impossible to attain, and 
because any interpretation of the past is deeply political, the use of history as a device 
to constrain judges seems impossible’.202 In another way de Vos is saying that truly 
factual narrative is not attainable. 
                                                                                                                                            
Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31, 
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 This section on historiography has put forward the view that there is no difference 
between fiction and non-fiction narrative. The contents of different narratives might 
be designated factual or fictive but the process of turning a mere chronicle of events 
into a story is the same. Applied to judgments, this view undermines the belief that 
some judges hold that their texts are based on an immutable pre-existing law. 
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Chapter 3: Judges and judgments in context 
Judgments in context 
Socio-legal context pre-constitution – apartheid 
‘Our law has never treated lesbians and gays kindly,’ says Edwin Cameron.203 This 
unkindness was largely attributable to the ‘unlovely creature’, as J M Coetzee calls 
apartheid.204 Most general commentary about apartheid centres, correctly, around 
racial apartheid. However, there was also sexual apartheid.205 During the period from 
which my corpus is mostly taken, apartheid was the prevailing ideology within which 
the judiciary operated. Critics such as John Dugard, and later the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, accused the judiciary of adopting this ideology. Here I 
consider apartheid generally and then particularly as it applied to the moral policing of 
sexual activity. 
 
The term ‘apartheid’ was first coined in 1943.206 It was first used in parliament on 25 
January 1944 by Dr Malan – ‘To ensure the safety of the white race and of Christian 
civilization by the honest maintenance of the principles of apartheid and 
guardianship’.207 In 1948, it was widely used as a slogan in the election and 
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‘undoubtedly helped to bring the Nationalists into power’.208
 
Whilst apartheid ideology dates back to 1652, 1948 was a watershed year – 
‘Apartheid after 1948 is different, not only in degree but even in some measure in 
kind, from pre-1948 policies of separation’.209 It was at this time that it was 
institutionalized as policy at government level, and racial discrimination became 
entrenched in law. The main association of racial separation with apartheid is obvious: 
‘Apartheid caused poverty, degradation and suffering on a massive scale. It denied to 
the overwhelming majority of the population access to ownership and occupation of 
land, to proper education and to fundamental rights and freedoms …. It forced those 
who were not white into inferior positions in society, denying them work and 
employment opportunities and requiring them to live in degrading and humiliating 
conditions. Through the pass laws, and the influx control system … it brought about 
the separation of families and had a devastating impact upon family life. Apartheid, in 
itself, and in the way it was implemented, constituted a gross abuse of human 
rights’.210
 
Whilst not detracting from this main harmful effect, ‘there is a long history that 
remains as yet unwritten of the repression and regulation of sexuality by the apartheid 
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state during its 40-year hold on power’.211 The control of sexuality through the law 
was an important aspect of the ideological aims of those in power during apartheid.212 
The socio-legal control of homosexuality was accordingly influenced by the 
prevailing thinking of the time – ‘[e]xclusivist definitions of human identity, 
European constructions of morality, preconceived perceptions of what is considered 
“natural” and ideological stereotypes of race, class, and ethnography have been 
primary among these’.213 Apartheid sought to reorganize social relations among 
people in both the public and private domains, including determining with whom they 
could have sexual intercourse.214
 
Sexual policing ‘to stamp out nonconformist eroticism’ was an important part of 
National Party government policy: ‘Racist legislation and iron-fisted rule have, since 
the earliest days of Nationalist government, gone hand in hand with an obsessive 
interest in sexual policing’.215 This policing was ‘based on the values of Christian 
Nationalist apartheid ideology: the need to keep the white nation sexually and morally 
pure so that it had the strength to resist the black communist onslaught’.216 From the 
first time apartheid was uttered in parliament, it was in the context of a Christian 
Nationalist ethos.217
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 The received common law in South Africa, Judeo-Christian in origin, criminalized 
homosexual conduct under the offences of sodomy and unnatural acts. The previous 
government codified and extended the common law, principally via the Sexual 
Offences Act of 1957.218 In section 14 the heterosexual age of consent was set at 
sixteen years while that of homosexuals (male and female) was set at nineteen years. 
In 1967 section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act became law. This section made it a 
crime for two men at a party to commit an act which was ‘calculated to stimulate 
sexual passion or give sexual gratification’, where a party was defined as being an 
occasion where more than two persons were present. Sodomy was classified as a 
Schedule 1 offence in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, which permitted 
the killing of, in certain circumstances, sodomites or suspected sodomites. 
 
Exploring reasons for the eventual de-criminilisation of homosexual acts leads one 
back to Foucault’s view that the processes through which reality is constructed and 
dissimulated are always acts of power and will always be resisted and contested. 
Apartheid was resisted by many on whom the policy was imposed. If the court was a 
site of repression and social regulation, it was ‘also a site of resistance and 
struggle’.219 A study of the sexual orientation cases makes ‘visible the manner in 
which the construction of reality in apartheid discourse has been contested by a series 
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of other, opposing symbolizations of reality’.220 Apartheid, in Aletta Norval’s view, 
‘was not a fully fledged blueprint for the ordering of society … it constantly had to 
take cognizance of the forces opposing it’.221 In order to form a heterosexual, 
Christian identity, it was necessary to exclude the other, ‘the canker that afflicted the 
Biblical Sodom’.222 However, ‘what is excluded as “other” has the capacity to 
challenge and subvert the manner in which social division is constituted’.223
 
In the National Coalition case, Ackermann J acknowledged the part apartheid played: 
‘Just as apartheid legislation rendered the lives of couples of different racial groups 
perpetually at risk, the sodomy offence builds insecurity and vulnerability into the 
daily lives of gay men. There can be no doubt that the existence of a law which 
punishes a form of sexual expression for gay men degrades and devalues gay men in 
our broader society’.224
 
Although common law sodomy may have been struck down and the offending statutes 
flagged ‘unconstitutional’, the ‘unlovely creature’ still resides in the ‘lair of the 
heart’.225 Apartheid laws may be dismantled, its practices combated, but apartheid 
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thinking is ‘likely to resist coercion’.226 It is ‘ultimately in the lair of the heart that 
apartheid must be approached. If we wish to understand apartheid … we cannot 
ignore its testament as it comes down to us in the heart-speech’.227
 
This was a society that allowed the police to entrap homosexuals, the last entrapment 
case being in 1987.228
 
In the middle of May 1952, two men booked into a room at the National Hotel, 
Pretoria. One of the men, R, was working for police detectives. R was to deliberately 
entice V to perform a homosexual act so that police detectives could catch him. R 
stripped naked and lay on a bed on his stomach. V, in his underpants, lay on top of R. 
The detectives entered the room and ‘observed that the accused’s penis was erect 
when he rolled off R’, that it was ‘emerging from the fly of his underpants’.229 V was 
found guilty of attempted sodomy. 
 
The way Greenberg ACJ structured his judgment, there is no mention that this was a 
police entrapment case until eighty-five percent of the way into the text. When 
reading the opening line of the case – ‘The appellant was charged ... with the offence 
of sodomy’230 – no explanation is given as to how V came to trial. The first mention 
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of entrapment is at the end of the case when R’s name is preceded with the unusual 
use of ‘trap’ as an adjective – the ‘trap R’.231
 
Not only is there no judicial censure; the judge commends R and wholly endorses his 
testimony: ‘The trap R created a favourable impression on the Court of his demeanour 
and the manner of answering the questions put to him. It is true that one should be 
cautious in dealing with the evidence of a trap, but what in my view provides 
overwhelming corroboration of R’s story is the evidence given by the two detectives 
…. R’s testimony was corroborated in all material particulars and left the Court in no 
doubt as to his truthfulness’.232
 
The accused’s testimony was dismissed entirely: ‘The accused’s story, on the other 
hand, is inherently improbable and unworthy of credence … I need say no more than 
that his testimony is a fabrication from beginning to end’.233 His testimony may have 
been fabricated, but at this stage in the law there was no room to challenge the 
injustice of the entrapment itself. 
 
In the mid-1950s, a man was suspected of having sex with school boys, but had never 
been caught. To build a case, the police sent in a ‘native constable’,234 in the guise of 
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a servant who ‘cleaned the accused’s shoes’.235 The man made ‘some overture’236 
towards the constable who then asked his officers in charge whether he could 
reciprocate. He was ‘given permission to perform indecent acts with the accused’.237 
The man was charged with sodomy, ‘in that he did wrongfully and unlawfully incite, 
command or procure a native male, E, to commit the crime of sodomy upon him, the 
said appellant, and to permit him, the said appellant, to commit the crime of sodomy 
upon the said E’.238
 
There are a few points about this charge. Describing E as a ‘native’ is gratuitous since 
race was not part of the so-called definition of sodomy. In the way the charge is 
styled, the man is the agent in both getting Constable E to sodomise him and in 
sodomising E. Yet the man did not ‘incite, command or procure’ anyone to commit 
sodomy with him. The constable was there as part of an entrapment where he 
‘insinuated himself or was insinuated into the room of the accused’.239 It was 
Constable E who requested permission to have sex with the man. In this light, the 
man’s version is more believable when he says that E ‘took the lead and performed 
acts that aroused his excitement’.240 Sodomy was not proved and from the facts of the 
case it is unlikely that anal intercourse took place. 
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 Both judges condemned not the entrapment process itself, but the permission given to 
the constable. Ramsbottom J refers to the person trapping only as a ‘native’ and never 
acknowledges that E was a constable. Significantly, the reader only learns that E is 
actually a constable in the very last sentence of the judgment. 
 
Ramsbottom J said, ‘It is to me a most shocking thing that a native should be “given 
permission” to perform indecent acts in order to secure the conviction of the person 
suspected of an aberration of this kind. If I had not seen it in a court record and sworn 
to upon oath by the policemen themselves, I would have had the greatest difficulty in 
believing that a thing of this kind could occur. I sincerely hope that it will never occur 
again’.241
 
Clayden J said, ‘I do wish, however, to associate myself with the expression of 
disapproval of the fact that a native constable was allowed, after he had reported that 
acts of immorality might be committed against him, to continue and subject himself to 
the possibility of further such acts, and I concur in the expression of the view that 
certainly no such happenings should be allowed in the future’.242
 
At 1:30 in the morning of Labour Day 1 May 1985, Major Kleynhans was patrolling 
the dimly-lit passages of Lebane Steam Baths ‘about the performance of his duty .... 
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to inspect for sodomy and other unlawful acts’.243
 
Suspecting sodomy was occurring in a cubicle, he ‘pushed the door open, entered the 
cubicle and switched on its light. There is a conflict between the appellant and Major 
Kleynhans as to what precisely the appellant and D, who were both naked, were doing 
at that moment and as to the postures they were assuming …. No sooner had Major 
Kleynhans entered the cubicle and switched on the light when the appellant and D 
moved apart and jumped up. The appellant dashed out of the cubicle and fled into the 
steam baths area. Major Kleynhans apprehended D there and then and subsequently 
also arrested the appellant elsewhere in the building’.244 The headnote uses other 
verbs in its version – ‘A policeman, K, barged in and turned on the light; two men 
sprang apart and dashed off’.245
 
The transitivity of the verbs shows the hunter and the hunted, the stalker and the 
stalked in this entrapment process. Major Kleynhans pushed the door open, entered 
the cubicle, barged in, switched on its light. The appellants moved apart, sprang apart, 
jumped up, dashed out, fled. Major Kleynhans apprehended, arrested. 
 
Since this was suspected sodomy, Major Kleynhans was legally entitled to kill his 
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quarry. Sodomy is246 a Schedule 1 offence in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
One of the effects247 this has, for example, is that when the men ‘dashed out of the 
cubicle and fled into the steam baths area’,248 they were fleeing the scene of a crime 
and they could have been killed if there was no other way for the policeman to stop 
the men from avoiding arrest.249 The patrons of Lebane Steam Baths are transformed 
into Schedule 1 criminals and the steam bath becomes a scene of a crime. 
 
Yet even in this restrictive society, one case shows that there was room for resistance. 
 
Prior to leaving home on 26 May 1965, a 19-year-old man (referred to by the court as 
‘Coloured’) put on make-up, a wig and woman’s clothing, most likely a dress. He 
then walked down Bezuidenhout Street, Johannesburg, with two friends also dressed 
in drag. Detective Constable Bambridge approached, informed him that he was a 
policeman and asked him his name. He gave his correct surname, Kola, and was then 
arrested. 
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 The Attorney General pressed into service an obscure law from 1891 which read ‘The 
wearing or use of masks, false beards, or other means whereby disguises are effected, 
in public roads or other public places is forbidden’.250 This law was used to bring the 
case to the magistrate’s court. The magistrate sentenced him to a fine of R10 or 14 
days’ imprisonment. The Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court where the 
conviction and sentence were set aside. The Attorney General then applied to have the 
case heard by the Appellate Division.251 The Appellate Division upheld the conviction 
but the sentence was altered to a caution and discharge. Such was the power of the 
Attorney General to take a case from the lowest to the highest court of the land. 
However, I like to think Mr Kola’s form of resistance won the day. A look at the 
treatment he received and his response help explain. 
 
During the court hearing his attorney was unsure whether his client was a man or a 
woman and so he had a district surgeon inspect Mr Kola’s genitals. This was the 
second time a district surgeon had examined his genitals. Six months earlier Detective 
Constable Heine had seen him in Marshall Square and had sent him for an 
examination. He was treated like a freak, not dissimilar to Sarah Bartman (‘The 
Hottentot Venus’) – ‘a tragic case’,252 a ‘psychological aberration’.253 There were 
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‘doubts about his sex’,254 and so he was examined. ‘The evidence of the district 
surgeon ... showed that, although his general physical configuration (e.g. his build and 
hips) and sexual organs were those of a male, the pitch and tone of his voice and the 
style of the hair on his head were feminine, that possibly he had a sexually inverted 
mind, which was congenital, and that he was in consequence a psychological misfit or 
deviate’.255 When a person’s expression of sexual identity does not conform, that 
sexual identity is perceived by the court as ‘deviant’. The court did not know why he 
dressed this way, perhaps ‘to satisfy some feminine instinct or urge, or perhaps to 
save himself from the embarrassment or inconvenience that his feminine 
characteristics, such as his voice, could cause him’, they mused.256
 
This indignity notwithstanding, he also had to hear a bewildering array of legal talk 
which he could never have contemplated would arise from a walk down Bezuidenhout 
Street: talk of false beards, theatrical performances, masked balls, extracts from the 
Oxford English Dictionary – The shepherd’s garb the woman shall disguise, a 
disguise or habit of a girl beyond sea – translations from Dutch to English, extracts 
from a 1917 insurance case, and a quote from Halsbury, Laws of England, vol 10, 
p283, note (m). 
 
In all this he never uttered one word. The ‘embarrassment or inconvenience that his 
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feminine characteristics, such as his voice, could cause him’, were never put to the 
test.257 Had he testified, he would probably have told the truth. He had answered the 
policeman’s questions truthfully then a fortiori, he would have answered the court’s. 
 
But, ‘[t]he accused himself did not testify’, causing Trollip AJA, with Beyers JA and 
Holmes JA concurringly to presume, ‘I think that, in the absence of any evidence 
from him explaining his conduct, it must ... be presumed that he ... intended to conceal 
his identity, for that would be a reasonable and probable consequence of concealing 
his sex …. The failure of the accused to testify is of importance ... because .... “Where 
a question of the state of mind of an accused person is in issue, it is not easy for a 
Court to come to a conclusion favourable to the accused as to his state of mind unless 
he has himself given evidence on the subject’”.258 Yet in spite of his silence, the court 
did come to a conclusion more ‘favourable to the accused’. 
 
Not only did the accused choose not to testify, he dressed in drag for each court 
appearance. ‘On both occasions on which the appellant appeared in court he was 
dressed as, and had the appearance of, a woman’.259 ‘[H]is own attorney must have 
been impressed by his appearance because during the hearing he applied for a 
postponement “to have accused medically examined, he says that the sex of the 
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accused is in dispute”’.260
 
This 19-year-old youth’s silence and his going to court in drag were acts which twice 
confirm the district surgeons’ findings. He sat in court, impeccably turned-out and 
silently watched, in ascending importance, three courts flip-flop – guilty and a 
sentence, not guilty therefore no sentence, guilty but no sentence. In retrospect, the 
Attorney General lost. If he had stopped at the magistrate’s court he would have 
secured a conviction and a sentence. It was Ms Kola’s day in court. 
 
There is a history of scrutinizing beds, bedrooms and, generally, private and public 
spaces occupied by homosexuals. It is not normal, according to one judge, for 
members of the same sex to occupy private spaces for intimate purposes, for it is 
‘male and female who share a bed’.261 When beds and bedrooms are mentioned in the 
corpus, they are always in the context of tainted sites: men getting into or lying on top 
of beds, all-male steam baths or a lesbian’s bedroom. 
 
In the mid-1920s a witness saw two men get into bed: ‘he saw Riley on one occasion 
get into accused’s bed’.262 The specific use of the preposition ‘into’ indicates that they 
got in between the sheets. Thirty years later two men lay on a bed: ‘R took off his 
pants and underpants and lay on a bed on his stomach. V, in his underpants, lay on top 
                                                          
260 S v Kola 1966 (4) SA 322 (A), 327. 
261 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329-330. 
262 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 388. 
 85
of R’.263 Both cases resulted in criminal sentences. 
 
The descriptions by policemen in court describing two all-male steam baths resemble 
here-there-be-monsters stories: 
‘The health clinic is divided up into various large rooms. In the centre of the health 
clinic there is a swimming pool and a round whirlpool. On the lefthand side of the 
building as well as on the right-hand side, it is a sort of a square. It used to be an old 
school in the old days. There are rooms about the size of the court room, divided up 
into cubicles with wood partitioning and there is a curtain hanging in front of each 
cubicle, it is a loose curtain. In each cubicle there are two beds, in some cases there 
are three’.264
and 
‘The place was a small room or cubicle fitted with a bed, within a building complex 
known as the Lebane Steam Baths in Polly Street, Johannesburg. The centre consisted 
of a reception area and various facilities, including change-rooms, areas for steam 
bathing and for showering; a TV room and towards the back, a passage along which 
three or four cubicles, including the cubicle in question, were situated. Each cubicle 
had a door opening onto the passage’.265
 
Whereas the men’s ‘bedrooms’ are curtained cubicles with two or three beds, in 
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public downtown Johannesburg, the women’s bedrooms are private and domestic, in 
the suburbs. The number of beds for women is not mentioned but by implication there 
is only one – ‘Not only is she a lesbian but she lives in a lesbian relationship. She 
shares the house and the bedroom with her associate’.266
 
‘The choice, as in regard to her bedroom life, is hers’.267 Here ‘bedroom life’ is 
discreetly euphemized as sex life whereas in the male cases policemen physically 
enter the private areas and observe ‘that the accused’s penis was erect when he rolled 
off R’, that it was ‘emerging from the fly of his underpants’268 or patrol the passages 
of Lebane Steam Baths in the middle of the night ‘to inspect for sodomy and other 
unlawful acts’.269
 
Flemming DJP’s obsession with beds and bedrooms finds its way into the final order. 
GM (the applicant’s partner) is specifically mentioned in the order as the person with 
whom the mother may not share a bedroom – ‘when the children sleep at the 
applicant’s residence, the applicant will not share a bedroom with GM’.270 This 
poorly-crafted order makes it possible for the applicant to ‘share’ any other room in 
the house with GM, or to share her bedroom with XY. 
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Ackermann J puts an end to bedroom-policing when he makes an American case 
applicable to South Africa. ‘Hardwick, an adult male, was criminally charged for 
violating Georgia’s sodomy statute by committing a sexual act with another adult 
male … in his own bedroom …. [I]n the kind of society contemplated by our 
Constitution, government must offer greater justification to police the bedroom than it 
must to police the streets …. The position is also anomalous in South African law’.271
 
Socio-legal context under the constitution 
This attitude to homosexuality softened under constitutional discourse. If society’s 
attitudes to contraception and marriages which are deliberately childless had changed, 
these changing attitudes ‘must inevitably cause a change in attitudes to 
homosexuality’.272
 
The National Coalition cases touch on deep convictions and evoke strong emotions: 
‘It must not be thought that the view which holds that sexual expression should be 
limited to marriage between men and women with procreation as its dominant or sole 
purpose, is held by crude bigots only. On the contrary, it is also sincerely held, for 
considered and nuanced religious and other reasons, by persons who would not wish 
to have the physical expression of sexual orientation differing from their own 
proscribed by the law …. It is nevertheless equally important to point out that such 
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views, however honestly and sincerely held, cannot influence what the Constitution 
dictates in regard to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation’.273
 
Under a constitutional discourse judges could speak openly of a change in society’s 
view of homosexuality: ‘The changing attitude of society generally to intimate 
relations between homosexuals demands greater tolerance and lenience in the sphere 
of sentencing adult persons for private consensual acts of intimacy which are still 
proscribed by the criminal law’.274
and 
‘Events in the sphere of constitutional negotiation, whatever the ultimate result might 
be, indicate a significant change in attitude in South African society to the issue of 
homosexuality’.275
 
‘Constitutionally we have reached a stage of maturity,’ says Heher J, ‘in which 
recognition of the dignity and innate worth of every member of society is not a matter 
of reluctant concession but is one of easy acceptance. Nor is that perception inimical 
to views held by a large percentage of the population, as witness the liberalisation of 
attitudes in the media, the open acceptance of persons of divergent sexual orientation 
into positions of responsibility in society and the public recognition of what has 
always been the de facto reality that, by reason of their particular emotional and 
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intellectual make-up, many homosexuals contribute vastly to the greater well-being of 
mankind’.276
 
This is fairly patronising in that many homosexuals do not contribute vastly to the 
greater well-being of mankind. And why should that be a consideration? The case 
which dealt a significant blow to the end sodomy, for example, was about a semi-
literate, unemployed prisoner. There is this deliberate attempt to make homosexuals 
acceptable. Writing in 2004, Pierre de Vos says that homosexuality ‘is still widely 
regarded in almost all societies as an aberration, a deviation from the heterosexual 
norm and even when accepted this acceptance often seems to stem from a patronising 
impulse to accommodate “abnormal” sexuality in the name of tolerance and 
openmindedness’.277
 
During the pre-constitutional period the immorality of homosexuality was a strong 
driving force behind the decisions judges reached. The following extracts 
acknowledge this and dismantle the morality justification. 
 
‘The enforcement of the private moral views of a section of the community, which are 
based to a large extent on nothing more than prejudice’.278
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S20A ‘was motivated by … rank prejudice’279
 
‘Although the Constitution itself cannot destroy homophobic prejudice it can require 
the elimination of public institutions which are based on and perpetuate such 
prejudice’.280
 
‘A law which has facilitated homophobic assaults and induced self-oppression, ceases 
to be’.281
 
‘Although the suppression of sodomy may in times past have been regarded as a 
necessary prop of morality both public and private, that is today too tenuous a thread 
upon which to support its continued criminalisation’.282
 
‘What passes (or attempts to pass) for justification are, I find, historical antipathy, 
personal revulsion, religious conviction, the prevailing opinion in society, and the 
protection of the morals of the people’.283
 
‘The Court is not concerned with making any value-judgment as to the morality of 
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homosexual relations between male adults’.284
 
‘Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be 
shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual 
acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is 
consenting adults alone who are involved’.285
 
‘… many of those who believe that homosexual activity between adult males is 
immoral and should be proscribed by criminal sanction may be occasioned distress by 
the thought that others are engaging in such acts, albeit in private’.286
 
‘It may be that when the legislation was enacted Parliament regarded the threat posed 
by homosexual licence to public morality or the pernicious influence of the impugned 
conduct on other persons who might be present (perhaps innocently), as more real and 
serious than any like behaviour by women or heterosexuals and that equivalent 
criminalisation of the same conduct by women or between a man and a woman was 
unnecessary. There is no evidence suggesting that the distinction is still warranted or 
regarded as justified’.287
 
‘… how we manage difference. In the past difference has been experienced as a curse, 
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today it can be seen as a source of interactive vitality …. A State that recognises 
difference does not mean a State without morality or one without a point of view. It 
does not banish concepts of right and wrong, nor envisage a world without good and 
evil. It is impartial in its dealings with people and groups, but is not neutral in its 
value system. The Constitution certainly does not debar the State from enforcing 
morality. Indeed, the Bill of Rights is nothing if not a document founded on deep 
political morality’.288
 
To those who sincerely believe that homosexuality is evil, ‘those persons who for 
reasons of religious or other belief disagree with or condemn homosexual conduct are 
free to hold and articulate such beliefs’.289
 
The concept of a ‘gay and lesbian community’ is introduced in the Constitutional 
Court National Coalition case.290 Sachs J commenting on Ackermann J’s judgment 
says, ‘the judgment has with appropriate sensitivity for the way anti-gay prejudice has 
impinged on the dignity of members of the gay community, focused on the manner in 
which the anti-sodomy laws have reinforced systemic disadvantage both of a practical 
and a spiritual nature’.291
 
This so-called community formed the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
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Equality, a duly constituted voluntary association of gay, lesbian, bisexual and 
transgendered persons comprising seventy organisations and associations. The 
coalition was the first applicant in the cases that challenged the sodomy laws. It was a 
big group because the issues involved a wide range of sexual minorities and it was 
expedient to band together in this way, a pragmatic ‘choose your battle’ approach.292 
However, there were a variety of people who came under the sexual minority banner – 
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals, and the transgendered. These descriptors 
do not imply that persons in each of these groups is the same. It simply acknowledges 
that these sexual minorities are ‘perceived as aberrational under traditional 
heteropatriarchal ideology’.293
 
It is not strange therefore that, like the Homosexual Law Reform Fund in the 1960s 
(discussed later), this group also disbanded after their cause had been achieved. The 
goals of a ‘unified’ group ‘may not reflect exactly those of certain factions within it, 
yet the larger group benefits from their participation because of the increased numbers 
they bring’.294 There are no ‘stable assumptions about who belongs to the group and 
what their interests are, and about who can speak for the group’.295 The so-called gay 
and lesbian community was also splintered along racial lines. Urban blacks formed an 
organisation called GLOW (Gay and Lesbian Organisation of the Witwatersrand). 
This indicates that blacks were willing to be called gay and lesbian but not to be 
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aligned to the white organisations. 
 
Judges in context 
This study considers judges over nearly seventy-five years. It is useful to consider the 
position of a judge to see if the nature of that position changed over time. Drawing on 
Foucault, if we accept that knowledge is not a pre-existing reality but rather 
constituted within discourse, we have to then ask who lays claim to that ability to 
constitute. Foucault would say it is those with the right to enunciate according to the 
rules of formation. 
 
These rules of formation centre around statements uttered by subjects empowered to 
make serious truth claims because of their training, institutional location and mode of 
discourse. In a legal context, this means that only a properly trained and appointed 
judge, sitting in a court room and occupying the subject position of judge can 
enunciate statements which would find their way into the prevailing discourse by way 
of court judgments. In the theatre of the courtroom, the judge is elevated and is said to 
‘hand down’ a judgment. In this way various legal concepts emerge within society, 
rather than being introduced with purpose or intention. Just as there is no teleological 
purpose specifying which themes are to emerge, those that do often comprise 
heterogeneous judgments which future judges sometimes force with procrustean 
crudity to conform to their viewpoint. The originality of Foucault is that he does not 
try to explain away such inconsistencies. By meeting discourse on its own complex, 
messy terms, he entertains new possibilities foreclosed by ordinary thinking. 
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearing 
At the Legal Hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission two questions were 
put to the judiciary which go to the heart of John Dugard’s sustained criticism of 
them: ‘How was it that you implemented without protest, and often with zeal, laws 
that were so manifestly unjust? And how was it that when you had some discretion as 
to how to interpret or apply the law, you consistently decided in a way that assisted 
the government?’296
 
The judiciary and the ‘establishment’ legal professionals answered297 that the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty required judges to defer to the will of the majority in 
parliament, thus denying the courts the opportunity to fashion statute law to achieve a 
degree of justice in the face of legislated injustice. Where there was some room for 
manoeuvre, particularly in the construction and development of the common law, or 
where clear statutory ambiguity permitted it, judges mostly adopted an interpretation 
that favoured liberty and equity. Any attempt by the judiciary to circumvent unjust 
effects would have led to further legislative steps to reverse such decisions or would 
have led to a ‘packing of the Bench’. The record of judicial impartiality and pursuit of 
justice was satisfactory, if not good. In a nutshell, the judiciary’s submissions argued 
that an administration of justice and a legal order that preserved a limited degree of 
impartiality and independence was better, in all circumstances, than a legal system 
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that was completely subservient to the will and whims of the political masters in 
parliament. 
 
The counter argument298 was that the judiciary had co-operated in servicing and 
enforcing a diabolically unjust political order, that parliamentary sovereignty was no 
defence and that judicial independence was a myth. Judges were able to exercise a 
choice in almost all circumstances, although in some cases the range of options might 
have been extremely narrow. The inherent ambiguity of language and the diversity of 
factual circumstances allowed judges a degree of latitude in deciding what the law 
was, the more so for common law. In the rare circumstances where little or no judicial 
choice existed, judges could still have criticized the law both on and off the bench, 
within the limits of propriety. The judicial oath of office demanded that judges 
‘administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, and, as the 
circumstances of any particular case may require, in accordance with the law and 
customs of the Republic of South Africa’.299 This was not the case. 
 
After hearing the submissions from both sides, the Commission found300 that the 
National Party leaders craved the aura of legitimacy that ‘the law’ bestowed on their 
harsh injustice. The courts subconsciously or unwittingly connived in this legislative 
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and executive pursuit of injustice. Judges too easily made sense of the illogical and 
the unjust in language, and too quickly accepted the word of the police or official 
witness in preference to that of the accused. The judiciary unthinkingly allowed 
judicial policy to be influenced by executive dictate or white male prejudice, and was 
intent on maintaining and protecting the status quo. 
 
Some judicial submissions emphasized their relative impotence in the face of the 
exercise of legislative power by a sovereign parliament. The Commission regarded 
this as a flawed argument: parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law work hand in 
hand and are premised on a political system that is fundamentally representative of all 
the people subject to that parliament. This situation never applied in South Africa. 
Judges had a choice, and it was feasible for them to have heightened their alertness as 
to government abuse of powers in the power vacuum created by the partially-
representative legislature and the absence of basic fairness in the citizen-state 
relationship. Judges, had they wished to do so, could have resisted encroachments on 
basic rights and fairness, using the skills and knowledge which they manifestly 
possessed and arguing from common law principles. 
 
Profile of judges and the influence of positivism 
The TRC criticized the judiciary for maintaining the status quo rather than exploiting 
ambiguity in language to effect change. This maintenance was due largely to the 
composition of the judiciary and the positivistic training such judges had. For this 
reason I look at the composition of the judiciary in more detail and review the debates 
about the role positivism played with the South African judiciary. Judges, at the time, 
were a small professional elite, drawn mostly from senior advocates in private 
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practice.301 Although this ‘ensured a high level of professionalism’, it also led to 
‘insulation from the wider implications of social problems and dynamics’, and to 
‘complacency and self-satisfaction’ on the part of judges.302 This small elite was 
mostly white, male, Protestant, privileged and political.303
 
The National Party government packed the bench either with political appointments or 
with lawyers who had no history of opposition to apartheid. During this time, there 
was a small minority of ‘liberal’ judges.304 Dugard estimates that at least fifty percent 
of the judiciary could broadly be described as supporters of the National Party 
Government, with a loyalty to the status quo.305 South African judges prided 
themselves on their political neutrality and refrained from identifying themselves 
publicly with any political party. But, to Dugard, this is one of the ‘many legal 
fictions which is assiduously maintained in South Africa’.306 The South African 
public was generally given the impression that newly appointed judges were 
distinguished jurists with no political affiliation, who had earned their appointments 
on pure merit.307
 
Although judges did not make overt political statements from the bench, their views 
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were ‘mediated through law’.308 Ideally, judges are supposed to come to court like a 
‘tabula rasa, with no knowledge whatsoever of the situation – a blank space waiting 
to be filled by facts’.309 In reality, judges usually find confirming legal 
rationalizations for their choices or adopt whatever seems easiest or least 
controversial, which often involves ignoring or distorting contrary arguments, 
authorities, facts, or social realities, according to Bernard Jackson.310 Judges are most 
influenced by ‘the culture that pervades their daily lives, their associations, their self-
perceptions, and the world around them’.311
 
It is accepted that personal bias plays a part in legal decisions. The degree of bias 
varies and, hopefully, the ‘better the judge, the less likely is this to occur’.312 In a rare 
admission of bias, Centlivres JA wrote that a judge’s ‘duty is to administer the law as 
it exists but he may in administering it express his strong disapproval of it … [H]e 
cannot on becoming a Judge be expected to divest himself of those views’.313 As 
Edwin Cameron notes, ‘judges do not enter public office as ideological virgins’.314
 
According to the International Commission of Jurists, commenting on the judiciary in 
the 1960s, ‘the overall impression is of a judiciary as ‘establishment-minded’ as the 
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executive, prepared to adopt an interpretation that will facilitate the executive’s task 
rather than defend the liberty of the subject and uphold the Rule of Law’.315 For 
Dugard, positivism was at the root of the accusation that the South African judiciary 
had become ‘establishment-minded’.316 There was no suggestion of deliberate bias; 
all that he suggested was that by relying on mechanical, positivistic methods of 
interpretation, judges had become ‘subconsciously influenced by submerged forces 
which may coincide with the will of the executive’.317
 
In cases concerning male sexuality, judges were also influenced by their own views 
on ‘normal’ sexuality as well as being aware of the anti-homosexual attitude of the 
National Party. There was little or no incentive to disturb the prevailing attitude in 
these kinds of cases. Judges are not ‘value-free arbiters, independent of and 
unaffected by social and economic relations, political forces, and cultural 
phenomena’.318 Judges are neither neutral nor objective; rather, they are affected by 
their society and this reflects in their judgments: ‘[T]he law consists of people-made 
decisions and doctrines, and the thought processes and modes of reconciling 
conflicting considerations of … judges are not mystical, inevitable, or very different 
from the rest of ours’.319
                                                          
315 Dugard, J., Human rights and the South African legal order, p. 279 quoting Erosion of the 
Rule of Law in South Africa, Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1968, editorial 
comment, iv. 
316 Dugard, J., Human rights and the South African legal order, p. 380. 
317 Ibid., p. 380. 
318 Kairys, D., The politics of law, p. 6. 
319 Ibid., p. 6. 
 101
 Judges accepted legal positivism as their ‘jurisprudential guide’, in Dugard’s view.320 
By doing so, judges regarded as their duty ‘to analyse and interpret the will of 
parliament but not to “reason why”’.321 This enabled judges to apply harsh laws with 
an easy conscience and sometimes resulted in a failure to grasp the extent to which 
technical rules of interpretation might be invoked to moderate the inequity. Dugard 
maintained that where there was no applicable rule or ambiguity or uncertainty, the 
judge had the discretion to ‘fill in the gaps in the law’.322 His criticism of the judiciary 
was that they ‘failed to exercise this discretion in favour of the essentially libertarian 
principles of the Roman-Dutch common law’.323 South African judges had ‘not 
sufficiently selected that rule of construction, presumption, principle or precedent 
which most advances human rights’.324 There was a great deal of latitude available to 
judges when interpreting the Dutch jurists’ views on sodomy, for example. Yet there 
is not one comment by a judge in the pre-constitutional cases comprising over 92,000 
words on how male sodomy laws might be an abuse of human rights. 
 
Whereas Dugard mainly blamed positivism for the judges’ non-engagement, 
observers of the South African judicial system regarded this neutral, objective attitude 
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as ‘an excellent state of affairs’,325 but ‘[t]hey forget that legal positivism, judicial 
aloofness, and protestations of political neutrality are often an unconscious device for 
disguising inarticulate considerations. Judicial positivism cannot eradicate inarticulate 
premises. As long as the judicial function is entrusted to men, not automatons, 
subconscious prejudices and preferences will never be completely removed from the 
judicial process’.326
 
Benjamin Cardozo had acknowledged these inarticulate considerations more than fifty 
years before Dugard – ‘Deep below consciousness … forces, the likes and the 
dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions 
and habits and convictions, … make the … judge …. There has been a certain lack of 
candour in much of the discussion of the theme, or rather in the refusal to discuss it, as 
if judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to 
human limitation’.327
 
Dugard quotes Jerome Frank (a contemporary of Cardozo) who also recognized the 
part played by inarticulate premises – in ‘decisions handed down …. judges exercised 
their choice in one direction or another without any satisfactory explanation, which 
suggests that the inarticulate premise may have played some part in the preference 
shown for certain precedents and principles of apparent equal force and validity …. 
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While the inarticulate premise is not susceptible to total eradication, it can at least be 
curbed or controlled by an open recognition of the irrational forces at work in the 
judicial process and by a conscious determination to suppress these forces’.328
 
According to Christopher Forsyth and Johann Schiller, Dugard’s reason for rejecting 
positivism as a jurisprudential guide is mistaken in that he had misunderstood the 
nature of positivism, and had therefore wrongly attributed judicial flaws to it.329
 
To these authors, positivism is not a theory of law but a theory of knowledge, the 
central tenet of which is that ‘all genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and 
can only be advanced by means of observation and experiment, [and that] 
metaphysical or speculative attempts to gain knowledge by reason unchecked by 
experience should be abandoned’.330 Applying this tenet to the study of law, 
knowledge about law is gained by the application of reason to certain ‘observed 
phenomena, viz previously decided cases and the relevant statutes, rather than by 
reference to moral values’.331 The authors acknowledge that laws are not value-free 
but their point is that the study of law should be value-free.332 They appear to 
contradict themselves, however, when they state that a positivist can hold and act 
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upon moral or political truths they know cannot be objectively proven.333
 
In a rebuttal article Dugard said that his aim was to ‘depict the pathology of the South 
African legal order’, not to analyze positivism itself.334 His empirical study of the 
legal process in South Africa led him to conclude that judges adopted a ‘neutral, non-
activist position in their approach to human rights issues and that a form of positivism 
may account for this phenomenon’.335 Dugard still contended that judges had been 
influenced by positivism which resulted in ‘moral disengagement’.336
 
Dugard criticized judges for adopting a mechanical approach when interpreting 
statutes. His comments apply, a fortiori, to the common law which is even more open 
to interpretation. He questioned the view that judges had no creative power in the 
interpretation process, ‘it would seem that the court’s only duty is to “discover” and 
then to “declare” the “true” intention of the legislature’.337 This mechanical approach 
was adopted, Dugard believed, to absolve the judge from personal responsibility, 
assuming the judge really was against government policy in the first place. It is 
‘comforting for the judge opposed to the laws he is required to enforce to seek refuge 
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in the knowledge that his role is purely … mechanical’.338 What judges did not seem 
to notice is that disinterestedness is itself a stance, endorsing the status quo and 
rendering judges ‘unresponsive to victimized individuals ensnared in legal 
technicalities’.339
 
Dugard’s main complaint against the South African judiciary was that it refused to 
recognize that it does make law, ‘albeit only “interstitially”’, that it does make policy 
decisions, and that it is part of the South African political process’.340 For Dugard, 
later vindicated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, judges could have 
played a ‘creative role in filling in the gaps’ of both statutory and common law.341 A 
judge does ‘not follow a previously laid down rule nor does he “discover” the 
intention of parliament, but by his choice of one or other interpretation he makes the 
law on the point’.342 Most South African judges, however, denied that they had this 
ability to make or invent new law. But as Jerome Frank (an outspoken iconoclast) had 
noted in 1949, judges ‘no more make or invent new law than Columbus made or 
invented America’.343 What judges were trying to deny was that they do make law. 
 
Judges purport to speak on behalf of society 
Judges are part of the hegemony of a society. The society during the National Party 
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period clearly did not favour promoting homosexuality. The absence of any outspoken 
criticism by judges (either on or off the bench) indicates that they were not willing to 
make this their battle. Judges could have interpreted the common law in ways more 
favourable to the defendants. However, as this story by George Orwell illustrates, 
those in power are constrained by society to act in a certain way. 
 
Orwell was a British policeman in Burma, himself against colonialism yet embodying 
British rule to the locals, and therefore maligned by them.344 An elephant had run 
amok and he was called to assist. He took a rifle to scare the elephant. When he 
arrived, the elephant’s rage had passed. As he turned to go back, he noted that a huge 
crowd had gathered – ‘faces all happy and excited over this bit of fun. They were 
watching me as they would watch a conjurer about to perform a trick. They did not 
like me, but with the magical rifle in my hands I was momentarily worth watching. 
And suddenly I realized that I should have to shoot the elephant after all. The people 
expected it of me and I had got to do it; I could feel their two thousand wills pressing 
me forward, irresistibly’. He realises that even though he held the power, he had to 
obey the will of the people: ‘Here was I ... seemingly the leading actor of the piece; 
but in reality I was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those faces 
behind .... a hollow, posing dummy .... a mask, [whose] face grows to fit it. I had got 
to shoot the elephant’. He concludes, ‘I often wondered whether any of the others 
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grasped that I had done it solely to avoid looking a fool’. 
 
This account illustrates that judges do not have unlimited power and that there is a 
potential for backlash when they disappoint the majority. The analogy breaks down 
when one considers how some judges ‘shot elephants’ with alacrity, or when they 
expressed no objections as to what they were being ‘forced’ to do. The story also 
illustrates how judges could say certain things in their judgments with impunity, such 
as the pejorative words they used to refer to homosexuals, until such time as it became 
unacceptable to do so. Judges could certainly have been more neutral and outspoken 
but to have been overtly pro-gay would have been like not shooting the elephant. 
 
In their judgments, judges purport to speak on behalf of society. In doing so, they add 
their own opinion, either for or against. In 1926, referring to unnatural acts between 
males, a judge said, ‘Is there then any reason to think that the commission of the acts 
charged has ceased to be an offence? There has been no change in public opinion, 
which would cause such conduct to be regarded as otherwise than abhorrent’.345 Here 
the judge states with certainty that there has been no change to public opinion, and 
that the public consider such acts abhorrent. 
 
In 1932, a judge commenting on why male-female oral sex should not be punishable 
said, ‘The real reason … is that it has become out of harmony with modern views and 
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unsuited to modern conditions …. public opinion has for long recognised the 
advisability of leaving the offence to be dealt with by sanctions of morality and 
religion rather those of the criminal law’.346 This quote is repeated in R v M,347 also a 
case dealing with an ‘unnatural sexual act committed by male on female’. In both 
instances it is the male-female acts which enjoy immunity. By differentiating between 
male-male and male-female oral sex, the judge is in effect saying that no matter the 
shaky grounds of authority, male-male sex had not yet become out of harmony with 
modern views or unsuited to modern conditions. 
 
In 1990, a judge accepted that society’s attitude was changing towards homosexuals: 
‘We cannot close our eyes, however, to the fact that society accepts that there are 
individuals who have homosexual tendencies and who form intimate relationships 
with those of their own sex. It has to be taken into account that homosexuality is more 
openly discussed and written about. It is common knowledge that so-called gay clubs 
are formed, where homosexuals openly meet and have social intercourse. If that is 
accepted by society, even with reluctance or distaste, it is also a factor that has to be 
taken into account by the courts when sentence is considered’.348
 
The acceptance, however, is equivocal and grudging. Phrases which suggest this are 
‘we cannot close our eyes’, ‘has to be taken into account’, and ‘openly meet’. In this 
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judge’s view society accepts homosexuality but with reluctance and distaste. He uses 
the word ‘gay’ but it is prefixed with the adjective ‘so-called’, indicating that such 
clubs are generally referred to by the term ‘gay’ but he himself is not willing to use 
the word. Instead, he uses the word ‘homosexuals’ in the same sentence where, had he 
been sincerely advocating social acceptance, he might have used the term preferred by 
the group he is referring to. Jansen J’s observation is regarded by Kevin Botha and 
Edwin Cameron as Jansen J calling ‘for judicial notice to be taken of social 
acceptance of homosexuality’, but the language itself does not indicate acceptance.349 
How can this be so when, on the same page of the judgment he says, ‘The majority of 
people, who have normal heterosexual relationships, may find acts of sodomy 
unacceptable and reprehensible’.350 One can only call for judicial notice for 
something which is so widely accepted that it can almost be taken for granted. 
 
In 1995 Ackermann J said that ‘Although sodomy between males is still a crime 
today, the question arises as to what an appropriate sentence is where the parties 
involved are consenting adults who commit the act in private, particularly having 
regard to changing public attitudes regarding homosexual relationships and self-
expression. There is a growing body of opinion, in South Africa as well, which 
questions fundamentally the sociological, biological, religious and other premises on 
which the proscription of homosexual acts between consenting adult men which takes 
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place in private, have traditionally been based’.351
 
He then negates the pro-religious objection. The ‘evolution of these offences was 
greatly influenced by … theological considerations …. There is still a substantial 
body of theological thought which holds that the basic purpose of the sexual 
relationship is procreation and for that reason also proscribes contraception. There is 
an equally strong body of theological thought that no longer holds to this view. 
Societal attitudes to contraception and marriages which are deliberately childless are 
also changing. These changing attitudes must inevitably cause a change in attitudes to 
homosexuality’.352
 
The language used in the above extract indicates that the judge is in favour of the 
changes to the way society thinks. After quoting the passage from the 1990 judgment 
by Jansen J, Ackermann J deliberately expands on this by saying, ‘I am certainly in 
respectful agreement with the tolerant approach enunciated in regard to sentencing. I 
would go further, however, and hold that consensual adult sodomy committed in 
private can rarely, if ever, justify a custodial sentence whether or not the accused is a 
first offender and whether or not the initiative has come from the other party’.353
 
Ackermann J also introduces texts to support the move for reform, for example the 
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Bowers case. For four years this case had been available to the judge in the 1990 case 
but he chose not to refer to it. Ackermann J devotes a quarter of his judgment to 
extracts from Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986), a case which took a critical 
look at sodomy in the USA. He also quotes from an Afrikaans textbook on criminal 
law which was already in 1975 calling for a more tolerant view – ‘There is great 
doubt as whether there is enough authority to justify the crime “unnatural offence”. In 
the landmark decision of R v Gough and Narroway (1926 CPD 159) there is strong 
reliance on … Dutch writers …. It is a pity that these sources were not considered 
more critically …. One hopes that less conservative attitudes as that in 1926 will 
prevail if the question ever arises again. We no longer live in the middle ages and the 
history of Sodom lies in ancient times’.354 From this we can see that although the two 
judges took the changes of society into account when passing sentence, the one did so 
unwillingly while the other did so with more enthusiasm. Ackerman J uses 
intertextuality to include texts to support his view. Jansen J had these same texts at his 
disposal but chose not to use them. 
 
Sachs J presents the most accepting view of homosexuality. He illustrates how in 
reality there was already a strong homosexual presence in South African society and 
that it was a matter of time before the law caught up with this reality. ‘The law 
catches up with an evolving social reality. A love that for a number of years has dared 
openly to speak its name in bookshops, theatres, film festivals and public parades, and 
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that has succeeded in becoming a rich and acknowledged part of South African 
cultural life, need no longer fear prosecution for intimate expression. A law which has 
facilitated homophobic assaults and induced self-oppression, ceases to be’.355
 
The phrase ‘dared openly to speak its name’ is a reference to Lord Alfred Douglas’s 
poem ‘Two Loves’ (1894). A line from that poem – ‘I am the love that dare not speak 
its name’ – became famous in the Oscar Wilde trial: 
Prosecutor: What is ‘the love that dare not speak its name’? 
Wilde: It is in this century misunderstood, so much misunderstood that it may be 
described as the ‘Love that dare not speak its name’, and on account of it I am placed 
where I am now. It is beautiful, it is fine, it is the noblest form of affection. There is 
nothing unnatural about it. 
 
But Sachs J’s Wilde love is Heher J’s wild lust. To Sachs J there are books where this 
‘love’ dares openly speak its name in bookshops, but to Heher J these selfsame books 
are about ‘orgiastic practices to which homosexuality seems often to fall prey (if one 
may fairly judge from the books on “male bonding” which lie exposed to the 
inspection of all and sundry, including children, in the reputable bookshops of 
Johannesburg)’.356
 
The rhetoric in Sachs J’s judgment indicates a relief that homosexuality, which was 
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there all the time, can now be legally sanctioned. His allusion to the poem shows a 
willingness to be associated with the pro-Wilde camp. The rhetoric in Heher J’s 
judgment is that of homosexual orgies which even children can stumble upon by 
going into even a reputable bookshop. The same books are treated so differently. Both 
judges go to extremes with their rhetoric. 
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Chapter 4: Judgments as a genre and the grammar of sexuality 
Judgments as a genre 
In his essay ‘The judicial opinion and the poem’, White advocates a close reading of 
the judgment as text, in a similar way New Critics used to read poems: ‘It is … never 
enough to read a poem or an opinion for its main idea, which is often … trite …. 
[T]he interesting question is not what the main idea is but how it is given meaning by 
the text, and given meaning in particular by the oppositions that are its life’.357
 
But the judgment is a certain kind of text. It is a narrative according to White. Since 
all voices at the trial – for example, the parties, counsel and witnesses – are subsumed 
by the judge, he imputes to the judgment its own ‘organic design’ to the exclusion of 
other competing designs.358 By an ‘organic design’, White means a narrative. When 
seen as a narrative, the judgment is an artefact made by another mind, with a meaning 
of its own. The judge can impute his own meaning out of material he has inherited. 
The judgment gives ‘special and related meanings to sets of words … and make[s] 
these new meanings available to others’. The judge assigns these meanings ‘not by 
stipulative definitions but … by the way [he] uses them: by association and contrast 
with other terms, by location in a larger imaginative and purposive design, and by the 
tensions it establishes among them and among their various uses’.359
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The judgment is variously described as a ‘distinct literary genre’,360 a ‘prototypical 
legal text’,361 or a ‘specific … “register” of an actually existent language system’362 
found within ‘adjudicatory discourse’ or ‘justificatory discourse’.363
 
If a judgment is a distinct literary genre, what would be its characteristics as found in 
a typical case reported in the South African Law Reports? These judgments are edited 
by SALR editors who attach a flynote and a headnote to each judgment, and edit the 
judgment text itself. The flynote is a brief telegraphic section indicating what section 
of law is being considered. The headnote provides a brief account of the case followed 
by the holdings, that is, details of what the court held or decided. Some cases list the 
authorities counsel cited during the proceedings. 
 
This is followed by the judge’s own words (sparingly edited) who usually begins with 
a restatement of the facts of the case which ‘squats somewhere near the beginning of 
the text’.364 Within the facts section David Papke suggests judges ‘may omit or alter 
pertinent details, recharacterize what happened prior to or at trial, or in various ways 
present the “facts” in a new narrative framework’.365 Rubinson agrees that a judge 
will try to ‘present facts as determinate and finite when in fact they are carefully 
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chosen to present a given story’.366 Nor is this skepticism about the veracity of the 
facts new. In 1949 Jerome Frank wrote, ‘The facts of a case are not the actual past 
facts as they happened in the past. At first glance they seem to be what the trial judge 
thinks happened. But … when the judge publishes his findings, we can never be sure 
that they report what he thinks were the facts. Those findings report merely what he 
says he thinks the facts were …. To discover what he thinks, it would be necessary to 
learn what “went on in his mind”’.367
 
The ‘facts’ are then usually followed by a discussion of what legal rules apply, and a 
justification for applying those rules to the particular facts. This section is broadly 
referred to as the judge’s opinion which precedes the actual judgment or ruling, thus 
concluding the text. The judge’s opinion embeds a variety of narratives, culminating 
in a formula story or master narrative, suggests Papke, which ‘articulate normative 
understandings of social life’.368 Master narratives arrange themselves into genres, 
according to Papke, and each genre has a fundamental, basically fixed formula. 
Individual judges develop variations, but the formula remains essentially the same 
until supplanted by a new one. These master narratives ‘constitute virtual morality 
tales for the dominant system.’369 The master narrative of homosexuality, for 
example, seemed to be one of getting rid of a diseased, cancerous part of society, or at 
least hiding and containing it. This narrative was supplanted after the constitution as 
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one of acceptance of difference. 
 
If law is its own linguistic register within its own discourse, it can be described 
linguistically and discursively ‘in terms of its systematic appropriation and privileging 
of legally recognized meanings, accents and connotations (modes of inclusion), and 
its simultaneous rejection of alternative and competing meanings and accents, forms 
of utterance and discourse generally, as extrinsic, unauthorized or threatening (modes 
of exclusion)’.370 Considering first what is included in the text, ‘[w]ords are arguably 
the fundamental element of law’, the ‘quantifiable building blocks of judicial 
opinions’.371
 
When Joe Rollins makes this rather obvious observation, he is focusing on the text, 
the actual words, phrases, and sentences as written. The text of a judgment is rich and 
diverse; apart from the actual decision, it can comprise ‘factual restatements, critiques 
of lower courts, presentations of conflicting arguments, attempts to frame crucial 
questions, invocations of various precedents, freshly imagined hypotheticals, extended 
exercises in syllogistic reasoning, and a wide range of historical and social policy 
discussions’.372 In South Africa one could add that it also contains extracts from 
Roman and Dutch authorities, and extracts from legislation. Through the inclusion of 
these various, distinct sources, a judgment takes on a certain form which places it 
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within a distinct literary genre. 
 
But a judgment also has substance, naturally. Nearly all who approach a case do so for 
its substance, particularly for its ratio and precedential value. Very few approach a 
judgment for its form, its genre. Fewer still stop to consider whether form and 
substance have any relationship. For Benjamin Cardoza a strong form leads to 
unassailable substance: ‘[t]he strength that is born of form and the feebleness that is 
born of the lack of form are in truth qualities of the substance’.373 J B White agrees 
with Cardoza that form gives essence to content. Applying this to judgments, he 
shows how the opinion is often neglected as mere form in favour of the result. Only 
for purposes of discussion will White accept ‘the rather common separation of the 
opinion from the result, the form from the content’,374 otherwise he maintains that the 
two are inseparable. Foregrounding the opinion, he suggests that it is in this part of the 
text where the judge ‘explains or justifies or otherwise talks about the decision that he 
… [has] reached in a particular case’.375
 
White reasons that the judge cannot grant authority to the ‘result simpliciter’ since a 
result is expressed in text; not as some reification beyond the text.376 The result is the 
‘result as characterized’,377 ‘an act for which meaning is claimed’378 by the opinion. It 
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is in the opinion that the judge is meant to give his reasons for coming to a particular 
result. Like results, reasons are also expressed in text, not ‘reified propositions’.379 
Through the text of the opinion the reader is entitled to see the judge’s ‘method of 
thought’, his way of imagining the world and his own role within it, his intellectual 
and literary procedures, his sense of the shape of a proper argument, including what 
counts as a result.380 If a judgment is to be classed excellent then it has to be so in 
form combined with substance, an ‘excellence of thought, represented and enacted in 
language’.381 In keeping with Cardoza, the feebleness that is born of lack of form 
arising from, for example, ‘narrow minded or unperceptive or dishonest or 
authoritarian’382 reasoning reflects in the quality of the substance – the result. The 
separation of opinion from the result is an artificial construct; each informs the other 
and should be read as a single stretch of text. 
 
Without the aid of the opinion component, there would be no precedent, J B White 
maintains, since later judges would ‘not know what the cases meant’.383 Merely 
restating previous decisions would not count as stare decisis. There would be no 
indication as to how past judges perceived the cases they decided or why they decided 
them as they did. There would be no way for present judges to speak about the past 
                                                                                                                                            
378 White, J. B., Justice as translation, p. 92. 
379 White, J. B., What’s an opinion for?, p. 1366. 
380 Ibid., p. 1366. 
381 Ibid., p. 1367. 
382 Ibid., p. 1368. 
383 Ibid., p. 1364. 
 120
events. Different cases in ‘varying contexts’384 will ‘define the cluster of opinions that 
count … with special force’.385 This variety imputes to a topic’s ‘key terms a … 
richness and complexity and clarity, a location in our experience, that they could not 
otherwise have’.386 For Posner, each previous case is an ‘effort to formulate, refine, or 
apply a concept’, which future judges can ‘revise … to make it approximate the 
concept better’.387 Reflexively, current decisions ‘must be warranted by past decisions 
read together, against the backdrop of historical experience’.388 Both White and 
Posner strike me as ingenuous in not being able to see the power judges have to 
manipulate previous cases. As Karl Llewellyn notes, ‘there is no precedent that the 
judge may not at his need either file down to razor thinness or expand into a 
bludgeon’.389 The section on the history of sodomy in Chapter Five illustrates how 
cases do not always follow the ideals of stare decisis. They are more in keeping with 
Foucault’s view of meeting each text on its own terms without trying to impute a 
teleological purpose. 
 
Instead of taking full account of the whole judgment, lawyers often embark on a 
‘brutal reductiveness’ of rule-seeking and treat opinions as ‘cluttered display cases 
containing isolated pieces of legal jewellery’390 and the rest is dismissed as ‘mere 
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dicta’.391 Papke says that this evaluative divide is short-sighted because the formula 
story resides in the dicta ‘more general and mythic than precise and specific’392 and is 
lost to lawyers intent only upon the ‘application of static rule to freeze-frame fact’.393
 
This rule-to-fact correspondence chimes with positivists, but clashes with Hayden 
White. If ‘law’ is objective and reified, as positivists believe, White assists here in 
suggesting that law cannot exist outside of narrative when he explores what a ‘non-
narrative representation of historical reality’ would look like.394 Judges reading 
previous cases are, like historians, reading historical texts. They share with other 
readers of history that it is not enough that an historical account deal in real events in 
chronological order; the events must also be narrated, ‘revealed as possessing a 
structure, an order of meaning, that they do not possess as mere sequence’.395 The 
example he gives is of a medieval annalist merely listing events: 709 Hard winter. 
Duke Gottfried died. 710 Hard year, deficient in crops. 712 Floods everywhere, etc. 
This would be similar to merely listing the results of previous judgments. The 
annalist’s account ‘remains something less than a proper history if he has failed to 
give to reality the form of a story’.396
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Even in these seemingly bald statements there is subjectivity. The winter of 709 may 
not have been ‘hard’ to a polar bear, why is Duke Gottfried’s death deemed important 
enough to record, at what cut-off point do crops become ‘deficient’, would 710 be a 
‘hard’ year if one’s barns were full of grain, the absence of an event in 711 is in itself 
a subjective decision, etc. The positivists would have a discourse where the rulings 
appear chronologically, unadorned of narration, speaking for themselves. But surely 
objective ‘law’ should not have to speak for itself, but should simply be? Viewed this 
way, law becomes as enigmatic as Descartes’ triangle: ‘[w]hereas Descartes, speaking 
of the properties of triangles, stated, “No one can say that I have invented or imagined 
them”, mathematicians today say precisely this’.397 Has the law always ‘been there’ 
just like a triangle, or does a judge, like Descartes, have to imagine it into being? 
 
So far I have considered what is included in a judgment, the ‘facts’, the opinion and 
the ruling. However, judges also leave things out of their judgments. It is more 
difficult to comment on what is not said in a judgment but the insights this exercise 
reveals are rewarding. I conclude this section with a comment on the significance of 
this silence. Specific gaps which I have found in the corpus are discussed in the 
commentary and conclusions chapter. 
 
Stanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux emphasize the centrality of text: ‘ascertaining 
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the meaning of texts is a central reality of any legal system’.398 However, they also 
encourage questions such as: What does the judgment leave out?, What is repressed in 
the judgment?, What does the judgment disregard?, What does the judgment consider 
unimportant?, and What does the judgment put in the margins? 399
 
For Terry Eagleton it is in the exclusion and repression of text that ideology presents 
itself most strongly – ‘It is in the significant silences of a text, in its gaps and absences 
that the presence of ideology can be most positively felt. It is these silences which the 
critic must make “speak”’.400 A technique to draw out these silences is the use of 
counterfactuals (if-then statements or contrary-to-fact speculations), as suggested by 
Hirsch.401 Not just idle speculation, ‘[i]nterpreters sometimes need to imagine what a 
text from the past would mean if it were being reauthored in the present’.402 J B White 
acknowledges, without expanding, that looking at the text out of context affords, ‘no 
reliable way for talking about what is left out or for criticizing the cultural context in 
which these forms occur: their unstated premises, their enacted but implicit values, 
their relation to their larger world …. [W]hat is needed is …. a responsible way of 
paying attention to … the social and cultural context of the text … to the ‘unsaid’…. 
What is needed is a cultural or ideological criticism’.403 We are again, therefore, led 
back to the importance of placing a text within a context. 
                                                          
398 Levinson, S. & Mailloux, S., Interpreting law and literature, p. ix. 
399 Ibid., p. ix, paraphrased and made applicable to court judgments. 
400 Eagleton, T., Marxism and literary criticism, p. 34. 
401 Hirsch, E. D., Counterfactuals in interpretation, pp. 55-68. 
402 Ibid., p. 55. 
403 White, J. B., Heracles’ bow, p. 122. 
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 The grammar of sexuality 
Naming 
The choice of terms which judges use shows that ideological decisions are behind 
each choice. Categories do not arise naturally or randomly, says Mark Kessler, ‘but 
rather reflect social relations and power. Unstated norms … are consistent with the 
values, interests, and “mode of living” shared by dominant groups’.404
 
The words ‘heterosexual’ and its derivatives are used seventy-four times in the corpus 
and mainly relate to ‘normal’ sex as being heterosexual, or to differentiate between 
male-male and male-female anal intercourse: 
‘… normal heterosexual relationships’405
‘A heterosexual norm was established’406
‘… heterosexual hegemony’407
‘… heterosexual anal intercourse’408
‘Heterosexual intercourse per anum falls outside the definition of sodomy’409
 
The term ‘straights’ for heterosexuals is used only twice in the corpus, both by Sachs 
J – ‘there is no evidence before us that gays are either wealthier or poorer than the rest 
                                                          
404 Kessler, M., Legal discourse and political intolerance, p. 566. 
405 S v M 1990 (2) SACR 509 (E), 514. 
406 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 68. 
407 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 56. 
408 S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C), 478. 
409 High Court National Coalition, 109. 
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of society. Nor are they as individuals necessarily less represented than straights in the 
corridors of political, economic, social, cultural, judicial or security force power’, and 
‘catching and prosecuting criminals who prey on gays and straights alike’.410 
Dictionaries still flag ‘straight’ as informal which shows his willingness to be avant 
garde. 
 
The word ‘gay’ or ‘gays’ is used nearly a hundred times in the corpus. All its uses are 
from 1995 to 1999. The Constitutional Court National Coalition case uses the word 
‘gay’ eighty-seven times; eighty-eight percent of the use of the word is in this one 
case. The distribution of the word between the judgments of Ackermann and Sachs JJ 
is equal in proportion to the length of their judgments. The popularity of the term gay 
‘testifies to its potential as a non-clinical descriptor unburdened by the pathologising 
history of sexology’.411
 
The word ‘gay’ is first used in a reported judgment in 1990 in S v M412 – ‘It is 
common knowledge that so-called gay clubs are formed, where homosexuals openly 
meet and have social intercourse’. It is used with the adjective ‘so-called’, indicating 
that such clubs are generally referred to by the term ‘gay’ but that not everyone 
accepts this name. This quote is then repeated by Ackermann J in S v H413 and this is 
how it first came to be used in the South African Law Reports. 
                                                          
410 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 65 & 67. 
411 Jagose, A., Queer theory, p. 73. 
412 1990 (2) SACR 509 (E), 514. 
413 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 123. 
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 The next time it is used is in the same case, by Ackermann J in direct reference to an 
article by Cameron, which is quoted in the judgment – ‘Even when these provisions 
are not enforced, they reduce gay men and women to what one author has referred to 
as “unapprehended felons”’.414 It is used elsewhere in the same judgment, again from 
quoting from Cameron’s article.415
 
After this, in S v Kampher,416 Farlam J quotes from academic law journals which use 
the word ‘gay’.417 Farlam J does not use the term himself in this judgment of over 
16,000 words. Similarly, in the High Court National Coalition case, the only time the 
word ‘gay’ is used is because it happens to form part of the name of the applicant. 
Like Farlam J, Heher J does not use it once in a judgment of some 16,500 words. This 
indicates a conscious effort by both judges not to appropriate the term. 
 
In the Constitutional Court National Coalition case, the word ‘gay’ is embedded 
fourteen times in six of the holdings alone.418 Again, Cameron is quoted in relation to 
the use of gay – ‘In what follows I rely heavily on an influential article written by Prof 
Edwin Cameron. Edwin Cameron ‘Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test 
                                                          
414 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 127, quoting Cameron, E. 1993, ‘Sexual orientation and the 
constitution: a test case for human rights’, SALJ, vol. 110, p. 450, p. 455. 
415 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 128, quoting Cameron, E. 1993, ‘Sexual orientation and the 
constitution: a test case for human rights’, SALJ, vol. 110, p. 450, p. 464. 
416 1997 (4) SA 460 (C). 
417 On pp. 467, 483 & 485 all by way of quotations from Cameron, E. 1993, ‘Sexual 
orientation and the constitution: a test case for human rights’, SALJ, vol. 110, p. 450. 
418 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 7-10. 
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Case for Human Rights’ (1993) 110 SALJ 450 .... I have followed Cameron’s use of 
the expressions ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’ and ‘homosexual’’.419
 
Homosexuality is first mentioned in the SALR in 1952, but not in its own right.420 The 
first time homosexuality debuts in its own right is in 1954 drum-rolled by the 
adjective ‘disgusting’.421 The law has encountered ‘intractable difficulties’ in its 
efforts to write ‘coherent definitions of the homosexuals upon whom legal burdens 
may be placed’, especially when referring to lesbians, says Janet Halley.422 Lesbians 
are referred to as homosexuals only three times in the corpus, each time marked with 
the adjective ‘female’.423 The unmarked term ‘homosexual’ refers to males, for 
example, ‘anal intercourse between men and women is not penalised by law, while 
between males it is a criminal offence, which in the nature of things strikes only at 
homosexuals’.424 Several cases which are clearly about homosexuality do not mention 
the word at all.425
 
The terminology is sometimes loose and indiscriminate, for example, ‘No legitimate 
                                                          
419 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 25. 
420 R v C 1952 (1) SA 635 (C), a female prostitution case which referred to Horton v Mead, 
1913 (1) KB 154 concerning homosexual soliciting. 
421 R v E 1954 (4) SA 501 (SR), 501 (‘a disgusting act of homosexuality’). 
422 Halley, J. E., The politics of the closet, p. 948. 
423 S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C), 475; High Court National Coalition, 128 (twice). 
424 High Court National Coalition, 103. 
425 For example, R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD; R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385; R v L 1951 
(4) SA 614 (A); S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA). 
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basis for treating homosexual men and women differently from heterosexuals’.426 
Since homosexuals can only be men or women, there was no need to spell this out. 
Also, ‘To protect children from being exposed to anything which might connote 
approval of homosexuality or lesbianism’.427 This is like distinguishing between 
flowers or roses. By 1993 it was nuanced to such a degree that a man who persuaded a 
15-year-old boy to engage in fondling and masturbation, was ‘neither a homosexual 
nor a paedophile but that he suffered from an inferiority complex which led to his 
inability to form sexual relationships with people of his own age’.428
 
The word ‘lesbian’ is referred to ninety times and ‘lesbianism’ eleven times. It is 
mostly referred to in the context of motherhood. 
 
Words and metaphors 
A large part of the constitutive nature of rhetoric is in the choice of words and 
metaphors. Anti-homosexual rhetoric uses pejorative words and metaphors. This 
changes under constitutional discourse where the informing metaphors are of the 
acknowledgment of scarring caused and whether healing can take place. 
 
Words 
Words, especially adjectives, carry value judgments. Adjectives are usually subjective 
                                                          
426 High Court National Coalition, 102. 
427 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 325. 
428 S v R 1993 (1) SA 476 (A), 479. 
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and indicate the subjective feelings of the speaker. There are many ways of ‘wording’ 
a meaning. There are always alternative ways of giving meaning to a situation which 
entails interpreting from a particular ideological perspective. From 1926 through to 
1990, judges used a number of pejorative words to refer to homosexuality.  
 
The following words are used in the extracts below: abhorrent (3), depraved (2), 
disapproval, disgust(ing) (5), filthy (2), horrible, odious, perversity, profoundly 
repulsive, reprehensible (2), repugnant to nature, revulsion, sexually perverted, shame, 
and unacceptable. 
 
The following are extracts from the judgments showing the context in which these 
words are used. 
 
‘[A]cts of indecency’ between two consenting adult men ‘of so disgusting a nature 
that I refrain from repeating them’.429
 
For one young man to try and touch the penis of another man, outside of his clothing, 
is ‘odious and reprehensible’.430
 
‘[U]nnatural acts …. These offences were regarded as so abhorrent to all ideas of 
                                                          
429 R v Baxter & another 1928 AD 430, 431. 
430 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 351. 
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decency, that they ought to be punished’.431
 
Of male-male intercrural sex, in three separate cases: 
‘There has been no change in public opinion, which would cause such conduct to be 
regarded as otherwise than abhorrent’.432
 
‘I imagine that most people would consider the defendant’s conduct in the present 
case much more abhorrent than adultery …. the gross conduct of the defendant was ... 
sexually perverted and depraved’.433
 
‘… the horrible nature of the act’434
 
Of homosexual acts in general, ‘it is the attribution of perversity and shame to 
spontaneous bodily affection’.435
 
‘Gays constitute a distinct though invisible section of the community that has been 
treated not only with disrespect or condescension but with disapproval and revulsion; 
they are not generally obvious as a group, pressurised by society and the law to 
                                                          
431 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 162. 
432 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 163. 
433 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 170 & 171. 
434 R v Taylor 1927 CPD 16, 19. 
435 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 66. 
 131
remain invisible’.436
 
‘… conduct … profoundly repulsive as depraved and repugnant to nature’437
 
‘… acts of sodomy unacceptable and reprehensible’438
 
‘Where a male performed this disgusting act upon himself’439
 
‘… a disgusting act of homosexuality’440
 
‘the court should suppress its dismay and disgust at the nature of the offence’441
 
‘This [letter] contains a filthy story …. a disgusting story, and a filthy allusion to the 
private parts’.442
 
Metaphors 
Judges use several metaphors in relation to homosexuality. To draw attention to a 
judge’s metaphors might be considered disparaging, like praising his ability to use 
                                                          
436 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 66. 
437 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 79. 
438 S v M 1990 (2) SACR 509 (E), 514. 
439 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386. 
440 R v E 1954 (4) SA 501 (SR), 501. 
441 Baptie v S 1963 (1) PH H96 (N), 225. 
442 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 387. 
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long words. This would be so if by metaphor I mean the simplistic definition 
schoolchildren learn, that a metaphor is a similarity or comparison without using ‘as’ 
or ‘like’. This implies that metaphors can be translated into a literal paraphrase 
without any loss of cognitive content. Metaphors are not just superficial stylistic 
adornments. 
 
A metaphor brings together in a single word or phrase the image of two or more 
things or relationships and out of them creates a third. Metaphors result from a 
‘cognitive process that juxtaposes two or more not normally associated referents, 
producing a semantic conceptual anomaly, the symptom of which is usually emotional 
tension’.443 A metaphor is part of a rhetorical process by which factual narrative can 
be refashioned in the same way as fiction can. Metaphors are pervasive and are not 
only limited to fiction. 
 
When a judge signifies something through one metaphor rather than another, he is 
constructing reality in one way rather than another. The metaphors used for 
homosexuality are mostly pejorative, for example depicting homosexuals as diseased. 
Metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of 
knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and fundamental way. People in power, like 
judges, get to impose their metaphors. They therefore get to define what society 
considers to be true. The idea that a judge, through metaphors, can create a reality 
                                                          
443 MacCormac, E. R., Cognitive theory of metaphor, p. 5. 
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goes against most traditional views of metaphor. The reason is that a metaphor has 
traditionally been viewed as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a 
means of structuring our conceptual system. It is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor 
but the perceptions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are 
sanctioned by it.444
 
An uncontrollable appetite 
The phrase ‘gratify sexual lust’ and associated adjectives (‘perverted’, ‘depraved’ and 
‘unnatural’), together with the word ‘carnal’,445 form a metaphor that homosexual sex 
is a purely physical, strong, uncontrollable sexual appetite. The appetite is in need of 
constant gratification. This metaphor is even embedded in legislation.446
 
The following are extracts from the corpus: 
‘gratify his sexual lust by … handling the private parts of …’447
‘habitual gratification of a particular perverted lust’448
‘he did gratify his sexual lust by …’449
                                                          
444 Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M., Metaphors we live by, p. 158. 
445 In the corpus, ‘carnal’ is used in the following contexts: carnal intercourse, carnal 
connection, carnal acts contrary to the order of nature, unnatural carnal acts, carnal knowledge 
had against the order of nature (per anum).  
446 S20A(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 – ‘A male person who commits with 
another male person at a party any act which is calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to 
give sexual gratification, shall be guilty of an offence’. 
447 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 350. 
448 Thompson v K (HL) [1918] A.C. 221, 235. The same phrase from the Thompson case is 
used in R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A), 620 and S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13. This is the last time 
‘lust’ is used in the corpus. 
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‘to stimulate the depraved lusts of those given to such practices’450
‘gratification of sexual lust’451
‘unnatural lust’452
‘unnatural gratification of lust’453
 
Disease 
Homosexuality is likened to a disease in need of curing. In some of the extracts it is a 
biological condition whereas in others it is a mental disease. The metaphor is 
dismantled under two constitutional cases. 
 
One man gave another man a lift. The driver propositioned the passenger who took 
offence at the suggestion. On sentencing the judge said, ‘It may be that the appellant 
is more in need of a physician than a gaoler and, indeed, Mr Young has undertaken on 
his behalf that he will leave the Colony to return to his own country for the purposes 
of treatment’.454
 
A man was said to have committed sodomy with an adult male and two boys. He was 
sentenced to 12 months prison with hard labour, partly suspended provided that he 
                                                                                                                                            
449 S v V 1967 (2) SA 17 (E), 17. 
450 Thompson v K (HL) [1918] AC 221. 
451 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 161. 
452 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 161. 
453 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 169. 
454 R v E 1954 (4) SA 501 (SR), 502. 
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submit himself to medical treatment. According to Ramsbottom J, this was a 
‘biological condition which … is very difficult to cure – very difficult indeed …. 
although Dr Pienaar holds out little hope for the redemption of this man, he does not 
say that there is no hope’.455
 
A man, looking for a woman, instead had sex with another man. He was sentenced to 
fifteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour, partly suspended provided that he 
undergo psychiatric treatment and not commit a similar offence. The ‘appellant was 
prepared to submit to psychiatric care and in fact had actually consulted one Dr. 
Baker, a psychiatrist’.456 The ‘desire to commit these unnatural offences stems from 
some form of mental disease. Where, therefore, the reformation of the accused, in the 
sense that he may be cured of his disease, can be combined with the other aspects of 
punishment, some consideration may in an appropriate case be given to suspending a 
portion of the sentence on condition that the accused undergoes suitable treatment’.457
 
Two men engaged in unspecified consensual sex, referred to a ‘gross indecency’. 
According to the judge, ‘I think it is now well understood as a result of the recent 
advances in medical knowledge that offences of this kind, involving perversity, are 
offences which have a background in the disordered mental condition of the 
                                                          
455 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52 & 53. 
456 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 90. 
457 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 90. 
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perpetrators and that they can usually be cured by psychiatric treatment’.458
 
In two judgments,459 Ackermann and Heher JJ dismantle the disease metaphor. Both 
do so by quoting from an article by Edwin Cameron: ‘More enlightened current 
attitudes approach homosexuality as a natural sexual variant unlinked to any 
pathology, part of what Susan Sontag refers to as “the ineradicable variousness of 
expression of sexual feeling”’.460 ‘Cameron’s article continues: “This implies .... that 
homosexual orientation is not in itself evidence of illness or depravity” .... I 
respectfully agree’.461
 
In fact extensive use is made of Cameron’s article,462 first by counsel for the National 
Coalition in the High Court case463 and by Ackermann and Sachs JJ in the 
Constitutional Court case. This is a good example of intertextuality. Ackermann J 
said, ‘In what follows I rely heavily on an influential article written by Prof Edwin 
Cameron. Edwin Cameron ‘Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for 
Human Rights’ (1993) 110 SALJ 450. The article is a revised version of an inaugural 
lecture delivered by the author on 27 October 1992 on the acceptance by him of an ad 
                                                          
458 S v Baptie 1963 (1) PH H96, 225. 
459 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C) and High Court National Coalition. 
460 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 128. Ackermann J quoting Cameron, E. 1993, ‘Sexual 
orientation and the constitution: a test case for human rights’, SALJ, vol. 110, p. 450, p. 458. 
461 High Court National Coalition, 112. Heher J quoting Cameron, E. 1993, ‘Sexual 
orientation and the constitution: a test case for human rights’, SALJ, vol. 110, p. 450, p. 465. 
462 Cameron, E., Sexual orientation and the constitution, p. 450. 
463 High Court National Coalition, 111 (‘Counsel, following Cameron, ‘Sexual Orientation 
and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights’ 110 (1993) SALJ 450-72, submitted 
that, …’). 
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hominem professorship in law at the University of the Witwatersrand. Despite the fact 
that it was conceived some 18 months prior to the adoption of the interim 
Constitution, its depth and lucidity of analysis is just as instructive in the present era 
when sexual orientation has indeed achieved constitutional protection’.464 Cameron’s 
credentials are specifically noted. He is not referred to as a professor of law, but has 
an ad hominem professorship in law at the University of the Witwatersrand. Sachs J 
also held this article in high regard, ‘This special vulnerability … is well brought out 
by Cameron in the germinal article to which my learned Colleague refers’.465
 
Exposure to contamination 
Another metaphor likens homosexuality to something contagious, or something which 
causes harm when exposed, like radioactive material. 
 
In a 1968 parliamentary report, homosexuals are referred to as ‘unpredictable 
pestilence …. as with every virulent infection, it spreads’.466
 
Homosexuals ‘are seen as especially contagious or prone to corrupting others. None 
of these factors applies to other groups traditionally subject to discrimination’.467
 
                                                          
464 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 25. 
465 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 66. 
466 Select Committee, Republic of South Africa. (1968). Report of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report 7-1968), p. 26. 
467 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 66 (per Sachs J). 
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‘… persons indulging in the conduct therein contemplated [homosexual acts] are 
required … not to expose others thereto’.468
 
‘… books on ‘male bonding’ which lie exposed to the inspection of all and sundry, 
including children, in the reputable bookshops of Johannesburg’.469 The reference to 
children ties in with the popular belief that homosexuality corrupts children and 
adolescents. Gay men in particular are ‘accused of child-abuse, with its associated 
implication of contamination and infectious spread of the condition’.470
 
The metaphor is even embedded in a judge’s order – ‘The applicant is ordered to take 
all reasonable steps and do all things necessary in order to prevent the children being 
exposed to lesbianism’.471
 
The exposure metaphor is also found in the section 20A cases which deal with privacy 
issues.472 The first case involving s20A gives an oblique acknowledgment of privacy 
between males. Gordon J says, ‘The object of the section is clearly not to punish acts 
performed in private, as long as no more than two persons are present on any such 
                                                          
468 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 77. 
469 High Court National Coalition, 110. 
470 Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 93. 
471 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 332. 
472 S20A of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957: ‘(1) A male person who commits with 
another male person at a party any act which is calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to 
give sexual gratification, shall be guilty of an offence. (2) For the purposes of ss (1) ‘a party’ 
means any occasion where more than two persons are present.’ 
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occasion’.473 Ackermann J also interpreted this section as affording privacy, ‘It … 
indicates that the Legislature has accepted in principle that insofar as certain sexual 
acts between consenting males are concerned privacy is recognised, albeit obliquely, 
as a right, inasmuch as it serves to ward off the intrusions of the criminal law in this 
protected sphere’.474
 
However, the next (and last) time a s20A case is heard, Schabort J quotes Gordon J to 
give privacy a different spin in keeping with the exposure metaphor – ‘It seems likely 
… that the Legislature’s intention in introducing 20A was to stamp out homosexual 
gatherings …. It also seems likely, I would add, that it was intended to prevent the 
obtrusion of conduct which, from time immemorial, has to many people been 
profoundly repulsive as depraved and repugnant to nature …. As I perceive the 
intention of the Legislature according to the nature, purpose and scope of s20A, 
persons indulging in the conduct therein contemplated are required to do so with due 
foresight and care as not to impose their behaviour upon others and as not to expose 
others thereto. They are in a position to determine the time and venue for their 
intimate actions and they can ensure that they will take place in private’.475
 
Heher J also favours the containment interpretation, ‘When two persons submit what 
would normally be regarded as an act of intimacy to the gaze of others with the 
                                                          
473 S v C 1983 (4) SA 361 (T), 364. 
474 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 123. 
475 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 79 & 80. 
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intention to debauch, I seriously doubt whether the privacy which the Constitution 
seeks to protect arises at all, even though the doors be barred to unrestricted public 
access’.476
 
A cancer in society 
Justice Minister PC Pelser, speaking in Parliament on 21 April 1967 said, ‘And who 
can deny that this was also the canker that afflicted the Biblical Sodom? No, Sir, 
history has given us a clear warning and we should not allow ourselves to be deceived 
into thinking that we may casually dispose of this viper in our midst by regarding it as 
innocent fun. It is a proven fact that sooner or later homosexual instincts make their 
effects felt on a community if they are permitted to run riot .... Therefore we should be 
on the alert and do what there is to do lest we be saddled later with a problem which 
will be the utter ruin of our spiritual and moral fibre’.477
 
Branding 
There is a metaphorical branding similar to Hester’s in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet 
letter where she was branded with an ‘A’ for adultery. Examples of this metaphor are 
found in the following extracts. The first two are actual instances of the branding 
metaphor whilst the last recognizes how branding stigmatizes. 
 
This quote comes from an English case but is repeated in two SALR cases: ‘Persons, 
                                                          
476 High Court National Coalition, 130. 
477 Quoted in Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 98. 
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however, who commit the offences now under consideration seek the habitual 
gratification of a particular perverted lust, which not only takes them out of the class 
of ordinary men gone wrong, but stamps them with the hall-mark of a specialized and 
extraordinary class as much as if they carried on their bodies some physical 
peculiarity’.478
 
One young man placed his hand, outside the clothing, on the penis of another young 
man causing Tredgold J to remark: ‘it is most undesirable that a young man should be 
unjustifiably branded with a conviction for a crime which is generally regarded as 
particularly odious and reprehensible’.479
 
Ackermann J, ‘in the eyes of the legal system all gay men were criminals. The stigma 
thus attached to a significant proportion of the population was manifest’.480 Sachs J, 
‘difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation, stigma and 
punishment’.481 Both judges address ‘those stigmas that are not yet unfashionable, 
those hatreds that are still countenanced, those prejudices that are still fostered by 
those in authority, and those discriminations that are still widely licensed’.482
 
Scarring 
                                                          
478 Thompson v K (HL) [1918] A.C. 221, 235. This same quote is repeated in R v L 1951 (4) 
SA 614 (A), 620 and S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13. 
479 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 351. 
480 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 8. 
481 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 67. 
482 Cameron, E., Constitutional protection of sexual orientation, p. 650. 
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In pre-constitutional discourse the metaphors are ones of disease, cancer, 
contamination and branding. Under constitutional discourse the metaphor is one of 
scarring and healing – what scars were caused and can healing take place? 
 
‘The objective is to determine … if the group concerned is subjected to scarring’.483
 
‘Inequality is established … through differentiation which perpetuates disadvantage 
and leads to the scarring of the sense of dignity and self-worth associated with 
membership of the group’.484
 
‘In the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the scarring comes not from 
poverty or powerlessness, but from invisibility’.485
 
‘… gay men were a permanent minority in society and had suffered in the past from 
patterns of disadvantage. The impact was severe, affecting the dignity, personhood 
and identity of gay men at a deep level. It occurred at many levels and in many ways 
and was often difficult to eradicate’.486
 
‘The discrimination had gravely affected the rights and interests of gay men and 
                                                          
483 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 58. 
484 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 65. 
485 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 66. 
486 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 7. 
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deeply impaired their fundamental dignity’.487
 
‘The common law prohibition on sodomy criminalised all sexual intercourse per 
anum between men: regardless of the relationship of the couple who engaged therein, 
of the age of such couple, of the place where it occurred, or indeed of any other 
circumstances whatsoever. In so doing, it punished a form of sexual conduct which 
was identified by the broader society with homosexuals. Its symbolic effect was to 
state that in the eyes of the legal system all gay men were criminals’.488
 
‘As a result of the criminal offence, gay men were at risk of arrest, prosecution and 
conviction of the offence of sodomy simply because they sought to engage in sexual 
conduct which was part of their experience of being human. A law which punished a 
form of sexual expression for gay men degraded and devalued gay men in broader 
society’.489
 
‘… the sodomy offence builds insecurity and vulnerability into the daily lives of gay 
men. There can be no doubt that the existence of a law which punishes a form of 
sexual expression for gay men degrades and devalues gay men in our broader society. 
As such it is a palpable invasion of their dignity’.490
 
                                                          
487 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 8. 
488 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 8. 
489 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 8. 
490 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 28-29. 
 144
‘… the present case highlights just how egregious the invasion of the constitutional 
rights of gay persons has been’.491
 
‘… the violation of equality by the anti-sodomy laws is all the more egregious 
because it touches the deep, invisible and intimate side of people’s lives’.492
 
‘The crime forbids the satisfaction of that basic need and deprives a person of that 
sexual orientation of physical, emotional and psychological outlets while his 
heterosexual compeers face no such obstacle’.493
 
Choice of perspective 
The choices of descriptors (such as homosexual or gay) and the different adjectives 
and metaphors used are the outward manifestation of certain perspectives which 
judges held. These are discussed under the headings abnormal sex vs. normal sex, 
essentialism vs. constructivism, and choice vs. immutability.  
 
Abnormal sex vs. normal sex 
The pre-constitutional discourse indicates that homosexual acts are abnormal by 
referring to them as ‘against the order of nature’. The concept of abnormal is also 
found in the use of the term ‘unnatural’, which adjective involves ‘a value judgment 
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varying from country to country, race to race, and age to age: it has little if any 
objective content’.494 ‘Unnatural’ is ‘colourless and is no indication of an offence’,495 
‘does not even have a sexual connotation’,496 and its meaning is ‘by no means 
clear’.497
 
According to one judge, it is sex other than per vaginam which renders the act against 
the order of nature. The ‘act legislated against involves the entry of the male organ 
into some orifice in the body of a man, woman or animal, the words “against the order 
of nature” however excluding from the operation of the section, entry into a woman’s 
vagina’.498 This is the most explicit statement in the corpus to indicate this. The other 
extracts are about acts between males. There are no cases which relate to sex between 
females. The control of sex is effected by means of a sexual norm – heterosexual 
monogamy – and any form of sexuality that threatens that norm is designated ‘against 
nature’. 
 
In some cases the phrase ‘against the order of nature’ is embedded in the charge: 
The ‘accused [was] convicted ... with “committing an unnatural offence” .... in that 
[he] did wrongfully and unlawfully and against the order of nature have a venereal 
affair with one T [a male], to wit, did insert his penis between the thighs of the said T 
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and move it backwards and forwards’.499
 
The accused ‘did wrongfully and unlawfully, and against the order of nature, gratify 
or attempt to gratify his sexual lust by placing his hand upon, and by handling the 
private parts of a certain [male]’.500
 
The ‘appellant was guilty of an unnatural offence in that he did gratify his sexual lust 
by an act against the order of nature, to wit, performing masturbation on the 
complainant and allowing the complainant to perform masturbation on him’.501
 
There were two pre-constitutional cases brought by lesbian mothers which relate to 
normality and abnormality. Surprisingly, the 1960 Marais case502 does not raise 
normality or abnormality whereas the 1994 Van Rooyen case503 mentions it explicitly. 
The Van Rooyen case was heard just before the 1993 interim constitution504 and was 
presided over by Flemming DJP. De Villiers AJ’s comments in 1960 indicate that it 
was possible to approach homosexuality from a fair, unbiased point of view, despite 
no constitutional backing. These two cases are analyzed in more detail in Chapter 
Five. 
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The V v V case505 was heard in terms of the 1996 Constitution and is a useful contrast 
to the Van Rooyen case because the facts are similar yet the treatment is different. 
This is also a child custody case where the father tried to limit the access of the 
mother because she was in a lesbian relationship. 
 
Here Foxcroft J states that the judge in the Van Rooyen case should not have 
designated homosexuals as abnormal: ‘Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen ... where the Court 
made a moral judgment about what was normal and correct insofar as sexuality was 
concerned. It was clear that the Judge in that case had regarded homosexuality as 
being per se abnormal …. It was thus, in law, wrong to describe a homosexual 
orientation as abnormal (as had been done in the Van Rooyen case)’.506
 
A 1995 case straddles the pre- and constitutional periods when Ackermann J, 
criticizing Jansen J, challenged the heterosexual norm for the first time in a reported 
judgment.507
 
In 1990 Jansen J said, ‘The majority of people, who have normal heterosexual 
relationships, may find acts of sodomy unacceptable and reprehensible’.508 In 
response Ackermann J said, ‘In the … passages from S v M …, reference is made to 
“normal heterosexual relationships” in a context which implies that homosexual 
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relationships are abnormal in a sense other than the mere fact that they are statistically 
in the minority. In my respectful view the use of the word “normal” in this context is 
unfortunate, as it might suggest a prejudgment of much current psychological and 
sociological opinion which is critical of various conventions and assumptions 
regarding human sexuality. It may also suggest a wrong line of enquiry when coming 
to re-evaluate the status of homosexual relationships’.509
 
Sachs J goes the furthest in analyzing normal and abnormal sexuality. He shows that 
heterosexuality is the embedded norm against which all other sexuality is compared. 
He debunks the entrenched heterosexual norm by referring to it as ‘spartan 
normality’,510 whilst still acknowledging that it is the ‘heterosexual hegemony’511 
against which homosexuals are ‘treated as failed heterosexuals’.512
 
In doing so, Sachs J is drawing on queer theory which attempts to dismantle the 
dominant/subordinate dichotomy altogether. In order for heterosexuality to be the 
norm, there has to be a sexuality abnormal to it: its existence is dependent on 
differentiation from the ‘other’. A binary division is thus established between 
heterosexuals and others. Since most of the population is (nominally) heterosexual, all 
other sexual minorities will be failed heterosexuals. By suggesting that 
heterosexuality is should not be the norm, Sachs J is questioning the norm-giving 
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category itself. 
 
In the National Coalition case he says, ‘The concept of sexual deviance needs to be 
reviewed. A heterosexual norm was established, gays were labelled deviant from the 
norm and difference was located in them …. What the Constitution requires is that the 
law and public institutions acknowledge the variability of human beings and affirm 
the equal respect and concern that should be shown to all as they are. At the very 
least, what is statistically normal ceases to be the basis for establishing what is legally 
normative. More broadly speaking, the scope of what is constitutionally normal is 
expanded to include the widest range of perspectives and to acknowledge, 
accommodate and accept the largest spread of difference. What becomes normal in an 
open society, then, is not an imposed and standardised form of behaviour that refuses 
to acknowledge difference, but the acceptance of the principle of difference itself, 
which accepts the variability of human behaviour’.513
 
Essentialism vs. constructivism 
There are two schools of thought about the nature of sexuality and sexual identity, the 
essentialists and the constructionists.514 Essentialists regard one’s sexual identity as 
transhistorical, fixed and culture-independent while constructionists assume sexual 
identity is fluid, the effect of social conditioning and culture-dependent. Same-sex 
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sexual acts have different cultural meanings in different historical contexts to 
constructionists. Although such acts have occurred throughout history, the people 
performing these acts were not necessarily viewed as ‘homosexuals’ by either others 
or themselves. 
 
To those who hold postmodern views, the constructionist view appeals, based largely 
on Foucault’s observations that, while there have always been same-sex sex acts, 
there had not always been a corresponding category of identification, until the late 
nineteenth century: ‘The nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a 
case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, a 
morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy anti possibly a mysterious physiology …. 
Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from 
the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the 
soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration, the homosexual was now a 
species’.515
 
According to this line of reasoning, prior to designating homosexuals a ‘species’, 
same-sex acts were condemned but a condemnatory name was not assigned to the 
person committing the act, ‘complete with an aberrant psychology and a unique 
character’.516 However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, mainly in medical 
discourses, the concept of the homosexual as an identifiable type of person emerges. 
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He is ‘no longer simply someone who participates in certain sexual acts, the 
homosexual begins to be defined fundamentally in terms of those very acts’.517
 
Deciding who is a ‘homosexual’ is clear-cut for the transhistorical, transcultural 
essentialist who would react incredulously to a comment from a man such as, ‘I’m not 
gay. If I was gay I would kiss the men I have sex with. I never kiss men’.518 A 
constructionist would accommodate the idea that different meanings can attach 
themselves to the same sexual acts. A few examples from the corpus illustrate the 
futility of trying to pigeon-hole erotic attraction. 
 
In one case Schabort J says, ‘The Lebane Steam Baths attracts and is frequently 
visited by, homosexual men. It is, however, also visited by heterosexual men’.519 The 
flynote refers to ‘homosexual acts’.520 Cameron refers to Lebane as ‘a well-known 
gay sauna in Johannesburg’.521 Lebane was a male-only sex-on-premises venue. It 
attracted any male who wanted to have sex with another male. Why, then, does 
Schabort J distinguish between homosexuals and heterosexuals, and why does 
Cameron designate it ‘gay’? 
 
According to Heher J, s20A of the Sexual Offences Act was ‘wide enough to strike at 
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conduct by heterosexual men in the presence of women only or in the presence of 
other heterosexual men’.522 He concludes that ‘the likelihood is that it was aimed at 
conduct directed by and at homosexuals …. the target of the section is plainly men 
with homosexual tendencies albeit that the wording is wide enough to embrace 
heterosexuals’.523 Both he and Schabort J suppose that heterosexual men perform 
same-sex sexual acts. 
 
Ackermann J is nearer the mark when he refers to ‘erotic attraction between adult 
members of the same sex’524 without distinguishing between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. Ackermann J specifically acknowledges that he is using Cameron’s 
definition of sexual orientation, ‘As to “sexual orientation”, I adopt the following 
definition put forward by Cameron – “sexual orientation is defined by reference to 
erotic attraction: in the case of heterosexuals, to members of the opposite sex; in the 
case of gays and lesbians, to members of the same sex. Potentially a homosexual or 
gay or lesbian person can therefore be anyone who is erotically attracted to members 
of his or her own sex’.525
 
However, this definition is also not ideal because it associates same-sex attraction 
with people, ‘homosexual’ or ‘gay or lesbian’. There are people who are attracted to 
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the same sex but who would not call themselves gay or homosexual. While many 
would describe themselves more or less unproblematically as homosexual, a number 
of ambiguous circumstances cast doubt on the precise delimitations of homosexuality 
as a descriptive category. For example, is the man who lives with his wife and 
children, but from time to time has casual or anonymous sex with other men, 
homosexual? Some men in this situation do not identify themselves as homosexual, 
for example, ‘It’s not important to me. I do it with men on occasions. It’s more 
important that I am married and love my wife .... It’s no one’s business what I do on 
my odd afternoon off’. Or another man who also rejected a gay identity, ‘I am also not 
really gay. Gay sex is something that I do 2-3 times a week. It amounts to so little of 
my time. If you were to add up the time I spend looking for and having sex with men 
it would total 1-2 hours weekly. The rest of the time I am heterosexual, married, a 
family man’.526 Is this the kind of man Schabort J had in mind when he said, ‘The 
Lebane Steam Baths attracts and is frequently visited by, homosexual men. It is, 
however, also visited by heterosexual men’?527 Janet Halley comments that the term 
‘homosexual’ is ‘an even less accurate indicator of individuals who entertain 
homoerotic desires or have had homosexual experiences without labelling themselves 
gay or lesbian’.528
 
To the observation that these men are ‘in denial’, once can counter ‘Who is to say’? It 
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would be preferable to say that sexual orientation is to either the same sex or the 
opposite sex, or to both, without further labeling. And how many times does one have 
to have same-sex sex before being designated ‘homosexual’? Ackermann J favoured a 
‘once only’ approach – ‘[t]he concept “sexual orientation” as used in s 9(3) of the 
1996 Constitution must be given a generous interpretation of which it is linguistically 
and textually fully capable of bearing. It applies ... to the orientation of persons who 
might on a single occasion only be erotically attracted to a member of their own 
sex’.529
 
In the extract above Ackermann J is trying to be generous in his approach but in S v S 
a mean-spirited magistrate labelled a man a homosexual despite only one instance of a 
homosexual act and overwhelming evidence of his heterosexuality. This case is an 
instance where men who are mostly attracted to women sometimes use men as 
makeshift women. The facts were as follows. A man, whilst looking for a woman with 
whom to have sex, in a drunken state picked up a male and had intercrural sex. The 
magistrate refers to the man as a homosexual even though he himself said that ‘he was 
unable to ignore the appellant’s statement that his search originally was for a Bantu 
woman and that the fact that he achieved his purpose with a male instead of a female 
seemed to be purely the result of circumstances’.530 Despite this acknowledgment of 
preferred heterosexuality, the magistrate suspended his sentence on condition that ‘the 
accused is not convicted of any offence involving an act of a homosexual nature 
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committed during such period of suspension’.531
 
The man was married (‘his wife informed him that she was leaving him’532), was 
looking for a woman (… ‘“ek wil ‘n Bantoevrou hê”. It was apparent that his purpose 
was to obtain a Bantu woman in order to have sexual relations with her’),533 and 
stated that he had no homosexual tendencies (‘ek het nooit neigings gehad om 
sodomie te pleeg’).534 The man used the male as a makeshift woman. The male asked 
‘the appellant whether he still wanted a girl and then said that this was not necessary 
‘aangesien hy net so goed was as ‘n meisie’.535 This man would have retained his 
heterosexual status had he been in the USA Navy which regards as heterosexual, ‘all 
those whose homosexual acts are not committed on a current basis reasonably close in 
time to the filing of the application shall be deemed to be heterosexual’.536
 
Race and apartheid add a uniquely South African flavour to the mix. In the mines in 
South Africa young black males took on the role of ‘mine wives’. They were ‘not 
merely sexual partners, but … also “wives” in other ways, providing domestic 
services for their “husbands” in exchange for substantial remuneration …. [The] 
relations on the mines seem to take place almost exclusively between senior men 
(men with power in the mine structure) and younger men. There is in fact an entire set 
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of rules’.537 The ‘wives’ often went on to marry, using the money earned to pay 
lobolo for their brides. The sex act was nearly always intercrural sex. What, then, do 
we call these men? They are neither homosexual nor gay in the Western sense of the 
word. And what do we call a white married miner who had intercrural sex with a 
fellow black miner, as happened in the Cunningham case?538
 
This is not to say that there is an easy correspondence between essentialists as out-
dated conservatives and constructionists as enlightened liberals. Where expedient, the 
essentialist claim that some people are born homosexual has been used in campaigns 
to secure legal recognition for homosexuals; on the other hand, the constructionist 
view that homosexuality is somehow or other acquired has been aligned with 
homophobic attempts to suggest that homosexual orientations can and should be 
corrected. Combinations of the two positions are often held simultaneously by both 
sides.539
 
The debate around these schools of thought foregrounds homosexuality, where in fact 
heterosexuality should rather be in focus. To foreground homosexuality implies that 
heterosexuality is somehow the more ‘self-evident, natural or stable construction’.540 
Heterosexuality is the background norm, against which homosexuals are ‘failed 
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heterosexuals’.541 Attempts to establish a homosexual family grouping, for example, 
elicits responses such as Judge Flemming’s, ‘The fact is that many people ... would 
frown upon the idea of calling the relationship created on the basis of two females a 
“family”. Quite clearly she regards what she is doing or what she has been doing but 
also what she intends doing as normal and acceptable’.542 Although heterosexuality is 
represented as the unmarked norm, once the ‘species’ homosexual emerged during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, by dint of this the heterosexual comes under the 
spotlight since in this group we find the absence of homosexuality, the non-
homosexual. Or do we? 
 
Janet Halley deliberately complicates this neat binary. Whereas homosexuals and 
other sexual minorities have to deliberately categorize themselves, the category of 
heterosexual includes anyone ‘wavering anxiously at the threshold of sexuality …. 
despite his confusion about his sexual orientation. The resulting class of heterosexuals 
is a default class, home to those who have not fallen out of it. It openly expels but 
covertly incorporates the homosexual other, an undertaking that renders it profoundly 
heterogeneous, unstable, and provisional. It can maintain its current boundaries and 
even its apparent legitimacy only if the … [silent non-heterosexual] remains silent …. 
When … judges undertake actual instantiations of the definitional categories 
homosexual and heterosexual, we might, then, think it fair to ask how the judge’ can 
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make such a call.543 And what of bisexuals who make no claim to either side? ‘Much 
is invested culturally in representing homosexuality as … unproblematic, and in 
maintaining heterosexuality and homosexuality as radically and demonstrably distinct 
from one another. Yet modern knowledges about the categories of sexual 
identification are far from coherent’.544
 
Choice vs. immutability 
A parallel debate to essentialism vs. constructivism is choice vs. immutability. The 
general belief nowadays is that sexual orientation is immutable from a very early age, 
possibly even genetic. Despite this current thinking, Flemming DJP favours choice, 
‘The choice, as in regard to her bedroom life, is hers. She cannot, however, make a 
choice which limits what should be appropriately done in regard to the children’.545
 
In the mid-1950s Ramsbottom J speaks of ‘congenital homosexuals, congenitally 
disposed towards having relations with others of their own sex …. a biological 
condition which it is very difficult to cure’.546 However, as will be discussed in the 
section on sexual abuse of underage boys, there is a distinct possibility he is actually 
referring to paedophilia. This is a case concerning allegations of sodomy with boys 
and an adult male. It is uncertain whether it is paedophilia or homosexuality which 
needs curing. 
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 Regrettably Ackermann J also falls into the trap of confusing homosexuality with 
paedophilia. In S v H he said, ‘There are cases in our Courts where it has been 
accepted that, in particular cases, homosexual orientation is congenital and that it 
might be well-nigh impossible to change such orientation. (See R v K referred to in R 
v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T) at 52-3 and S v S 1965 (4) SA 405 (N) at 409E-G.) One would 
however have to examine more fully all the available evidence before making a 
positive judicial pronouncement that all homosexual orientation is immutable. There 
does however appear to be a growing body of psychological opinion … that such 
orientation is immutable and a product of psychological or genetic factors. Whilst 
immutability of homosexual orientation would make the criminalisation of adult, 
private, consensual homosexual acts even more undesirable’.547
 
The first case Ackermann J refers to (R v K) is definitely a paedophile case – ‘R v K 
.... In that case the accused was a young man of 26 years who was charged with 
sodomy on a little European boy 8 years old .... a whipping ... would not alter the 
accused’s inherent sex nature’.548 The second case he refers to (S v S) is about a 
married man who got very drunk and went looking for a woman. An opportunistic 
young male took advantage of his state. The passage cited by Ackermann J is at the 
part where the judge is considering whether this was ‘a tendency to perversion’ versus 
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‘a temporary aberration’.549 A full reading of the case clearly shows that it was a 
temporary aberration. It is not a suitable reference to support immutability. 
 
The full quote from the article by Cameron mentioned in Ackermann J’s judgment 
favours immutability: ‘The fact that homosexual orientation is generally immutable 
… is widely accepted by psychologists: recent research may indicate that sexual 
orientation is a product of physiological or genetic factors. Yet the idea of non-
immutability continues to contribute to blame and rejection. These stem from moral 
and physical aversion, in that people assume that gays and lesbians can by volition 
remove the conduct or condition giving rise to disapproval …. it remains particularly 
repugnant and arbitrary from a moral point of view to discriminate against a person 
solely on the ground of a characteristic over which he or she has no choice. This is the 
case with sexual orientation’.550
 
 
Speech acts – private and public verbs 
Referring back to Foucault’s rules of formation, the enunciation of the subject ‘judge’ 
is usually effected by public verbs also referred to as speech acts. However, as this 
section shows, the speech acts are not always expressed in the traditional way. This 
section begins with the observation that judges also use private verbs which, by their 
nature, remain hidden from analysis. 
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 Private verbs 
Two private verbs often used by judges are ‘agree’ (and ‘disagree), and ‘think (and 
‘do not think’). A number of examples follow which show how difficult it would be to 
contest the privately-held views of a judge. 
 
Agree and disagree 
‘I agree that he must be regarded as an accomplice.’551
‘If this is what the magistrate meant, I agree with him.’552
‘I agree with the Attorney-General’s submission’553
‘I agree with Professors Milton and Snyman’554
‘I agree with the following comment made by Mr Justice Cameron’555
‘I agree with counsel that this analysis is helpful’556
‘I disagree with applicant’s counsel that …’557
‘I disagree. I think the Court’s duty is …’558
‘I disagree with counsel …559
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Think and do not think 
‘I think it would be very extraordinary if that were the law.’560
‘The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal, and I think they were right.’561
‘I think when examined this will be found to be a fallacy.’562
‘I think that all this is material corroboration’563
‘I think that the magistrate was entitled to accept the corroboration as sufficient.’564
‘I think that all the authorities would agree that …’565
‘Now I think it was rightly contended that Riley was an accomplice.’566
‘I do not think that there can be any doubt that …’567
‘I think that this is a case where …’568
‘I do not think that he took too conservative a view of what Dr. Pienaar had said.’569
‘I do not think it would be wholly accurate to say that this is the case.’570
‘I do not think there has been any misdirection in this case.’571
‘I think the magistrate’s sentence was too severe and, as I think the sentence …’572
‘I do not think that the magistrate’s stated reason for including this wording …’573
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‘Nor do I think that sodomy occurring between two adult male persons …’574
 
In one example Ogilvie Thompson J speaks for Innes CJ, who in turn interprets the 
minds of two Dutch jurists. The effect of this is that the thinking is twice removed. 
Ogilvie Thompson J says, ‘It was, I think, this particular form of sexual infidelity – 
viz. where there has been penetration – that Innes CJ, had in mind when in Kat v Kat, 
supra, he said “our law allows divorce for sexual infidelity”: and it is important to 
notice that the learned Chief Justice expressed himself as being satisfied that Schorer 
and van der Linden in referring to the crime of sodomy had in mind its commission 
“under circumstances analogous to those of adultery”’.575
 
Other examples are, ‘The magistrate, I think, felt that it was necessary to punish this 
man in the hope that other people would be deterred from committing this kind of 
crime’,576 and ‘It is clear, in my view, that what the learned Judge had in mind was 
…’577
 
Dorrit Cohn makes an interesting point. She quotes John Searle who says, ‘There is 
no textual property, syntactic or semantic, that will identify a text as a work of fiction 
…. The utterance acts in fiction are indistinguishable from the utterance acts in 
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serious discourse’. However, in the example Searle gives to illustrate this, the quote 
begins, ‘So thought Second Lieutenant’. Cohn asks, ‘What “serious” discourse ever 
quoted the thoughts of a person other than the speaker’s own?’578 This is what the 
judges do in the above extracts which, in effect, should render these texts fictional. 
 
Public verbs - speech acts 
Speech acts sometimes use public or reporting verbs. In some cases, however, the 
speech acts are framed in ways not readily recognized as a such and yet they still have 
the same effect of passing sentence and of branding homosexuals as criminals. Robert 
Cover says that a judge’s judgment ‘takes place in a field of pain and death …. Legal 
interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge 
articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, 
his property, his children, even his life …. When interpreters have finished their work, 
they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these 
organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it 
occasions may be properly understood apart from one another’.579
 
The following order is given by using the private verb ‘think’ and the modal ‘should’: 
‘I therefore think that the appeal should succeed and the convictions and sentences of 
both appellants should be set aside’.580 Although introducing uncertainty, this case 
                                                          
578 Cohn, D., Signposts of fictionality, p. 784 (footnotes omitted). 
579 Cover, R. M., Violence and the word, p. 1601. 
580 R v K & F 1932 EDL, 77. 
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became the founding precedent to distinguish between male-male and male-female 
unnatural acts. 
 
In the following examples, the violence of the order is hidden amongst the technical 
language. 
 
‘The appeal will be allowed in regard to counts 3 and 4, but dismissed in regard to the 
other counts. The convictions and sentences on counts 3 and 4 will be set aside, the 
convictions and sentences on counts 1, 2, 5 and 6 will be confirmed’.581 Perhaps being 
pedantic, but even the use of ‘will be’ (used three times) is incorrect. The order is not 
being made in the future and ‘is’ or ‘are’ should have been used. Technically, the 
order has not yet been made. This order had the following effect. One man received a 
total of eight months imprisonment with hard labour: four for mutual masturbation, 
where the other party was not convicted even though the act was consensual, two 
months for handling another’s penis, and two months for trying to touch another’s 
penis. 
 
‘The result is that the first question is answered in the negative, the second falls away, 
the third is answered in the affirmative and the appeal on the special entry is 
dismissed. The convictions and sentences are confirmed’.582 The effect of this is that a 
male was convicted of sodomy and attempted sodomy with youths deemed old 
                                                          
581 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 390. 
582 R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A), 623. 
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enough to be accomplices. He was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment 
with hard labour. 
 
‘It follows that the appeal against the conviction on the first count fails, and it is 
dismissed. The conviction and the sentence are confirmed. The conviction and the 
sentence on the second count are set aside’.583 The effect of this order was that a man 
who had tried to have oral sex with another man was sentenced to five months 
imprisonment. 
 
In the next two examples the violence is evident in the anti-homosexual rhetoric: 
 
‘It is said that the sentence on count 5 [handling another male’s penis] is out of 
proportion to the sentences passed in respect of the far more serious offences 
disclosed in counts 1 and 2 [mutual masturbation]. This may be so, but it is not 
because the sentence on count 5 is too severe, but because the sentences on counts 1 
and 2 are too light. The magistrate could not help himself; under the letter of remit he 
was limited to 12 months in all. It is quite possible that if his jurisdiction had not been 
so limited, he would have passed heavier sentences in respect of counts one and two. 
If the case had been indicted, I personally, should have inflicted sentences much more 
severe in respect of these counts. I see no good ground for interfering with the 
                                                          
583 S v C 1965 (3) SA 105 (N), 110. 
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sentence in count 5’.584
 
One young man placed his hand, outside the clothing, on the penis of another young 
man. He was charged with crimen injuria which meant that he could not be given the 
sentence of eight cuts with a light cane. He could have been charged with indecent 
assault in which case he would have been caned. The judge’s bias shows in the 
adjective ‘unfortunate’, and the verb ‘escape’. His tone shows in the adverb ‘clearly’ 
and the phrase ‘I cannot understand’ – ‘The accused in this case was clearly guilty of 
an indecent assault and I cannot understand why he was not charged with this offence. 
It is unfortunate he should escape punishment in respect of his offence’.585
 
This is an example where a judge uses a typical reporting verb – declare – is used in a 
typical speech act: 
‘In the result I make the following orders: 
1. It is declared that the common law offence of sodomy … 
2. It is declared that the common law offence of … an unnatural sexual act… 
3. It is declared that s 20A of the Sexual Offences Act … 
4. It is declared that the inclusion of sodomy … 
5. It is declared that the inclusion of sodomy … 
6. The aforementioned orders, in so far as they declare provisions of Acts …’586
                                                          
584 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 389 (italics added). 
585 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 351. 
586 High Court National Coalition, 131. 
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 It is noteworthy that this overt declaration is made in terms of constitutional 
discourse. Previously the speech acts are not obvious. They are couched in private 
verbs, hidden in technical language or accompanied by observations about how the 
judge would have liked the sentence to be more severe. 
 
When judicial orders, which are speech acts, involve criminal sanctions, Elaine Scarry 
describes how these speech acts become encoded in the defendant’s body, or as Janet 
Halley says, become the ‘criminalization of certain bodily acts’:587
‘Each major speech act by the state in a criminal case comes to define the defendant. 
Each becomes a verb that acts on the defendant. An accusation is made and the 
defendant becomes the accused. A verdict is reached and the defendant becomes the 
verdicted, or, as we more often say, the convicted. A sentence is announced and the 
defendant is sentenced. To be sentenced, to be physically punished, is to be directly 
acted on by a verbal sentence …. The sentence is inscribed into the defendant’s 
body’.588 The speech acts engrave guilt onto the defendant’s body like the scarlet 
letter ‘A’. 
                                                          
587 Halley, J. E., Reasoning about sodomy, p. 1743. 
588 Scarry E., Speech acts in criminal cases, p. 166. 
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Chapter 5: The construction of homosexuality: sexual act or person? 
Sexual act or person? 
Determining whether it is the sexual act which is punishable or whether it is 
punishable because one gender rather than another has performed the act lies at the 
heart of most of the cases in this corpus. The thrust of this study is to demonstrate the 
employment of rhetoric in a specific area of law. The previous chapters have 
considered the judge as a rhetorician. It has placed him in a context to try and account 
for why cases are constituted in the way they are depending on the period they were 
heard. This section provides a close examination of certain sexual acts and the people 
who performed them. In doing so it provides proof that criminality definitely attached 
to the person and not the act. 
 
According to Gore Vidal there are no such things as homosexual or heterosexual 
people, ‘The words are adjectives describing sexual acts, not people’.589 This may be 
so, but as Sachs J notes, until recently in South African law anal intercourse between 
men and women was not penalised by law, while between males it was a criminal 
offence, ‘which in the nature of things strikes only at homosexuals’.590 (In fact it 
struck only at homosexual men.) This led him to ask whether the sodomy laws were 
punishing an act or a person: ‘what is really being punished by the anti-sodomy laws. 
Is it an act, or is it a person? …. In the case of male homosexuality … the perceived 
                                                          
589 Gore Vidal, The second American revolution and other essays (1976 – 1982), (1982) 161. 
590 High Court National Coalition, 122. 
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deviance is punished simply because it is deviant. It is repressed for its perceived 
symbolism rather than because of its proven harm. If proof were necessary, it is 
established by the fact that consensual anal penetration of a female is not criminalised. 
Thus, it is not the act of sodomy that is denounced by the law, but the so-called 
sodomite who performs it; not any proven social damage, but the threat that same-sex 
passion in itself is seen as representing to heterosexual hegemony’.591
 
This reference to heterosexual hegemony coincides with Janet Halley’s hierarchical 
view. Sodomy laws, she says, ‘maintain themselves in part by their equivocal 
reference to identities and/or acts. The duality of the sodomy statutes – sometimes an 
index of identity, sometimes an index of acts – is a rhetorical mechanism in the 
subordination of homosexual identity and the superordination of heterosexual identity. 
Designating homosexual identity as the personal manifestation of sodomy confirms its 
subordination …. The criminalization of sodomy is crucial to the ordering of sexual-
orientation identities, particularly to the subordination of homosexual identity and the 
superordination of heterosexual identity’.592
 
Anne Goldstein critiques Halley for not clearly distinguishing between acts and 
people. A problem ‘hovering unspoken over Halley’s article’ is what is the 
relationship between ‘homosexuals’ and ‘homosexual acts’? Or, to put the problem 
more generally, what is ‘homosexuality’ and who is a ‘homosexual’? 
                                                          
591 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 56. 
592 Halley, J. E., Reasoning about sodomy, pp. 1722 & 1731. 
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‘Homosexuality’ is a word ‘at least as mutable, shifting, plastic and volatile as 
“sodomy”’.593 She lists a number of valid questions to show how difficult it is to 
assign homosexual acts to homosexuals, and says that Halley’s article does not 
achieve its purpose since these questions remain unanswered. 
 
But Goldstein will search in vain for these answers, because this is not Halley’s 
argument. Halley is suggesting that homosexuals and other sexual minorities hold in 
abeyance the identities they assign themselves, and concentrate instead on the sexual 
acts any person may perform. Working within a ‘register of acts’, is an exercise of 
power, she asserts, because it will collapse homosexual and heterosexual identities –
‘Resisting power in this form provides gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and their allies 
with a political opportunity. We can form new alliances along the register of acts. 
From that vantage point the instability of heterosexual identity can be exploited, and 
indeed, undermined from within. To be sure, adopting this approach requires that 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals place their identities as such in abeyance at least 
from time to time. This is dangerous, but it may be the only way that lesbians, gay 
men, and bisexuals can gain some kind of rhetorical leverage in a rhetorical system 
whose instability normally places us in a double bind’.594
 
Whether the word homosexual is an act or person, metonymically sodomy is to 
homosexual identity as burglary is to burglars. Sodomy is such an intrinsic 
                                                          
593 Goldstein, A. B., Reasoning about homosexuality, p. 1797. 
594 Halley, J. E., Reasoning about sodomy, pp. 1722-1723. 
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characteristic of homosexuality that it constitutes a ‘rhetorical proxy’.595 In other 
words, sodomy can receive its definitive characteristic from the ‘homosexuals’ who 
do it, or it can stand free of persons and be merely an act. Heher J said that ‘anal 
intercourse is the homosexual man’s form of sexual expression, equivalent to 
heterosexual intercourse per vaginam’.596 This is simply not true; ‘many resolute 
homosexuals never do any acts that could be called sodomy, while many resolute 
heterosexuals are, where sodomy is concerned, avid recidivists’.597 According to 
Halley, ‘Not knowing what sodomy is, not naming it at all, not describing it 
accurately, not acknowledging its presence, are all important parts of its historical 
profile. Obscurity is part of what sodomy is, a means by which it attains its social 
effects’.598
 
With this ambivalence in mind, I now turn to a consideration of the sexual acts 
themselves as portrayed in the corpus. Most of this section deals with sodomy because 
it is the clearest example of the ambivalence at work between act and person and 
yields the most interesting example of rhetoric. By tracing the historicity of sodomy 
we can follow the rhetoric used to distinguish between male-male and male-female 
anal intercourse. The lesser offences of intercrural sex and masturbation also show 
how it was only males who were punished. Statutes in the form of the introduction of 
s20A and the amendment to s14 of the Sexual Offences Act also shows how 
                                                          
595 Ibid., pp. 1734 (burglar analogy) & 1737. 
596 High Court National Coalition, 103. 
597 Halley, J. E., Reasoning about sodomy, p. 1722. 
598 Ibid., p. 1756. 
 173
parliament legislated against homosexual men. Unwittingly, these sections also 
brought heterosexual men into their ambit. A short note follows which shows how 
bestiality has always been associated with male ‘unnatural acts’. The section ends 
with a review of lesbianism within the corpus. Since no sexual acts are specifically 
mentioned in these cases, it is the lesbian as a female homosexual person which the 
court scrutinizes. 
 
Sodomy 
What is sodomy? 
If sodomy is under consideration then exactly what is sodomy? In the foreword to his 
The Order of Things, Michel Foucault discusses a short story by Jorge Borges who 
refers to ‘a certain Chinese encyclopedia’599 in which animals are divided into: ‘(a) 
belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) 
fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) 
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having 
just broken the water pitcher and (n) that from a long way off look like flies’. In a 
later work, Foucault would refer to sodomy as ‘that utterly confused category’.600 Is 
sodomy one of (a)-(n) above, or (a)-(n) below? 
 
                                                          
599 Borges, J. L. 1981, ‘The analytical language of John Wilkins’ in Borges, a reader: a 
selection from the writings of Jorge Luis Borges, Monegal E. R. & Reid A. (eds.), New York, 
Dutton pp. 141-143. Some users of this quote believe that such an encyclopedia actually 
exists! George Lakoff ascribes this gullibility to how Westerners think non-Westerners think. 
600 Foucault, M., The history of sexuality, vol. 1, p. 101. 
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Because as described in the corpus, the category ‘sodomy’ is utterly confusing: (a) 
anal coitus, (b) anal intercourse, (c) anal penetration, (d) between the buttocks, (e) 
heterosexual anal intercourse, (f) homosexual sexual intercourse, (g) intercourse per 
anum, (h) same-sex and opposite-sex anal intercourse, (i) sexual intercourse between 
males, (j) sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature, (k) sexual intercourse per 
anum between human males, (l) sexual intercourse per anum between men, (m) 
sodomy in the accepted sense of that term, and (n) unnatural intercourse between two 
males.601
 
There has never been a stable definition of sodomy. It seems to involve anal 
penetration, but even that basic element is contested. It is not clear as to whether the 
act itself is the crime, or that it is between males. Throughout the cases there is this 
ambivalence between punishment of the act or the person. In the National Coalition 
case Sachs J said, ‘Only in the most technical sense is this a case about who may 
penetrate whom where’.602
 
I write this section in the form of a narrative based on Hayden White’s view that 
history is portrayed in a narrative form.603 Critics of the historical narrative view 
                                                          
 
 
 
601 (a) R v K & F 1932 EDL 71; (b), (e) & (f) S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C); (c), (h), (k) 
& (l) Constitutional Court National Coalition; (d) S v M 1984 (4) SA 111 (T); (g), (i) & (n) R 
v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR); (j) R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T); (m) R v Gough & Narroway 1926 
CPD 159. 
602 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 55 per Sachs J.
603 Much of this section is an application of the section on historiography which appears in 
the literature review chapter, and where references are specifically cited. I again acknowledge 
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challenge how its advocates merge fiction and non-fiction. Factual narrative, such as 
judgments, should be separated from fiction because non-factual writing is based on 
reliable, verifiable documentation. In other words there needs to be a reliable 
reference upon which the text is based. However, by presenting a narrative of sodomy 
over some seven decades, I draw attention to how techniques of fiction writing are 
used notwithstanding that the cases are based on verifiable documentation. 
 
Critics of the historical narrative form seem content to identify a referential source, 
such as verifiable documentation, without going any further. There are, however, 
other issues. What if there are several referential sources of similar standing? How did 
those sources come to be incorporated into the text? Pre-existing material is always 
contestable as writers endow it with meaning expedient to their ideology. Writers of 
non-fiction can select what to include and what to exclude, and where to begin and 
end. We see this happening when judges decided which Dutch jurists they should rely 
on and over what period in order to support the criminalization of homosexuality. The 
assertion that the law regarding sodomy deals with the ‘real’ and ‘actual’ derives 
largely from the reliance on these pre-existing documents. However, just because 
these documents are verifiable does not mean that they are any clearer or more 
reliable. Each Dutch jurist only added to the number of possible texts a judge could 
choose from. The views of the jurists vary to such an extent that there is no certainty 
                                                                                                                                            
ideas introduced to me by Cohn, D. 1990, Lemon, M. C. 2001, Mink, L. O. 2001, White, H. 
V. 1978, 1987, 1989, 2001, Amsterdam, A. G. & Bruner, J. 2000, Toolan, M. J. 2001; de Vos, 
P. 2001. 
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as what gender sodomy relates to, whether the religion of the parties makes a 
difference, or even whether the act needs to be between humans.604
 
Sodomy carries freight from the past 
Even after the 1996 Constitution leading academics were maintaining that sodomy 
laws should still apply in certain circumstances: ‘In so far as heterosexual sexual 
intercourse is punishable if is occurs in public or without the consent of one of the 
parties, or where one of the parties is under the age of consent, it follows that 
homosexual sexual intercourse which is not private, or without the consent of one of 
the parties, or with a person who is under the age of consent may be punished as 
sodomy’.605
 
Ronald Louw disagrees, advocating that the offence should be removed entirely 
because ‘probably more than any other offence, [sodomy] is set in a history and 
context that is wider than that of criminal law alone’.606 Sodomy carries the freight of 
centuries of Judeo-Christian intolerance. The seventeenth century in Holland, the 
socio-legal context in which sodomy laws found their way to South Africa, imbibed 
this religious intolerance. Akin to a biblical stoning, sodomites were publicly executed 
after which ‘the bodies of the persons executed shall be immediately burned to ashes, 
                                                          
604According to Hunt et al, ‘some jurists regarded ordinary sexual relations between Jews and 
Christians as “sodomie”’ – Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (2nd ed.), South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure Vol. II, p. 268, and sodomy could even be committed with pictures and statues 
according to Von Quistorp. 
605 Burchell, J. & Milton J., Principles of criminal law, p. 634.  
606 Louw, R., Sexual orientation, the right to equality, p. 115. 
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thrown into the sea, or exposed on a gibbet’.607 Even in the High Court National 
Coalition case male-male sexual acts are still associated with disapproval.608 It is 
naïve to believe the disapproval disappeared after the Constitutional Court National 
Coalition case; merely that it is no longer permissible in public discourse. 
 
Because of this freight, ‘[s]ocietal condemnation is inextricably bound up with the 
offence. To decriminalise sodomy only in respect of consensual adult sexual 
intercourse does not elide its history …. The constitutional guarantee of non-
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation will not be given its fullest effect 
until the offence of sodomy is removed without exception from our law’.609 Louw 
reasons further that there is no need to retain the offence for non-consensual anal 
penetration of a male since there is no need to make a gender distinction at all; either 
way it is indecent assault. 
 
This campaign has not been helped with the attempt to introduce a sub-species of rape 
called male rape, similar to the way date rape has become a marked form of rape. In 
the corpus it is variously called: ‘male rape’ (with or without quotes),610 ‘a new crime 
of ‘male rape’ (if such be thought necessary)’,611 ‘“male” anal rape’,612 and ‘so-called 
                                                          
607 Ibid., p. 112, quoting Van der Linden. 
608 Heher J: ‘orgiastic practices to which homosexuality seems often to fall prey' (High Court 
National Coalition, 110). 
609 Louw, R., Sexual orientation, the right to equality, pp. 116 & 117. 
610 High Court National Coalition, 107. 
611 High Court National Coalition, 126. 
612 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 22. 
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‘anal rape’ or ‘male rape’’.613 Such designations deliberately gender non-consensual 
anal intercourse which should be treated as indecent assault no matter the gender. 
When males do this to females it is indecent assault so why does male rape have to be 
emphasised? It reinforces the thinking that anal intercourse is the homosexual’s form 
of sexual expression. 
 
Writing this before the National Coalition cases, Louw was vindicated in that these 
cases did strike down sodomy in its entirety, declining to draw a distinction between 
private and public acts and those with or without consent.614
 
Dutch jurists as basis for common law 
Sodomy was a common law offence which meant that its legal basis was not found in 
legislation but in various ‘old authorities’. Generally, in South African common law 
these authorities were either Roman jurists or Dutch jurists who either glossed Roman 
law or wrote their own treatises. The common law on sodomy in particular falls into 
the Dutch treatises category. It is not a definitive treatment but is made up of the 
views of many individuals. In some instances judges divided Dutch jurists into an 
older period – sometimes made even more distant by calling it ‘ancient’ – and a later 
period. Sometimes the law is not divided into periods at all but is compared in its 
totality to modern practice as opposed to modern law. The word practice indicates a 
                                                          
613 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 40. 
614 Louw, R., Specific crimes, p. 92, notwithstanding Louw’s criticism of retaining a residual 
category of ‘unnatural sexual acts’ on p. 96. 
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greater choice of freedom as to what is appropriated as current law. This shows that 
the law in this regard was malleable. 
 
Perhaps the most honest admission by a judge regarding the inconsistency of the 
common law of sexual acts is when Pittman J said, ‘The real reason for its non-
employment [i.e. common law] is that it has become out of harmony with modern 
views and unsuited to modern conditions’.615 The implication is that distinguishing 
between earlier and later Dutch writers, or deeming certain parts of Dutch law as 
having fallen into disuse are not the real reasons for making the distinction between 
male-female and male-male sexual acts. The real reason is that society wants it so. 
 
In the male-female anal intercourse cases, a distinction is made between old and more 
recent Dutch writings. This is because old Dutch law clearly stated that male-female 
anal intercourse fell within the ambit of a crime. Until then everyone who practiced 
anal intercourse was a sodomite, but this did not sit well with a heterosexual majority. 
Such earlier law was then deemed to have fallen into disuse, to be out of keeping with 
modern practice. This deeming was effected by a ‘speech act of silence’, which 
allowed heterosexual sodomy to drop silently out of the picture.616 The dominant 
class (of heterosexuals) silently (mis)read themselves out of the target group of 
sodomites by means of rhetoric. 
                                                          
615 R v K & F 1932 EDL, 75. 
616 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the closet, Berkley, Univ. of California Press, 
1990, 3. 
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 By contrast, male-male sodomy is deliberately anchored to ancient times, times 
immemorial, past millennia. Being steeped in history serves as a justification for 
preserving these time-honoured laws; who are modern-day judges to tamper with the 
sacred ancient law? This rhetoric is used in Bowers v Hardwick – ‘the proscriptions 
against sodomy have very “ancient roots”. Decisions of individuals relating to 
homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of 
Western Civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards .... To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy 
is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of 
moral teaching’.617
 
Schabort J used this same distancing device in a case brought in terms of s20A of the 
Sexual Offences Act. He says that s20A ‘was intended to prevent the obtrusion of 
conduct which, from time immemorial, has to many people been profoundly repulsive 
as depraved and repugnant to nature’.618 This judge had at his disposal De Wet’s 
Strafreg which says, ‘We no longer live in the middle ages and the history of Sodom 
lies in ancient times’.619 Schabort J chooses to hold onto an Old Testament worldview 
and he states that many people would agree with him that to not do so would mean 
                                                          
617 S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C), 481. Farlam J quoting, but not with approval, from 
Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986). 
618 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 79. 
619 Quoted in S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 122. The above is an approximate translation of  
De Wet, J. C. & Swanepoel, H. L. 1975, Strafreg, (3rd ed.), Butterworths, Durban, p. 270. 
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that a repulsive, depraved and repugnant activity would surface. De Wet was 
suggesting in the mid-1970s that we take up anchor from the past. 
 
There is evidence of this distinction between ancient law and modern practice in a 
number of cases: 
– ‘… “unnatural offence” …. The phrase was not in use by the ancient authorities and 
has not been adopted in our law’.620
– ‘In the old Roman-Dutch law, any gratification of sexual lust in a manner contrary 
to the order of nature was regarded as a crime. In modern practice the limits of the 
offence have been very much restricted, and many acts which were undoubtedly 
crimes under the old law are no longer so regarded’.621
– ‘… but at best a disputed provision of the ancient criminal law’.622
– ‘... and a third category into which fell certain residual, sexually abnormal acts .... It 
is in respect of this third category that difficulties arise in modern practice ...’623
– ‘… such old writers of the Roman-Dutch law as …’624
– ‘… these later writers’625
– ‘… unwillingness of writers like van Leeuwen and van der Linden to accept the 
views of those earlier …’ 626
                                                          
620 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD, 159. 
621 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 350. 
622 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 75. 
623 S v C 1988 (2) SA 398 (ZH), 400. 
624 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
625 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
626 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 330. 
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– ‘The phrase was not in use by the ancient authorities’627
– ‘Later Roman-Dutch authorities, however, do not mention such an act as a 
crime’.628
 
In addition to this timing differentiation, in the corpus all references to the Dutch 
jurists are made in the plural, either as ‘authorities’ or ‘writers’. Only when working 
with plurals can the determiners ‘some’, ‘several’ and ‘others’ (as an adjective) be 
used. When there is this subdivision of the whole, there can be no definitive common 
law. A judge could choose which jurist he wished to quote according to what view he 
adopted. The following extracts illustrate this. 
 
– ‘… some of the Roman-Dutch writers did not consider sodomy the appropriate 
term’629
– ‘Some of the Roman-Dutch writers …’630
– ‘… several of the ancient writers…’631
– ‘Other writers, however, take the view that sodomy ... ‘632
– ‘some of the old writers’633
– ‘was considered by some Roman-Dutch authorities as an unnatural offence. Other 
                                                          
627 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 159. 
628 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
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writers, however, thought otherwise …’634
– ‘... though the greater number of the authorities ... imply that conduct ... was 
criminal, there are others, who seem to state the contrary’.635
– ‘… some authorities also included acts such as self-masturbation, oral intercourse, 
lesbianism, and many other such practices’.636
 
Judges’ appropriation of Dutch jurists 
With so many jurists, it is not surprising that judges used different jurists as their basis 
to rule on the same issue. 
 
For example, in a 1952 case counsel for the plaintiff ‘whose argument and full 
reference to the authorities have been very helpful to the Court – based his argument 
.... that her husband has committed sodomy, and that defendant’s above described 
actions constitute sodomy as that word is used by the Roman-Dutch writers’.637 The 
sexual act referred to in the phrase ‘defendant’s above described actions’ was male-
male intercrural sex.638 Plaintiff’s counsel held that intercrural sex was sodomy ‘as 
that word is used by the … Dutch writers’. On the same page as calling counsel’s 
reference to the authorities ‘helpful’, the judge refers to his own research where he 
                                                          
634 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386. 
635 R v K & F 1932 EDL, 72. 
636 S v C 1988 (2) SA 398 (ZH), 400. 
637 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 169. 
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states that ‘Schorer and van der Linden ... do not attempt to define what precisely they 
mean by the term sodomy’.639
 
Another case illustrates the indeterminacy of Dutch law. In 1932 Pittman J ruled that 
‘even if unnatural lewdness between man and woman of the kind in question in this 
particular case had been criminal as recently as the early part of last century, such 
conduct is no longer so, and the force of this conclusion in favour of modern-day 
immunity is not lessened by the apparent unwillingness of writers like van Leeuwen 
and van der Linden to accept the views of those earlier ones …. [I]n view of the 
uncertainty that obtains on this particular question, in view of the obsolescence or 
rather desuetude in South Africa of a considerable portion of the Roman-Dutch 
criminal law and further in view of the clear elimination from the list of sexual 
offences of a number of crimes that were recognised by van der Linden in 1806 – as 
for example adultery, concubinage and fornication – it seems that no definite 
conclusions can be formed from a study of those earlier commentators’.640
 
The language judges used suggest that they are not confident in relying on the Dutch 
jurists. They often use the verbs ‘appear’ and ‘seem’ in their judgments. These are 
private verbs which a judge would use when he was not sure of the truth of what he 
believed or had been told. Alternatively, it is a way of making his statement less 
forceful. Either way, the words introduce uncertainty and ambiguity into the discourse 
                                                          
639 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 169. 
640 R v K & F 1932 EDL, 74. 
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and undermine the certainty of common law. The following are examples from the 
corpus. 
– ‘the authorities … seem to state …’641
– ‘The passages quoted seem sufficiently to show that …’642
– ‘It would seem, however, that in South African law the crime of sodomy is …’643
– ‘There seemed to be some doubt whether in Roman-Dutch law …’644
– ‘several of the ancient writers .... appear to use the term “sodomy”’645
– ‘from those authorities it appeared that sodomy …’646
– ‘It seems to be correct to say that ….This appears to have been the approach of the 
later Roman-Dutch authorities …’647
 
Sometimes the adjective ‘clear’ is used with ‘seems’ which effectively sets up a 
contradiction. ‘Clear’ means obvious and impossible to be mistaken about whereas 
‘seems’ is used by the judge when describing his own thoughts in order to make his 
statement less forceful. For example, ‘It seems to me clear, from the text writers 
…’,648 and ‘It seems clear enough that such old writers of the Roman-Dutch law as 
…’.649 Sometimes ‘clear’ and ‘seems’ are used near each other to indicate that it is 
                                                          
641 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 72. 
642 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 73. 
643 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR) , 279. 
644 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
645 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 169. 
646 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 407. 
647 S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C), 465. 
648 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 161. 
649 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
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obvious that there is no agreement amongst earlier jurists – ‘It is clear that among the 
expositors of the Roman, Roman-Dutch, and old German laws there is no complete 
agreement as to whether the act which is the subject of this charge is a punishable 
offence .... it seems that no definite conclusions can be formed from a study of those 
earlier commentators’.650 The use of ‘clear’ in the negative also reinforces the 
uncertainty of relying on common law – ‘the limits of the crime called “an unnatural 
offence” are by no means clear. A fortiori, the meaning of an “unnatural act” is even 
more ill-defined’.651 The use of ‘clear’ in the negative is later used in constitutional 
discourse: ‘it becomes clear that a proscription on private acts of sodomy should not 
survive’.652
 
One judge thinks on behalf of the Dutch jurists – ‘but I think that all the authorities 
would agree that …’653 – whilst another imputes a meaning to the Dutch jurists which 
may or may not be correct – ‘None of these writers, however, deals with this question 
at all. The most that can be inferred from what they say is that ...’.654
 
Finally, but perhaps most significantly of all, the two National Coalition cases655 do 
not mention Dutch jurists once in a combined total of some 50,000 words. The two 
cases that dealt the final blow to the common law crime of sodomy do not once 
                                                          
650 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 74-75. 
651 S v C 1988 (2) SA 398 (ZH), 400. 
652 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 126. 
653 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386. 
654 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 329. 
655 High Court National Coalition; Constitutional Court National Coalition. 
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mention the ‘authority’ so many past judges had manipulated to justify their own 
views. They are unlike previous South African judges who ‘adopted with zeal the 
ample and unrestricted ambit of the common law definitions so as to criminalize 
conduct the status of which was at least open to interpretation as uncertain’.656
 
Common law not always taken from source 
Dutch jurists did not always find their way into judgments directly from source. 
Sometimes they are mediated though textbook writers, and sometimes the judges are 
themselves the authors of the textbook. At other times judges think on behalf of the 
Dutch jurists, or impute meanings which may not be there. 
 
Various judges accepted textbook writers’ views on Dutch jurists.657 In some cases 
the judge is also a textbook writer, such as Gardiner JP. He penned the definition of 
sodomy which later judges such as Ogilvie Thompson J would use and endorse – ‘I do 
not think that there can be any doubt that Gardiner JP correctly stated the modern law 
when he said in Rex v Gough and Narroway … “in our practice sodomy has come to 
mean that particular kind of unnatural offence where there is penetration per 
anum’”.658 However, on two occasions judges have called the section on sodomy in 
                                                          
656 Botha, K. & Cameron, E., South Africa, p. 7. 
657 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 407 – ‘Hunt … takes the view that the crime of sodomy is 
not committed if the passive party is a woman. The same view is expressed by De Wet … in 
Strafreg’. R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 279 – ‘It would seem, however, that in South African 
law the crime of sodomy is confined to sexual intercourse between males. The learned authors 
of … Strafreg … examine the matter fully …, and they define the crime as follows …’ 
658 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 170. 
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Gardiner’s textbook vague and indecisive.659
 
Because of the reliance by judges on textbooks when considering sodomy cases, it is 
useful to look at the different editions of the textbook they most widely used, South 
African Criminal Law and Procedure. The first edition was written by Professor P 
Hunt. On his death, Professor John Milton edited the second and third editions. 
 
The definition of sodomy in the second edition is retained from the first edition: 
‘Sodomy consists in unlawful and intentional sexual relations per anum between two 
human males’.660 The footnote to the definition cites as ‘authority’ two previous 
textbooks, in particular Gardiner’s one which judges had called vague and indecisive. 
Neither Hunt nor Milton could provide a sounder reference than textbooks, 
themselves secondary sources. It is significant that they did not cite any Dutch 
authority. 
 
Milton then amplifies each of the points in the definition, beginning with 
‘unlawfulness’. Under this section he says, ‘Coercion, for example, might deprive the 
act of unlawfulness’.661 Directly after stating that sodomy is between two human 
males, the footnote to the above sentence, to substantiate unlawfulness, refers to a 
                                                          
659 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 279 – ‘See too Gardiner & Lansdown, 6th ed., p. 1227, 
where, however, the matter is left somewhat vague’ and R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 329 – 
‘Modern text-book writers are indecisive. See, for example, Gardiner & Lansdown, 6th ed., 
vol. 2, pp. 1227-1228’. 
660 Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (2nd ed.), South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II, p. 271. 
661 Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (2nd ed.), South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II, p. 271. 
 189
case where a husband forced his wife to submit to sexual intercourse with a dog, thus 
introducing the discourses of marriage and bestiality.662 This reference is removed in 
the third edition with no explanation. 
 
Under the section ‘intention’, the precedent cited is about a man who attempted to 
rape a woman, thus introducing male-female discourse.663 Under the section ‘between 
two human males’ Milton states, ‘Our practice has apparently come to recognize that 
if the passive party is a female the crime of sodomy is not committed’.664 The use of 
the word ‘apparently’ indicates there is no definitive authority, and the cases he cites 
as precedent are not authoritative.665 The R v N case is short and does not explore the 
gender issue with any rigor. It is an unconvincing, ambivalent decision. S v M has no 
precedential value. In this case, the magistrate had misgivings, after the case was 
concluded, that he had upheld a charge referring to male-female anal intercourse as 
‘sodomy’ instead of ‘indecent assault’. Amongst the ‘certain authorities’666 the 
magistrate used to arrive at this decision was in all likelihood only the first edition of 
Hunt, and that edition is definitely the one the judge consulted (‘Hunt … takes the 
view that the crime of sodomy is not committed if the passive party is a woman’).667 
After adding nothing new, the judge regarded the matter as ‘settled law’.668 This is an 
                                                          
662 R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App Rep 125. 
663 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR). 
664 Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (2nd ed.), South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II, p. 272. 
665 R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T) and S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RAD). 
666 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 407. 
667 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 407. 
668 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 408. 
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example of incestuous iteration. 
 
Earlier in the chapter, Milton’s comments on unnatural acts recognize that Dutch 
writers ‘concern themselves more with punishment than the niceties of definition, 
[and] are not always ad idem as to just what conduct falls within this description’.669 
By way of example, he mentions how ‘some jurists regarded ordinary sexual relations 
between Jews and Christians as “sodomie”’.670 Farlam J refers to this reticence of 
earlier jurists to spell out what they meant by sodomy – ‘In his lectures in the 
nineteenth century on the subject of what was then known as “sodomy”, Professor 
Van der Keessel, for example, expresses this type of sensitivity. He wrote: “[T]he 
turpitude of this unspeakable crime is so great that it ought, it seems, to be passed 
over in silence rather than to be expounded to the ears of the chaste, and hence many 
commentators on the criminal law too have merely touched on it with very few 
words”. (Beinart and Van Warmelo’s translation at 857)’.671
 
Cameron criticized Milton for retaining from the first edition comments about how 
society was not yet ready to accept homosexuality: the ‘most authoritative English 
textbook on the criminal law in South Africa – edited by an otherwise liberal 
academic – remarks that the “real reason” for the criminal proscription of sodomy “is 
the extreme disgust and abhorrence such conduct arouses”. On law reform, this book, 
                                                          
669 Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (2nd ed.), South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II, p. 267. 
670 Ibid., p. 268. 
671 S v C 1988 (2) SA 398 (ZH), 401. 
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in wording left unrevised since its first edition in 1970 expresses the view that … 
“South African mores are not yet ready … to accept the abolition of sodomy (and 
other ‘unnatural’ acts) as criminal [even] when practised in private between 
consenting adults”.672
 
This comment is removed from the third edition, attributable perhaps to Cameron’s 
criticism. In fact, there is a general change in tone and emphasis in the third edition. It 
was published in 1996 at the time the interim constitution673 was in place. It is also 
contextually wider. There are new sections on pre-Christian Roman Law and on 
Canon Law. Milton comments on unnatural acts in the context of a predominantly 
Christian society and a changing attitude of society towards unnatural acts – ‘The 
concept of the unnatural sexual act in Western legal systems derives from the 
teachings of the Christian Church, which pronounced that sexual intercourse between 
humans should be confined to heterosexual intercourse per vaginam. The proscription 
by the criminal law of other forms of sexual gratification as unnatural, and thus 
unlawful, represents an effort by the state to compel sexual partners to engage only in 
vaginal intercourse’.674
and 
‘If there is a rationale for the crime, it is the notion that the acts contemplated by this 
crime are so deeply disgusting as to deserve the sanction of the criminal law. Whether 
                                                          
672 Cameron, E., Sexual orientation and the constitution, p. 458 (referring to pp. 270-1 of the 
2nd ed.) 
673 Act 200 of 1993. 
674 Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (3rd ed.), South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II, p. 223. 
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this rationale in fact expresses contemporary views in relation to the acts in question 
is seriously to be questioned. This is a prime example of a “victimless” crime and 
there seems to be no sufficient or convincing reason for subjecting those who engage 
in the “unnatural” sexual acts here defined to prosecution and punishment. South 
African law would be better off without this crime’.675
 
South African Criminal Law and Procedure was the most authoritative textbook on 
male sexual offences. It was used by judges in making decisions that led to men 
serving prison sentences with hard labour. And yet a critical look at the entry on 
sodomy shows that section to be a house of cards. One would have expected to at least 
see references to Dutch jurists in the definition of sodomy but instead there are 
references to other textbooks. The authors cannot find suitable male-male examples to 
illustrate the elements of the crime and resort to female-dog and male-female 
examples, which examples quietly disappear in the third edition. It is only after 
criticism from respected quarters that derogatory, value-laden comments about 
homosexuality are omitted suggesting unreflecting editors. 
 
The actual cases 
Nearly all of the cases relating to sodomy are rendered seriously flawed because they 
are not specifically about sodomy. For example, they are about intercrural sex where 
sodomy is mentioned obiter, or about police entrapment case, or about male-female 
                                                          
675 Ibid., p. 224. 
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rape or men having sex with underage girls. 
 
The first case in the corpus relating to sodomy – R v Gough and Narroway676 – 
occurred in 1926. This case is in fact about intercrural sex but parts of the judgment 
refer to sodomy. There is in fact no flagship case dealing with male sodomy. All the 
significant cases which have the most to say about male sodomy are, curiously, about 
intercrural sex. It is this case which coins the definition of sodomy to be used 
henceforth in South African textbooks and judgments. Many of the references in this 
case to the common law are not relevant to the facts of the case (intercrural sex 
between males), yet some of them relate to sodomy, if only to show how vague the 
law was on this issue.677
 
In his review of the common law Gardiner J (the next year JP) touches on a number of 
jurists. His reference to Von Quistorp on sodomy is not gender-specific – sodomy 
could even be committed with pictures and statues according to Von Quistorp. The 
reference to Carpzovius on sodomy is also not gender-specific. Both Von Quistorp 
and Carpzovius were German jurists, not Dutch and it is debatable whether they had 
legal standing in South African law. The reference to Emperor Charles V relates to 
English law which was also not part of South African common law, but even then 
only vaguely mentions ‘unchaste behaviour’. 
 
                                                          
676 1926 CPD 159. 
677 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 161. 
 194
Gardiner J then diverges to tell a story about heterosexuals. As a defence against 
adultery, a man stated that he had performed coitus interruptus (‘followed the 
example of Onan’).678 Instead of the fine he would have received for adultery, he was 
‘flogged and banished, some of the judges at first thinking that the death penalty 
should be inflicted’.679 This story is then followed by a quote in Latin before linking it 
back to the present case – ‘This affords me a convenient opportunity of saying that the 
accused in the present case are not in so unfortunate a position, for the advocate 
appointed by the Court to argue on their behalf, has certainly been of assistance to 
them, and by his researches has been of great help to us’.680
 
This superfluous story is told for its shock value, a story to make the layman shake his 
head in amazement at ‘the law’. The lengthy Latin quote (naturally not translated) 
adds to the mystique of ‘the law’. The way the story is linked back to the present case 
is patronizing: the present accused are fortunate to have such a good lawyer who will 
not get them flogged or banished. Although Gardiner J refers to the defence attorney’s 
great help in research, he does not use any of his references, nor does he state why he 
discounts them. Instead, he supplies his own references. The prosecution have only 
one reference, the judge’s own textbook.681
 
                                                          
678 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 162. 
679 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 162. 
680 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 162. 
681 South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Gardiner and Lansdown. The other 
references concern procedural aspects. 
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Bernard Jackson makes an interesting point regarding judges who conduct their own 
research. He maintains that judges ought not to refer, in their judgments, to precedents 
or old authorities unless they have been cited in the argument by counsel. Increasingly 
this convention is ‘honoured in the breach, and there is little doubt that many judges 
do independent research on the legal issues presented to them’.682 This challenges the 
suggestion that judges are tabula rasa; they are not the mere vessels they purport to 
be. Just how far, and in what direction, their independent research goes is entirely up 
to them. 
 
Were the defence attorney’s references to the writings of Damhouder not ignored, the 
law regarding sodomy could well have taken a different course.683 It would take 
seventy years until Damhouder was again aired, tellingly under constitutional 
discourse – ‘Joost Damhouder (1507-1581), one of the earliest writers in the 
Netherlands on criminal law, divided sodomie into three categories: self-masturbation, 
unnatural sexual acts between one human being and another (not just between persons 
of the same sex) and bestiality’.684
 
This odd categorization shows just how arbitrary the classification was. In the 1920s 
Gardiner J was afforded the opportunity to incorporate this reference but chose rather 
to use his own inapplicable German and English references. Since Searle JP and 
                                                          
682 Jackson, B. S., Law, fact and narrative coherence,  p. 113. 
683 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 160 (‘For sodomy so-called, see Damhouder, 
Criminal Practice (Ch. 89)). 
684 S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C), 464-465. 
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Louwrens J concurred, one can only surmise that they were also selective as to what 
they included based on whether or not it promoted their view. These judges were 
intellectually dishonest. Comparing this case to the High Court National Coalition 
case, the reader knows that the judge in that case personally did not accept 
homosexuality, but he avoided being swayed by his own moral convictions. To 
Catherine Albertyn, ‘It is this “intellectual honesty” and courage that is such a 
valuable feature of this judgment’,685 and which by comparison makes the Gough 
case intellectually dishonest and not of much value. 
 
Gardiner J refers to reasons why ‘carnal acts contrary to the order of nature’ were 
punished.686 The first reason is that the acts could not lead to procreation. Sterility has 
more of a male-female connotation and is certainly not male-male specific. Another 
reason was that the acts were ‘so abhorrent to all ideas of decency, that they ought to 
be punished’.687 The use of the modal verb ‘ought’ makes this a moral obligation, not 
a prescriptive rule (not that the miscellany of references he provided could have made 
punishment prescriptive). Both reasons are value calls. Since none of the references 
are gender-specific, the assumption is that male-female acts should also be 
punishable. 
 
Gardiner J then gives his take on sodomy: ‘in our practice sodomy has come to mean 
                                                          
685 Albertyn, C., The decriminalization of gay sexual offences, p. 469. 
686 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 162. 
687 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 162. 
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that particular kind of unnatural offence where there is penetration per anum’.688 He 
refers to ‘practice’ rather than ‘law’ and provides no explanation as to how sodomy 
has come to mean what he says it does. By way of a blind-spot, perhaps, his definition 
is genderless, emphasizing the act not the person. 
 
Twenty-six years later, in 1952 in Cunningham v Cunningham, sodomy is mentioned 
again, and again within the context of intercrural sex between males.689 Ogilvie 
Thompson J endorses Gardiner J’s interpretation of sodomy: ‘I do not think that there 
can be any doubt that Gardiner JP [listed as J in the records], correctly stated the 
modern law when he said in Rex v Gough and Narroway, ... that “in our practice 
sodomy has come to mean that particular kind of unnatural offence where there is 
penetration per anum”’.690 This case endorses the gender-neutral definition. The 
‘unnaturalness’ of the act is that it is not per vaginam and not that it is specifically 
between males. 
 
So far there is very little to go on. In 1926 one judge coins a definition of sodomy not 
based on any convincing common law. It outlaws anal penetration between anybody. 
The definition is made obiter since this was in fact a case about intercrural sex. Some 
twenty-five years later another judge endorses this ‘definition’. The endorsement is 
also obiter since this case is again about intercrural sex. 
                                                          
688 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 163. 
689 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C). 
690 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 170. 
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 A year later, in 1953, there is an entrapment case concerning attempted sodomy.691 
The charge is extremely vague: ‘... in that ... the ... accused being a male person did 
wrongfully and unlawfully and against the order of nature have a venereal affair with 
... R ..., and the accused did then and there carnally know the said R ..., a male 
person’.692 This vague and imprecise charge resulted in a criminal conviction. Neither 
Gough nor Cunningham are referred to. 
 
The male-male sodomy narrative stops here until 1973 and the courts hear cases 
involving male-female sodomy, except in these cases the word ‘sodomy’ is not used. 
 
In 1961 a man sodomised a woman.693 There was no conviction as anal intercourse 
with a woman was held to no longer be an offence under South African law. This 
short case of some 600 words is the first case used to justify not indicting for male-
female sodomy. The term ‘sodomy’ gives way to ‘venereal intercourse with a woman 
… contrary to the order of nature by inserting his penis into her anus and penetrating 
it’.694
 
The following extract is not a convincing justification for not bringing a charge of 
sodomy. Gardiner J’s definition of sodomy, being genderless, should have been used 
                                                          
691 R v V 1953 (3) SA 314 (A). 
692 R v V 1953 (3) SA 314 (A), 315. 
693 R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T). 
694 R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T), 147 (The judgment is in Afrikaans.) 
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as authority but was not. Rather than mention the Gough case, Marais J states, ‘In 
South African law there is no reported incidence where a man has been condemned 
for sodomy in conjunction with a female person, and the indications are, as e.g. The 
Crown v K and F in 1932 EDL 71, is rather in the opposite direction; in that instance 
an unnatural crime was committed between a man and a woman in regards to sexual 
gratuitousness, although not of the nature of sodomy, and the Court came to the 
conclusion that in that instance no crime had been committed, as sodomy could not be 
used as a charge’.695
 
The story of sodomy could have taken a different turn at this stage. Speculating, if 
Marais J had relied on Gardiner J’s view of sodomy – ‘in our practice sodomy has 
come to mean that particular kind of unnatural offence where there is penetration ‘per 
anum’696 – he would have acknowledged that the act of sodomy had been committed 
no matter the gender since Gardiner J’s definition is genderless. Instead, he relies on R 
v K & F which is about oral sex between a male and a female. He is essentially saying 
that because male-female oral sex was not regarded as a crime, neither should male-
female anal intercourse. He chose to align himself with a male-female case of a 
weaker legal basis than a male-male case where anal penetration is specifically 
mentioned. 
 
                                                          
695 R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T), 148 (approximate translation). 
696 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 170. 
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Male-female sodomy was considered a year later in 1962.697 A man attempted to rape 
a woman. Because of the physical positions they were in (she was seated on him, and 
later he attempted to rape her from behind), he inadvertently penetrated her anus. A 
conviction of attempted sodomy was set aside. This was an appeal from a magistrates’ 
court and is used as authority that male-female sodomy is not a crime. The fact that it 
was really a case of attempted rape is not given the foregrounding it warrants. 
 
The attempted sodomy occurred whilst the man was trying to achieve his ‘real 
purpose’ which was to have ‘normal sexual intercourse’ with her.698 The normal 
sexual intercourse consisted of first placing her ‘on his lap and attempting intercourse 
in that position’.699 The woman called a girl into the room to try and stop this. The 
man tried to bribe the girl away. The woman then fled to the kitchen where ‘he 
pressed her against the wall, lifted up her dress and attempted to have intercourse with 
her from behind’.700
 
Despite indications of non-consent on the woman’s part, there are a number of 
contradictory statements. The ‘magistrate ... found that the complainant had not been 
a consenting party to intercourse of any kind’,701 and yet he had earlier used the 
                                                          
697 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR). 
698 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 279.  
699 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 278.  
700 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 278.  
701 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 279.  
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phrase ‘he attempted to make love to her’702 with the connotation of consent. A 
charge of attempted rape was not brought against the accused and there is no further 
mention of rape until the end of the case where the judge says: ‘In the present case the 
magistrate found that the penetration per anum was accidentally done in the course of 
an attempted rape …. It is quite probable in the circumstances of this case, that the 
complainant did consent to normal intercourse, but that it was the unnatural 
intercourse which distressed her’.703
 
Once the attempted rape is sent to the background, the case then turns on these 
questions: ‘(i) Can the crime of sodomy be committed with a woman? If so, (ii) Was 
there the necessary mens rea present here to support a conviction?’704 Young J found 
that as there was no mens rea, he did not have to answer the question whether sodomy 
could be committed with a woman.705 Despite this unsatisfactory result, the case is 
used as authority for legalizing male-female sodomy. 
 
A few years later, in 1968, a medical doctor testified before a parliamentary 
committee that heterosexual sodomy, when used as a contraceptive method, ‘often 
seems to confuse their whole sexual approach and they afterwards prefer the rectum to 
the vagina for sexual purposes’. He then confirmed that gender did not matter to some 
                                                          
702 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 278.  
703 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 280. 
704 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 279.  
705 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 280 (‘If a man has no intention of having intercourse per 
anum, I do not think he can be convicted of sodomy if while attempting to rape a woman he 
by mischance penetrates her anus’.) 
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men, ‘Yes, they often use anybody’s rectum’.706 But through judgments such as those 
heard in 1961 and 1962 ‘anybody’s rectum’ became gendered.707 Under the 
constitutional dispensation, judges acknowledged that there was ‘different treatment 
accorded by the law to anal intercourse according to whether the partner was male or 
female’,708 where ‘heterosexual intercourse per anum falls outside the definition of 
sodomy’.709
 
In 1969 another case was heard concerning male-female sodomy.710 It is rendered 
defective because it was really about sex with an underage girl and anal penetration is 
not proved. A man had an ‘unnatural affair’ with a girl under the age of twelve. 
Although not proved, this was taken to mean sodomy. Male-female sodomy was held 
to be abrogated by disuse and the conviction was set aside. 
 
The charge is vague about the sexual act but at the same time makes it explicit that the 
girl is under 12 years old: ‘accused is charged with the crime of committing an 
unnatural offence, in that … [he] did wrongfully, and contrary to the order of nature, 
have an unnatural affair with … a female juvenile … under the age of twelve years ... 
being then a child of tender years, that is to say, under the age of twelve years’.711
                                                          
706 Select Committee, Republic of South Africa. Report of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report7-1968, p. 293). 
707 R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T); R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR). 
708 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 63. 
709 High Court National Coalition, 109. 
710 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R). 
711 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
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 Sodomy is not mentioned in the charge. The only time the word is mentioned is in the 
context of male-male sodomy.712 However, the prosecutor does not use this word. He 
stated that ‘the accused had had sexual intercourse with the complainant per anum. 
This was explained to the accused ... and to this charge ... he pleaded not guilty’.713 
The judgment contains nothing about proof of penetration. 
 
The terminology used throughout the whole case is vague and studiously avoids the 
‘S’ word: ‘unnatural offence’,714 ‘unnatural affair’,715 and ‘unnatural intercourse of a 
man with a woman’.716 The terms then used are ‘such an act’ and ‘such acts’ 
(twice)717 before returning to ‘unnatural intercourse of a man with a woman’.718
 
Beadle CJ’s argument goes like this. Earlier Dutch writers had held that male-female 
unnatural intercourse was a crime. Later Dutch writers were silent on the matter and it 
would not be a ‘cogent argument’ to say that it had ceased to be a crime: ‘I would 
hesitate, therefore, to express any firm opinion as to whether or not in Voet’s day the 
Roman-Dutch law regarded unnatural intercourse of a man with a woman as a crime. I 
would prefer to approach the matter on the basis that, if it was a crime in those days, 
                                                          
712 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 330. 
713 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
714 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328 (in the charge and elsewhere another four times). 
715 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328 (in the charge). 
716 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 329. 
717 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 329. 
718 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 329. 
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the crime has since been abrogated by disuse’.719 He makes a choice between two 
legal arguments. By relying on the abrogation by disuse approach, he does not have to 
decide whether it is a crime. In the previous example, Young J had also been able to 
sidestep the issue once he had found that mens rea was absent. 
 
Beadle CJ relies on R v K and F as authority: ‘The matter is in South Africa covered 
by authority. In R v K & F [1932 EDL], the subject was exhaustively considered ... 
and both these learned Judges came to the conclusion that the crime had in South 
Africa been abrogated by disuse. See the remarks of Pittman J, at p. 74, where he 
stated: “... even if unnatural lewdness between man and woman of the kind in 
question in this particular case had been criminal as recently as the early part of last 
century, such conduct is no longer so, and the force of this conclusion in favour of 
modern-day immunity is not lessened by the apparent unwillingness of writers like 
van Leeuwen and van der Linden to accept the views of those earlier ones, from 
(which) the passages quoted have been taken”’.720
 
The judge says that ‘the matter’, ‘the subject’, and ‘the crime’ was exhaustively 
considered. It is correct that there is a comprehensive review of Dutch writers in R v K 
& F, but it ranges over all kinds of unnatural acts, including bestiality. In fact ‘the 
subject’ of R v K & F (‘the kind in question in this particular case’) was about oral sex 
between consenting male and female adults. The judge is using this case to support 
                                                          
719 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 329-330. 
720 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 330. 
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abrogation by disuse of male-female sodomy. He states that R v K & F was followed 
in other cases concerning male-female sodomy: ‘It [the ruling in R v K & F] has been 
followed in the Transvaal in R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T). In this country Young J, in R 
v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), stated that the crime of sodomy in South Africa seemed to 
be confined to sexual intercourse between males’.721 In fact R v N did not support R v 
K & F and R v K & F is not mentioned in R v H. 
 
The reference to R v H indicates that Beadle CJ still has sodomy in mind. However, 
he then switches to intercrural sex – ‘there have been numerous prosecutions in 
Rhodesia for what might be regarded as unnatural sexual acts committed by males 
upon females’.722 The claim that he is speaking of intercrural sex is supported by the 
fact that he quotes Gutsche J in R v K & F who said ‘dozens of cases every year pass 
through [the courts] in which the ancient and notorious native custom of metsha 
(perineal connection or coitus inter femora), practised between males and females, 
forms a prominent feature’.723
 
Beadle CJ conflates intercrural sex and anal intercourse whereas other judges go to 
lengths to separate the two.724 In one case, for example, Ogilvie Thompson J granted 
judicial separation instead of divorce on the grounds that the defendant had 
                                                          
721 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 330. 
722 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 330. 
723 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 330. 
724 For example, ‘There is no suggestion in his evidence that the accused’s penis was 
anywhere in the region of the complainant’s anus or that any attempt was made to penetrate or 
direct it towards that orifice’. (S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 357) 
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participated in intercrural sex and not anal sex – ‘It would be very difficult to 
determine exactly where to draw the line if unnatural sexual offences falling short of 
penetration were to be recognized as a ground for divorce. Penetration is required to 
establish adultery, and in my judgment that same criterion should be applied when in 
a divorce action the sexual infidelity complained of takes the form of an unnatural 
offence’.725
 
After stating that male-female sodomy has been abrogated by disuse, the next part of 
his argument focuses on terminology. He uses crimen injuria as an analogy. Whereas 
crimen injuria was originally a generic crime, he says, over time specific injuria came 
to be known by specific names. In modern times ‘a charge which describes one of 
these specific injuries as the [generic] crime of criminal injuria is bad’.726 Based on 
this reasoning, he is ‘on firm ground’ if he follows R v K & F – ‘I accordingly express 
the view that an unnatural offence consisting of an unnatural sexual act committed by 
a male upon a female is not the crime of an unnatural offence in Rhodesia to-day’.727
 
The crimen injuria analogy fails in that although specific names were given to 
specific injuria, this does not follow through to sodomy. It is still called by its vague 
terms ‘unnatural offence’ and ‘unnatural sexual act’ and there is no support for 
making it gender-specific. An unnatural sexual act does not necessarily mean sodomy, 
                                                          
725 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 171. 
726 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 331. 
727 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 331. 
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it could mean any other type of intercourse other than vaginal sex. 
 
Beadle CJ also manipulates the girl’s age because it inconveniently mars the point he 
wants to make that male-female sodomy was not illegal. The charge clearly refers to 
her young age: ‘an African female juvenile ... being then a child of tender years, that 
is to say, under the age of twelve years’.728 However, when Beadle CJ refers to the 
charge, he does not refer to her as a juvenile, but as a ‘female’: ‘as the charge in this 
case clearly alleged that the act was committed by a male upon a female’.729 In fact, 
what the charge clearly alleges is that she was under 12 years of age. Elsewhere in 
Beadle CJ’s judgment he refers to her as a female: ‘it was alleged that the unnatural 
offence was committed by a male upon a female’.730 The holding makes no mention 
of her age or lack of consent. It now carries forward stripped of these facts: ‘Held, as 
an unnatural sexual act committed on a male by a female was not the crime of an 
unnatural offence to-day, that the conviction could not stand’.731
 
By trading up the description to female, Beadle CJ makes this female equal and 
comparable to the female in R v K and F, except that in that case, the female is a 
consenting adult, ‘a woman ... with the woman’s consent’.732 Having attained this 
parity, he can now drive home his point: ‘I come to the conclusion that I will be on 
                                                          
728 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
729 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 331. 
730 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
731 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 328. 
732 R v K & F 1932 EDL, 71. 
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firm ground if I follow the decision of ... R v K & F [1932 EDL]. I accordingly 
express the view that an unnatural offence consisting of an unnatural sexual act 
committed by a male upon a female is not the crime of an unnatural offence’.733 It is 
the other judge, Greenfield J, who draws attention to the girl’s age and how ‘being a 
child of tender years was deemed incapable of consenting’.734 This observation did 
not affect the outcome of the case, however. 
 
The sodomy narrative now returns to males. In 1973 a man had ‘a venereal affair 
against the order of nature’ with another man.735 He was sentenced to fifteen months’ 
imprisonment with hard labour, partially suspended provided that he undergo 
psychiatric treatment and not commit a similar offence. Sodomy is not specified in the 
charge sheet but has to be inferred. The flynote boldly states sodomy – ‘Criminal law 
– Sodomy’736 – and the headnote interprets a venereal affair as sodomy – ‘The 
appellant had pleaded guilty to and been convicted of having a venereal affair against 
the order of nature .... The magistrate’s court had found that the complainant had not 
consented to this act, i.e. an act of sodomy’.737
 
The flynote and headnote are editorial embellishments. The charge itself only 
                                                          
733 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 331. 
734 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 333. 
735 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA). 
736 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 87. 
737 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 87. 
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mentions ‘having a venereal affair against the order of nature, with a male’.738 
‘Venereal’ is a general term associated with sexual desire or intercourse. The 
judgment does not contain ‘penetrate’ or ‘penetration’, and nowhere is it proved that 
penetration took place. Despite this he received fifteen months hard labour. According 
to the facts as per the judgment, there was an act of sodomy – ‘He then told the 
complainant to kneel down and remove his trousers .... The appellant then removed 
his penis and committed sodomy on the complainant’.739 When considering sentence, 
the judge refers to three (unreported) cases which were about sodomy.740 However, 
when he returns to the present case, he calls the act an ‘unnatural offence’.741
 
In 1977 another case about intercrural sex between men mentions sodomy.742 The 
charge was made in terms of a statute which required penetration. Since this did not 
occur, the conviction was set aside. The ‘act … involves the entry of the male organ 
into some orifice in the body of a man, woman or animal, the words “against the order 
of nature” however excluding from the operation of the section, entry into a woman’s 
vagina. The placing of a man’s penis between the thighs of a woman or of another 
man cannot constitute penetration within the ordinary meaning of the latter word’.743 
‘There is no suggestion in his evidence that the accused’s penis was anywhere in the 
region of the complainant’s anus or that any attempt was made to penetrate or direct it 
                                                          
738 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 87. 
739 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 88. 
740 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 89. 
741 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 90. 
742 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS). 
743 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 358. 
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towards that orifice’.744 This case highlights the importance of the actual site of 
penetration and reinforces the gender-neutral act not the person. 
 
In 1979 a man raped and sodomised a young girl.745 On review from a magistrate’s 
court, the sodomy charge was changed to indecent assault because sodomy only 
applied to male-male anal intercourse. This case was definitely about anal penetration 
– ‘in addition to raping the complainant, a young African girl, the appellant had also 
forcibly effected penetration of the complainant per anum’.746 Yet the flynote 
telegraphically states that this is not sodomy: ‘Male having intercourse per anum with 
a female - Such not sodomy ... - Conviction of indecent assault substituted in 
circumstances’.747 The judge does not reveal that this charge was part of a rape case, 
nor that the accused ‘forcibly effected penetration of the complainant per anum’. The 
fact that the complainant was a young girl who could not be deemed to give her 
consent anyway is also ignored. 
 
Why is penetration by a penis of an anus not sodomy? Why is it a lesser charge of 
indecent assault? Because the anus is gendered female. This is a case about 
terminology, sodomy for male-male anal intercourse, and indecent assault for male-
female anal intercourse. This is reinforced given that it was only the conviction and 
not the sentence which was challenged. That the term ‘sodomy’ had been used 
                                                          
744 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 357. 
745 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA). 
746 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 406. 
747 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 406. 
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worried the magistrate to the extent that ‘after the case was concluded he had 
consulted certain authorities and that from those authorities it appeared that sodomy 
can only be committed by males and not by a male on a female. He asked accordingly 
that the conviction for sodomy be set aside’.748
 
The judge in the present case (S v M) also refers to R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R) but 
does not mention Greenfield J’s concern over how the nomenclature used to describe 
a crime led to a conviction being set aside. In that 1969 case Greenfield J says, ‘The 
point which disturbs me, however, is the state of the law, which apparently is that, if 
the prosecutor delves into the past and uses to describe a crime nomenclature which 
has become obsolete, the effect is to invalidate the proceedings’.749
 
In R v M – a male-female sodomy case by any other name – the concern was that the 
charge had been framed as an ‘unnatural offence’, whereas it should have been 
framed as ‘indecent assault’. In fact, it was this very concern which led to the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act 37 of 1975 (of Rhodesia) which 
inserted the words ‘whether or not it discloses an offence’. Davies JA could now use 
that amendment to call male-female sodomy ‘indecent assault’ in the present case –
‘That section permits a court to correct any error in a charge where there is no 
prejudice to the accused and this power can now, as pointed out, be exercised even 
                                                          
748 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 406. 
749 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R), 333. 
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though the charge as originally framed does not disclose an offence’.750 The ‘error’ in 
this case was using ‘sodomy’ instead of ‘indecent assault’ when it came to male-
female anal intercourse. 
 
Relying on R v M, Davies JA says that he hopes that the dissociation with sodomy 
will become the settled law: ‘I consider, with respect, that the view expressed by 
Beadle CJ is correct and that it should now be regarded as settled law in this country 
that the crime of sodomy is not committed when a male has intercourse per anum with 
a female’.751 The 1970s see the last of the male-female cases. 
 
But his wish for it to be ‘settled law’ would be unsettled twenty years later. Things 
come full circle when Sachs J once again emphasizes the act, not the person: ‘what is 
really being punished by the anti-sodomy laws. Is it an act, or is it a person? …. In the 
case of male homosexuality … the perceived deviance is punished simply because it 
is deviant. It is repressed for its perceived symbolism rather than because of its proven 
harm. If proof were necessary, it is established by the fact that consensual anal 
penetration of a female is not criminalised. Thus, it is not the act of sodomy that is 
denounced by the law, but the so-called sodomite who performs it; not any proven 
social damage, but the threat that same-sex passion in itself is seen as representing to 
heterosexual hegemony’.752
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751 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 408. 
752 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 56. 
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 In 1984 a charge of sodomy was laid but not upheld because no penetration took 
place.753 Like the 1952 Cunningham case, this judge is also careful to specify when 
penetration takes place. He mentions the difference between the buttocks and anus 
with almost medical precision: ‘The act was performed by the accused by directing 
his penis between the buttocks of the complainant but there was no direct evidence of 
penetration per anum nor of any attempt at penetration …. On these facts the conduct 
of the accused is consistent with seeking gratification by some practice not involving 
penetration’.754
 
The final two cases involving male sodomy were heard in 1995 and 1997 in terms of 
the South African constitution. 
 
In 1995 a man in his twenties was convicted of sodomy which took place with another 
consenting male adult.755 He was sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment, the 
whole of which was conditionally suspended. On review before Ackermann J, the 
conviction was confirmed but the sentence was replaced with one of a caution and 
discharge. This is the first case that deals with sodomy in a constitutional discourse, 
namely the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
The charge of sodomy still had to stand at that stage but Ackermann J exercised 
                                                          
753 S v M 1984 (4) SA 111 (T). 
754 S v M 1984 (4) SA 111 (T), 111-112. 
755 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C). 
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discretion with the sentence. 
 
The second case, which occurred in 1997, is not a ‘typical gay’ situation like the 
above case.756 This was an act of sodomy between two prison inmates awaiting trial. 
We are told that the one man was unmarried with two children. He had completed 
standard four and was a bricklayer currently unemployed. Even though this was not 
the ideal case in which to attack the sodomy laws, the time was ripe and it was 
therefore pressed into service. He was convicted by a magistrate on a charge of 
sodomy and sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment suspended for three years. On 
review, the conviction and sentence were set aside by Farlam J. The 1996 constitution 
states that judges may take into account foreign law. In this case of some 16,000 
words, Farlam J devotes almost seventy-five percent to direct quotations from foreign 
law. Further quotations from articles by Edwin Cameron, and extracts from common 
law take this up to eighty-six percent of the judgment. 
 
The history of sodomy, as far as it occurs in the SA Law Reports, ends in the late 
1990s with the two National Coalition cases.757 These cases were brought to 
challenge common law sodomy which criminalized anal intercourse between men. To 
this extent it was declared unconstitutional. 
 
                                                          
756 S v Kampher 1997 (4) SA 460 (C). 
757 High Court National Coalition; Constitutional Court National Coalition. 
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Other ‘unnatural acts’ 
Cases heard in connection with ‘unnatural acts’ include intercrural sex and 
masturbation. These two sexual acts also reinforces that the person, and not the act, 
was being punished. A certain sexual act, called intercrural sex (situated or occurring 
between the legs), occurs when a male places his penis between the thighs of a male 
or a female and achieves orgasm by friction. This particular term will be used 
although it is not used in the corpus where it is referred to as ‘metsha’, ‘perineal 
connection’ or ‘coitus inter femora’.758 An examination of the applicable cases 
follows. 
 
The first instance occurred when two men were found guilty of an unnatural offence, 
specifically intercrural sex with another male. The court held that this act, when 
between two males, was a crime. The ‘accused [was] convicted ... with “committing 
an unnatural offence” .... in that [he] did wrongfully and unlawfully and against the 
order of nature have a venereal affair with one T, to wit, did insert his penis between 
the thighs of the said T and move it backwards and forwards until he ... had an 
emission of semen’.759
 
Gardiner J specifically distinguishes this act from sodomy – ‘there was no penetration 
per anum nor any attempt at penetration, and therefore no question arises as to the 
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offence of sodomy’.760 He then considers whether the act committed by the men was 
a crime.761 After citing various common law authorities Gardiner J concludes, ‘there 
can be no reason for exempting from penalty the acts set forth in the charge-sheet in 
the present case …. Is there then any reason to think that the commission of the acts 
charged has ceased to be an offence? There has been no change in public opinion, 
which would cause such conduct to be regarded as otherwise than abhorrent’.762 It is 
not clear from this case whether the act of intercrural sex is a crime, or whether it is a 
crime because it is between two men. On face value it seems to be genderless because 
the authorities he cites refer also to male-female sexual relations. 
 
Six years later, in 1932, male-female intercrural sex is condoned. This case is actually 
about male-female oral sex but intercrural sex is referred to.763 It is specifically within 
a black male / black female context and is referred to by its African name, metsha.764 
Thus, intercrural sex is made race-specific and gender-specific. It is ‘their’ practice 
and the thighs are gendered female: ‘their practice of metsha, in which sexual 
gratification is afforded as a result of the male organ being inserted between the 
female’s thighs’.765 Pittman J regarded intercrural sex between blacks as an everyday 
occurrence766 which is non-indictable.767 If male-female intercrural sex is not a crime, 
                                                          
760 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD, 161. 
761 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD, 161. 
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but male-male intercrural sex is, then it is the person and not the act which is being 
punished. 
 
The case in which metsha is discussed is actually about consensual oral sex between a 
white male and a white female.768 The judge referred to the custom of metsha in his 
judgment because he regarded both types of sexual acts as being the same – achieved 
by friction, whether it be by mouth or thigh: ‘It is true that the present case is different 
from one of metsha, but the difference is not of such a character, that we should go 
out of our way to make it the basis of a distinction between criminality and 
immunity’.769
 
By introducing the African custom of metsha to justify male-female oral sex, Pittman 
J is in effect saying that it does not matter what race the parties are; both acts are legal 
provided it is between a male and female. After relying (in the Gough case) on the 
common law (which is not gender-specific) to make this act criminal between men, in 
this case (heard only six years later) the common law is again used, but this time to 
condone the act: ‘The passages quoted seem sufficiently to show that, although under 
the earlier Roman-Dutch law the conduct here under investigation would have 
                                                                                                                                            
767 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 73 & 74 (‘such conduct is not in these days indictable’, 
‘definitely outside the range of criminal responsibility’). 
768 The case does not specifically mention their race, but the oral sex took place in ‘a private 
sitting-room at an hotel in Port Elizabeth’ (R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 71-72). It is unlikely that 
blacks, in 1932, would have been in the hotel. 
769 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 74. 
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constituted a crime, still towards the end of the eighteenth century at any rate a less 
comprehensive view was taken of the species of unnatural vice, that were, proper for 
prosecution’.770
 
Apart from the selective reliance on common law, intercrural sex between males and 
females is ‘definitely outside the range of criminal responsibility’ when it is being 
referred to as metsha, something which blacks do and which is not prosecuted under 
white law. However, this race-justified exemption is then applied to white males and 
females by way of making oral sex analogous to intercrural sex. The only conclusion 
is that prosecuting male-male intercrural sex was definitely based on the person and 
not the act. Common law was used as justification to both prosecute same-sex acts 
and exempt male-female acts. 
 
The next time intercrural sex is mentioned in a judgment is in the Cunningham case in 
1952 where it is between two men.771 Instead of being the ‘generally accepted and 
relatively innocuous’772 act which males and females engage in, because it is between 
men, it is ‘sexually perverted and depraved’.773 Ogilvie Thompson J also refers to it as 
‘some erotic act’, perhaps to avoid using the term metsha with its crime-free 
connotation.774
                                                          
770 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 73. 
771 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C). 
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 Cunningham is compared to another case involving male-male intercrural sex, S v S, 
where the use of ‘merely’ and ‘going through the motions’ suggests that intercrural 
sex is not ‘real’ sex: ‘he was ... seen ... to be going through the motions of sexual 
intercourse, … the appellant merely inserted his penis between his legs’.775 This 
description contrasts to Ogilvie Thomson J’s one of ‘sexually perverted and 
depraved’.776
 
In both these cases race is introduced by the judges. In both cases the one person is 
black and the other white. In S v S it was the magistrate who introduced race into the 
discourse. The review judge comments – ‘the fact that the appellant a White person 
consorted with a Bantu youth aggravates the immoral or indecent act he committed 
with such youth’, and it seems clear from his [the magistrate’s] judgment that this was 
the main reason why he declined to give effect to the request by the appellant’s 
counsel that a wholly suspended sentence should be imposed’.777 According to the 
judge, however, ‘the race of the victim of the offence is quite irrelevant’.778
 
Despite what the judge says here about race being irrelevant, it is specifically 
foregrounded in the Cunningham case. Two male miners, one white and married, one 
black, had intercrural sex whilst down a mine. Cunningham’s wife sought a divorce 
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because of this. The white man is referred to as a ‘European’ and as the ‘defendant’. 
The black man is referred to as ‘an adult male native’ and ‘a native subordinate’.779 
The parts of the black man’s body are specifically referred to by race, the ‘thighs of 
the native’.780 Whereas the white man is referred to as the defendant, again the race of 
the other man is mentioned: ‘the defendant neither penetrated, nor made any attempt 
to penetrate, the native’.781 Referring to the black miner as a subordinate introduces a 
hierarchy of power and authority based on race. This is made explicit in that 
intercrural sex ‘was not only sexually perverted and depraved, but it was all the more 
shameful because committed by a European upon a native subordinate’.782
 
Yet when talking about the act within the discourse of marriage, the black ‘native’, 
male miner is referred to as a race- and gender-neutral ‘partner’: ‘the husband has 
committed an unnatural sexual act with a partner’.783 This shows how much latitude 
the judge has when describing the parties. 
 
In 1977 a case was heard concerning two males who had intercrural sex.784 In this 
example I again emphasize race but this time not because it was first raised by the 
judges. In this case race is only introduced by implication where a case involving 
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the thighs of KJ and discharged’). 
 221
male intercrural sex between whites is used to condone the same act between blacks. 
 
The charge was made in terms of a statute which required penetration. Since this did 
not occur, the conviction was set aside. The charge was made under The Transkei 
Penal Code of 1886 which read, ‘Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against 
the order of nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with 
imprisonment .... The offence is complete upon penetration’.785
 
Significantly, this is the only case that invokes this particular part of the code, and it 
happened to be between two males.786 A statute dating back to 1886 invoked in 1977 
suggests gender bias. This suggestion is reinforced by comments made forty-five 
years earlier in R v K & F where intercrural sex in a male-female context is referred to 
as an ‘almost daily experience in our criminal courts …. which so frequently obtrudes 
itself in the actual course of criminal trials’.787
 
Munnick CJ specifically introduces the Gough case into his judgment to rule that 
intercrural sex is not sodomy: ‘In R v Gough and Narroway 1926 CPD 159, the 
[Court] ... held that a charge sheet wherein it was alleged that one of the accused, a 
male, had “committed an unnatural offence in that he did wrongfully and unlawfully 
and against the order of nature have a venereal affair with one T to wit did insert his 
                                                          
785 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 357.  
786 The Transkei Penal Code is referred to in two other cases involving forgery and damage to 
property. 
787 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 73 & 74. 
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penis between the thighs of the said T and move it backwards and forwards until he, 
the said N, had an emission of semen” disclosed an offence, although not amounting 
to sodomy in the accepted sense of that term’.788
 
By introducing Gough, the judge is acknowledging that sodomy is not the issue. 
However, at the same time he is acknowledging, by implication, that race is not an 
issue because the present case is about black males in rural Transkei whereas Gough 
is about white males in suburban Cape Town.789 Having established that the act is not 
sodomy, the judge quotes, inter alia, from R v K and F, a case referring to the African 
custom of metsha. The balance of his statement aligns male-male intercrural sex with 
its female counterpart, and makes Pittman J’s reference to female thighs now seem 
strange: ‘one must assume that the lawgiver was acquainted with the general 
prevalence in the Transkei of the practice of Metsha in which, as Pittman J, put it in R 
v K & F …, “sexual gratification is afforded as the result of the male organ being 
inserted between the female’s thighs” and it cannot be contended with any 
justification that in a penal code enacted especially for the “Transkeian Territories” it 
was intended to legislate against a generally accepted and relatively innocuous custom 
extant among the peoples of those territories. This, since the section refers to both 
men and women, affords further evidence of the fact that the prohibition was against 
the penetration of an orifice, not against the placing of the male organ between the 
                                                          
788 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 357. 
789 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 357 (‘a Bantu youth’). 
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legs of another, be it male, female or animal’.790
 
Munnick CJ reasons in the following way. Since the writers of the penal code must 
have known about the custom of metsha, the assumption is that the code must have 
been introduced to forbid anal penetration of any male, female or animal. The judge 
makes the bold statement that male-male intercrural sex is not contrary to the penal 
code. He confines his observations to Transkei which was almost wholly black. His 
opinion de-genders intercrural sex but confines it to a particular race. This is accepted 
since he is ruling only in terms of a penal code applying only to blacks. However, he 
has also introduced Gough as a supporting case which de-races his argument. Yet in 
1932 Pitman J had referred to this ‘black’ custom to support his view that male-
female oral sex should be decriminalized.791 He had no problem in de-racing the act. 
Between these two cases, therefore, intercrural sex is de-gendered and de-raced. 
Equalizing race and gender, therefore, male-male acts similar to those performed by 
male-females (but falling short of male-male sodomy) should have been legally 
allowable since 1977. 
 
All the cases dealing with masturbation are between males only. In the mid-1920s, 
two men masturbating was called a crime by Gardiner JP.792 He purports to speak on 
                                                          
790 S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS), 358 (italics added). 
791 In R v K & F 1932 EDL which probably involved non-blacks: the act took place ‘in a 
private sitting-room at an hotel in Port Elizabeth’ in 1932 (pp. 71-72). 
792 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386 (This Court had occasion recently … to discuss very fully 
this crime’). 
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behalf of Dutch-writers-past when he says, ‘masturbation was considered by some 
Roman-Dutch authorities as an unnatural offence. Other writers, however, thought 
otherwise, but their reason for holding that masturbation was not a crime was that an 
unnatural offence required … an active party and a passive party. Where a male 
performed this disgusting act upon himself, his conduct, according to the latter view, 
would not be a crime, but I think that all the authorities would agree that, when the 
act was performed by one person upon another, an offence was committed’.793
 
Gardiner JP equates masturbation with intercrural sex, ‘there can be no distinction 
between the case where sexual gratification is obtained by friction between the legs of 
another person, and the case where it is obtained by friction against another’s 
hand’.794 He is not gender-specific here which means that male-female masturbation 
and intercrural sex should also have been a crime. However, the judges in R v K & F 
to be heard six years later would disagree, making only male-male sex acts a criminal 
offence.795
 
Forty years on from Curtis, in 1969, another case concerning masturbation came to 
court.796 Counsel for the defendant argued that whilst ‘the conduct disclosed by the 
facts might well have been regarded by the old Roman-Dutch writers as an unnatural 
                                                          
793 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386 (italics added). 
794 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386. 
795 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71. 
796 S v V 1967 (2) SA 17 (E). 
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offence, it should not be and is not regarded so to-day’.797 Counsel referred to two 
cases798 where this argument had been used successfully, but Jennett JP disagreed 
saying that that was because in ‘those cases the Court was concerned with conduct 
committed on a female and it seems to me that that was the basis on which those 
decisions were founded’.799 Despite the Curtis case not being gender-specific, the 
judge concluded, ‘I see no reason to think that where conduct … occurs between two 
males the present outlook has developed to the stage of regarding such conduct as not 
constituting an unnatural offence’.800
 
By the 1990s, male masturbation was not only no longer disgusting, the Appellate 
Division regarded it as no big deal, even when performed by a man and a 15 year-old 
boy. The man was sentenced to correctional supervision, and Nesdadt AJ regarded as 
a mitigating factor the fact that the other party was ‘not a defenceless child but a boy 
of 15 for whom masturbation was probably no shocking revelation’.801
 
Section 20A Sexual Offences Act 
Background 
The sexual acts of anal intercourse, intercrural sex and masturbation were common 
law acts. Section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act was the only attempt at legislating 
                                                          
797 S v V 1967 (2) SA 17 (E), 17-18. 
798 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71 and R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T).  
799 S v V 1967 (2) SA 17 (E), 18. 
800 S v V 1967 (2) SA 17 (E), 18. 
801 S v R 1993 (1) SA 476 (A), 479. 
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against homosexuality and it was an embarrassing failure. The background to its 
promulgation is as follows. 
 
In January 1966, the police raided a house in the affluent suburb of Forest Town, 
Johannesburg where, to their ‘disgust and repulsion’, they found a party in progress, 
‘the like of which has never been seen in the Republic of South Africa’. There were 
approximately 300 men present who were all ‘obviously homosexuals .... Males were 
dancing with males to the strains of music, kissing and cuddling each other in the 
most vulgar fashion imaginable. They also paired off and continued their love-making 
in the garden of the residence and in motor cars in the streets, engaging in the most 
indecent acts imaginable with each other’.802
 
The South African Police immediately sent a circular to all divisional commissioners 
warning that it appeared that homosexuality and gross indecency ‘is being practised 
between male persons throughout the country and that offenders are now pursuing an 
organised modus operandi’. The circular also recommended that informers be used to 
infiltrate ‘queer parties’ and that effective action be taken.803 The police noted that the 
events ‘filled even hardened members of the Criminal Investigation Department with 
disgust and revulsion’. This description portrays same-sex activity as being amongst 
                                                          
802 Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 101, quoting from the Report of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report 7-1968), 
footnotes omitted. 
803 Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 101, quoting from the Report of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report 7-1968), 
footnotes omitted. 
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the worst activity police officers had ever had to deal with. The police regarded this 
kind of activity as ‘constituting a threat to the moral basis of the populace’. Within 
weeks of the raid, police wrote to the Minister of Justice complaining that ‘stringent 
measures cannot be taken against homosexuals in terms of existing legislation’.804
 
The 1966 raid was the largest, most publicised the police had ever attempted. Glen 
Retief offers a possible explanation, ‘led by Prime Minister Verwoerd’s clampdown 
on the liberation movements and his formalisation of apartheid, the South African 
authorities were consolidating Afrikaner “Christian National” control over the 
country, expelling from the laager anything that was deemed threatening to white 
civilisation’.805
 
The raid led to a proposed amendment to the Sexual Offences Act which sought to 
make male and female homosexuality an offence punishable by compulsory 
imprisonment of up to three years. This would have had the effect not only of 
bringing lesbians into the scope of the law, but of making homosexuality itself 
statutorily illegal, whereas previously, only public male homosexual acts had been 
regulated by statute.806 The proposed amendment was considered so harsh that it was 
                                                          
804 Botha, K. & Cameron, E., South Africa, quoting from the Report of the Parliamentary 
Select Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report 7-1968), footnotes omitted. 
805 Glen Retief, ‘Keeping Sodom out of the laager’, in Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant 
desire. 
806 Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 31. 
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referred to a Parliamentary Select Committee which reported back in 1968.807 
Homosexuals formed the Homosexual Law Reform Fund and made a submission to 
this committee, after which it disbanded.808 As a result of this committee’s findings, 
the wording of the amendment was modified. 
 
Wording of S20A 
Section 20A was inserted into the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 in 1969.809 It 
remains legislation but has been declared inconsistent with the constitution.810
 
It reads as follows: 
(1) A male person who commits with another male person at a party any act which is 
calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification, shall be guilty of 
an offence. 
(2) For the purposes of ss (1) ‘a party’ means any occasion where more than two 
persons are present. 
 
                                                          
807 Select Committee, Republic of South Africa. (1968). Report of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report 7-1968). 
808 Anecdotal evidence is that funds left over were used in the National Coalition cases. 
809 By s3 of Act 57 of 1969. 
810 The section is invalid to the extent set out in the Constitutional Court Order published 
under Government Notice No 1354 in Government Gazette 19349 of 23 October 1998 and 
Government Notice No R588 in Government Gazette 21266 of 15 June 2000. 
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Commentary on S20A 
An article written in 1970, entitled ‘The Third Sex’, criticized section 20A.811 Despite 
its unflattering title, this is the only criticism at the time. Barend van Niekerk called 
this provision ‘an unfortunate throwback to times when legal concepts were crude and 
criminal law steeped in the taboos of a superstitious age. It is also in sharp contrast to 
criminal policy elsewhere in the civilized world …. Because [it] is so widely framed, 
because it contains a serious inroad upon an individual’s private sphere, and because 
finally it seeks to punish acts which are progressively regarded by medical science 
and enlightened legal systems as symptoms of an illness and not of criminal conduct, 
our courts would serve justice well if the narrowest possible meaning is put on it’.812
 
Cases heard in terms of S20A 
Only two cases were heard in terms of s20A and neither led to convictions. The first 
case was brought fourteen years after its enactment, an irony in itself given the haste 
in which the amendment was pushed through. 
 
In the first case, two men were charged under s20A of the Sexual Offences Act. They 
were convicted and sentenced to R200 or two months’ imprisonment with a further 
four months’ imprisonment suspended for five years on certain conditions. The 
conviction was later dropped because the charge had not included the phrase ‘at a 
                                                          
811 Van Niekerk, B., The third sex, p. 87. Not mentioned anywhere in the article, the term ‘the 
third sex’ was coined by a German philosopher Ulrich whose term was Uranian (Urning in 
German) meaning a woman’s mind in a man’s body. 
812 Van Niekerk, B., The third sex, pp. 88-89. 
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party’. 
 
An extract from the questions put to the men, and their answers reveals confusion 
surrounding the interpretation of ‘at a party’: 
[The court] ‘There were a number of people there and is it a condition that they pair 
off two-two in a cubicle? 
Accused No 1: Yes, depending on their sexual preferences, yes. 
By the court: Were there more than the two of you at this place? 
Accused No 2: I really could not tell you how many were there to be honest. 
 
It is clear from this line of questioning and the replies, that neither accused was aware 
of the significance of the questions as to the number of persons present. Both assumed 
that the questions related to the number of persons who were present in the building, 
not in the cubicle’.813
 
It was not only the accused who did not understand the implications. It was the 
magistrate who decided to drop the charge but only after the men had pleaded guilty, 
and even then, he did not himself understand the meaning of ‘a party’. The 
‘magistrate convicted the accused, on the basis of the presence of other persons, not in 
the cubicle, but in the clinic itself’.814
 
                                                          
813 S v C 1983 (4) SA 361 (T), 363-364. 
814 S v C 1983 (4) SA 361 (T), 363. 
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In the second case, two men were engaged, in private, in an unascertained sexual 
activity. When a policeman entered the area, they stopped and ran. It was held that 
this was not ‘a party’ in terms of s20A of the Sexual Offences Act and the conviction 
was set aside. 
 
Schabort J’s reasoning about who is deemed present at the ‘party’ is confusing. He 
favours a definition of ‘present’ that includes a mental element: ‘in my view … the 
presence of persons was intended to have a mental element. The commission of acts 
of this kind in the physical presence of persons who are asleep or for some other 
reason not aware of them (e.g. owing to darkness or blindness or deafness)’815 would 
not meet this mental requirement. According to Schabort J’s reasoning, a deaf person 
who sees two people engaged in any activity would not be mentally ‘there’, nor would 
a blind person who heard the activity. 
 
He then contradicts himself a few lines later by saying that ‘proper perception remains 
feasible whether by eye or by ear’,816 and reinforces this when he says, ‘as a matter of 
“presence” under the section, the reason why people may happen to find themselves 
within eyeshot or earshot of conduct as contemplated in the section, can make no 
difference’.817 How can a deaf or blind person not be present mentally? A bizarre 
presupposition would therefore be that deaf or blind people are not mentally present 
                                                          
815 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 79. 
816 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 80. 
817 S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W), 81. 
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when they are having sex; they are in the same category as those who are asleep. 
 
In the National Coalition cases this section was challenged and declared 
unconstitutional. Two examples from these cases lead me to conclude that the 
intention behind this section was never understood. 
 
When discussing s20A in the High Court National Coalition case, Heher J makes the 
strange observation that, as worded, the section could equally apply to heterosexual 
men. The section is ‘wide enough to strike at conduct by heterosexual men in the 
presence of women only or in the presence of other heterosexual men’818 but he 
concludes that ‘the likelihood is that it was aimed at conduct directed by and at 
homosexuals’.819 Why would heterosexual men perform with each other (either in 
front of women or heterosexual men) acts calculated to stimulate sexual passion or 
give sexual gratification? 
 
His hypothetical illustration as to how the section might apply to heterosexual men 
casts doubt on his grasp of the section. In his example, the act that would fall foul of 
s20A is ‘the sort of stupid romp that sometimes results from excessive indulgence in 
liquor by sportsmen’.820 S20A forbids more than two males to engage in an act which 
is calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification. This means 
                                                          
818 High Court National Coalition, 110. 
819 High Court National Coalition, 110. 
820 High Court National Coalition, 110. 
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that the ‘romp’ would have to stimulate sexual passion or gratification. Seventy years 
earlier, a man witnessed two men get into bed ‘and that they skylarked there’.821 
Skylark is a quaint term meaning to romp and indulge in horseplay, much like Heher 
J’s sportsmen. Back in 1926, to ‘skylark’ suggested nothing sexual but in fact it was 
used as a euphemism for an unspecified sexual act between men that resulted in eight 
months imprisonment with hard labour. 
 
To emphasize their heterosexuality, the men are ‘sportsmen’. To condone their antics, 
they are drunk. Nonetheless, unless Heher J’s sportsmen have a fetish for towels, they 
had to be doing something more than towel-flicking in the locker-room. He then goes 
on to say that ‘the target of the section is plainly men with homosexual tendencies 
albeit that the wording is wide enough to embrace heterosexuals’.822 The 
presupposition here is that the heterosexuals embraced also have homosexual 
tendencies, something many lads down at the sports club would be appalled to hear. 
 
Ackermann J also tried to illustrate the absurdity of s20A in the Constitutional Court 
National Coalition case, but his example only conjures up an unusual cocktail party. It 
starts in the manner of a joke: ‘A gay couple attend a social gathering attended by gay, 
lesbian and heterosexual couples. The gay man, in the presence of the other guests, 
kisses his gay partner on the mouth in a way “calculated to stimulate” both his and his 
partner’s “sexual passion” and to give both “sexual gratification”. They do no more. A 
                                                          
821 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 388. 
822 High Court National Coalition, 127. 
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lesbian and a heterosexual couple do exactly the same. The gay couple are guilty of an 
offence. The lesbian and heterosexual couples not’.823 This is a contrived example. 
Even in 1970 Barend van Niekerk did not envisage ‘tongue-kissing’ as infringing 
S20A.824 To use the term ‘social gathering’ suggests something like a cocktail 
function. It would be unlikely to find a couple at such an event, no matter of what 
sexual orientation, tongue-kissing each other intent on sexual arousal. When he says 
‘They do no more’, what more need they do? 
 
Male homosexuality associated with sexual abuse of boys 
Introduction 
Homosexual men are often accused of sexually interfering with boys. Section 14 of 
the Sexual Offences Act was enacted to protect all children against sexual abuse no 
matter from what quarter. This legislation was not always used, however, with some 
cases being brought under common law, under crimen injuria for example. This 
section looks at all the judgments concerning age, whether in terms of the Act or 
common law, and concludes that the outcomes do not support this man-boy abuse 
view. Again, it is the person rather than the act which is being targeted. 
 
I begin with cases heard either before the Sexual Offences Act became law, or with 
cases heard in Rhodesia (which were reported in the SALR). Section 14 is then 
                                                          
823 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 43. 
824 Van Niekerk, B., The third sex, p. 89 – ‘Acts such as ‘tongue-kissing’ … should not, it is 
submitted, fall within the scope of the prohibition, although such acts, as well as many others, 
can marginally be regarded as calculated to stimulate sexual passion’. 
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considered – the wording, background to the increase in age of consent for males, and 
cases heard in terms of s14. This is followed by two cases which should have been 
heard in terms of s14. 
 
Background to changes to section 14 
When the police raid in Forest Town led to amendments to the Sexual Offences Act, 
the age of consent was also reviewed. Although there were no underage males at the 
party, it has been suggested that the government used this as an opportunity to 
legislate against the so-called corruption of Afrikaner youth – ‘gay men who were 
active at the time recall that, in Johannesburg, Afrikaans cultural and religious 
organisations were agitating about the fact that wealthier Jewish and English men 
were corrupting their youths: most “rent-boys” were young Afrikaners, often fresh in 
from the platteland, and most of their clients were wealthier English-speakers’.825
 
The suggestion to change s14 of the Sexual Offences Act to raise the age of consent of 
males to 19 years was not in the original draft bill, but was added after the Select 
Committee had met.826 At the second reading of the Bill, the Minister of Justice stated 
that ‘homosexuals are being unequivocally informed that rather than relax existing 
measures we are going to take stricter steps for the protection of our youth. 
Fortunately this amendment was not only the unanimous recommendation of Select 
                                                          
825 Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 31. 
826 Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee into the Immorality Amendment Act (Report 
7-1968). 
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Committee, but it is understood that everyone who gave evidence in this connection 
was agreed that juveniles need to be protected. There were of course, as is 
understandable, disagreement on what the age between the age group 16 to 21 should 
be up to which young boys should be protected against immoral or improper deeds, 
nevertheless 19 years appears to be the most suitable age in the light of considered 
opinion’.827
 
Ronald Louw notes that despite the Minister’s comments, the legislature was still not 
provided with any cogent reason as to why the age of consent should have been 
raised. Furthermore, when the chairman of the Select Committee reported to 
parliament, he disclosed his prejudice against homosexuals and thus could clearly not 
have had their interests in mind when drafting the legislation. He stated, ‘We all felt 
that homosexualism cannot in any respect be excused, and we found that even the 
most hard-baked homosexual would give anything to be able to live a normal life’.828
 
In 1987, a link to homosexuality and youth was again made in the government-
commissioned Report on the Youth of South Africa. This report listed homosexuality 
as part of a general problem of promiscuity (along with extra-marital sexual 
intercourse, prostitution and living together).829 Homosexuality was classed as an 
                                                          
 
 
 
827 House of Assembly Debates (1969) col 4800. 
828 Louw, R., Sexual orientation and the age of consent, p. 132, quoting House of Assembly 
Debates (1969) col 4804. 
829 Report of the Committee for Social Affairs on the Youth of South Africa (Government  
Printer, Cape Town, 22 May 1987) para 4.3 pp 42ff as mentioned in Cameron, E., Sexual 
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‘acquired behavioural pattern’ and ‘a serious social deviation’ which was 
‘irreconcilable with normal marriage’.830 The Committee classed homosexuality as 
something by which the potential in life of thousands of young people was being 
destroyed – ‘[T]here is cause for concern about the promising young people who fall 
prey to these evils [that is, including homosexuality] and have little chance of tasting 
the joys of achievement and of the realisation of one’s own potential’.831
 
When section 14 was later considered from a constitutional view, to John Milton there 
were no justifying features which would render separate ages for males and females 
constitutional. One justification put forward under foreign law, for example in cases 
decided under the European Convention on Human Rights, was that ‘(male) 
homosexual persons only become fixed in this identity later in life than is the case 
with heterosexuals …. The contention seems to be that therefore they must be 
excluded from the opportunity to engage in (homo)sexual relations for a longer 
period’.832 Milton could not accept this, pointing out that sexual orientation is 
established in children at a young age. Within the context of South Africa in the 
1960s, the protection of Afrikaner youth seems the more likely explanation. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
orientation and the constitution, p. 461. 
830 Report of the Committee for Social Affairs on the Youth of South Africa , Para 4.3.4.3 p. 
48.  
831 Report of the Committee for Social Affairs on the Youth of South Africa, Para 6.4 p 89. 
832 Milton, J., Unfair discrimination on the grounds of gender, p. 302. 
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Cases heard before s14 or in another jurisdiction 
The Thompson case was about a man convicted of gross indecency with two males. 
The case refers to the males as ‘boy’ or ‘boys’. These terms comprise thirty percent of 
the number of times ‘boy’ or ‘boys’ is used in the entire corpus, yet the case 
represents only four percent of total text of the corpus. This shows a heavy use of a 
term which connotes innocent children being preyed on by an adult. And yet these 
were not innocent boys. They accepted money from him and met him at pre-arranged 
meeting times and places on at least two occasions.833
 
Another case involved a man and various other males deemed old enough to be 
accomplices. The charges concerned masturbation between Curtis and Riley and 
Curtis handling another’s penis. Curtis is described as ‘a man a good deal older than 
Riley’.834 Riley is described as a ‘youth’,835 and, by implication, a boy.836 However, 
he is also considered an accomplice: ‘Now I think it was rightly contended that Riley 
was an accomplice’.837 Riley ‘submitted to the unnatural offences .... he offered no 
resistance or objection’.838 Even though he is described as a youth and a boy, he was 
found to be an accomplice which means he consented to the acts. 
                                                          
833 Thompson v K (HL) [1918] A.C. 221, 224 (‘again on the Monday, March 19. Both boys 
went on the Monday to the appointed place, and saw the appellant’). Although this is an 
English case, it is used in the corpus because it is mentioned twice in SALR cases: R v L 1951 
(4) SA 614 (A), 620 and S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13. 
834 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 387. 
835 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386. 
836 ‘with other boys than Riley’ (R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386). 
837 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 386. 
838 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 388. 
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 Curtis calls the other males collectively ‘The Click’, ‘“The Click” was ... the coterie 
of boys who visited accused’s house’.839 A coterie is a clique, which is perhaps why 
the young men were called ‘the Click’. A coterie is a small group of people who are 
close friends or have a common interest, and who do not want other people to join 
them, like an inner circle or pack. The idea of force or duress or corrupting the morals 
of innocent boys is not associated with this word. This strengthens the notion that 
these were not young boys. 
 
As in cases such as Thompson, and Gough these young men also accepted gifts: ‘they 
were given drink, given money, taken for motor rides’.840 There is nothing in the 
judgment to suggest outrage that so-called ‘boys’ were involved. In none of the cases 
in the corpus where the other parties are teenagers do judges express outrage at this; 
‘the sole fact of relevance is homosexuality, and this was enough to trigger 
expressions of moralistic revulsion’.841
 
Gough is about intercrural sex between an adult man and a ‘boy’ deemed old enough 
to be an accomplice. The sentences imposed by the magistrate were confirmed but the 
case does not specify what these were. The other party is referred to as a ‘boy’ seven 
                                                          
839 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 387.  
840 R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, 388. 
841 Cameron, E., Sexual orientation and the constitution, p. 457. 
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times, once is which he is referred to as a ‘school boy’.842
 
And yet the boy is regarded as an accomplice who received gifts and money – ‘… the 
boy. I agree that he must be regarded as an accomplice …. The boy said that, in return 
for his submission to the indecent acts, accused No. 2 gave him a fountain pen, a pair 
of trousers and diverse sums of money .... The two accused admit the gifts of a 
fountain pen and a pair of trousers, and the boy’s mother testified as to these articles 
having come into her son’s possession. She also noticed that he had lots of money. 
She gave him none, and as he was a school boy he was not earning his living. She also 
speaks as to her son having gone out in the evening with No. 1; on his return he had 
money’.843
 
To emphasise how imprecise the terms ‘boy’ and ‘man’ are, a later case refers to the 
Curtis case as being between a ‘man and boy’ and in the same sentence refers to 
Gough as being between ‘man and man’.844 Both cases are about males of a similar 
age. In fact, even though the youth in Gough is classified as an accomplice, he is 
referred to as a school boy whereas this term is not used in Curtis. The school boy is 
effectively called a man. 
 
In R v S case one young man placed his hand, outside the clothing, on the penis of 
                                                          
842 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD, 164. 
843 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD, 164. 
844 R v K & F 1932 EDL, 73. 
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another young man his own age. The use of the term ‘juvenile’ indicates that they 
were young people who were not yet adults. His sentence of eight cuts with a cane 
was dropped but only on a technicality. ‘The accused, described in the charge sheet as 
a juvenile, was convicted of committing an unnatural offence and sentenced to eight 
cuts with a light cane. The charge alleges that he “did wrongfully and unlawfully, and 
against the order of nature, gratify or attempt to gratify his sexual lust by placing his 
hand upon, and by handling the private parts of a certain juvenile”’.845
 
In R v L a male was convicted of sodomy and attempted sodomy with youths deemed 
old enough to be accomplices. He received 21 months hard labour. The parties are 
referred to as ‘school boys’846 who, like several other cases, accepted money and 
presents. The court considered them accomplices. This case illustrates that a ‘young 
boy’ can be a willing party – ‘he was a young boy who was probably very reluctant to 
admit in Court that he was a willing party to these assaults’.847
 
In the mid-1950s, a man was suspected of having sex with boys but had never been 
caught. To build a case, the police sent in one of their own to spy on the man. The 
policeman willingly played agent provocateur with the man who was then charged 
with sodomy with the policeman. He was sentenced to twelve months prison with 
hard labour, partially suspended. 
                                                          
845 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 350. 
846 R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A), 618. 
847 R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A), 618. 
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 This case shows the confusion between paedophilia and homosexuality. The term 
‘paedophile’ would only be introduced into court judgments thirty-four years later in 
1989.848 The only reference to the youths is in the charge where they are called 
‘boys’.849 There is no further mention of the boys other than in the charge. We are not 
told their ages nor what the accused did to them. No evidence is led that he actually 
committed sodomy with them. They may have been very young vulnerable boys, or 
boys in that grey area who accept gifts in return for sex. At first it appears that they 
were in the vulnerable category because in his judgment Ramsbottom J refers 
extensively to an unreported case he presided over concerning an eight year-old boy 
and a man.850 And yet not in keeping with a paedophile’s behaviour, the man in this 
case is also sexually aroused by an adult man. 
 
Two doctors in the eight-year-old boy case conclude that punishment ‘would not alter 
the accused’s inherent sex nature’.851 One assumes that the inherent sex nature that 
they are referring to is that the accused was a paedophile. This assumption is 
strengthened by this further extract: ‘His offence of course makes it more difficult to 
decide what punishment should be meted out as he interfered with a young child …. 
he cannot be allowed to go about interfering with children and ruining their lives for 
                                                          
848 S v D 1989 (4) SA 225 (C).  
849 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 51 (‘sodomy upon a boy, B., and ... sodomy on a boy called L’). 
850 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52 (‘where Ramsbottom J refers to a review case he presided 
over, R v K (unreported))’. 
851 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52. 
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the sake of gratifying himself’.852
 
However, Ramsbottom J then refers to homosexuals as ‘congenital homosexuals, 
congenitally disposed towards having relations with others of their own sex’.853 
Finally the judge conflates homosexuality with sex with young children: ‘But whether 
or not punishment of this kind would deter the accused from practising homosexuality 
with young children, which is what he has done in this case, it may certainly deter 
other persons from committing crimes of this nature’.854
 
In this case homosexuals are also associated with pedophiles in an indirect but 
powerful way through what linguists call discourse deixis. In terms of deixis, ‘this’ is 
used as a demonstrative pronoun to refer back to a person or idea expressed or implied 
in a previous part of the text. Ramsbottom J’s opens the case with the word ‘This’: 
‘This is a very difficult type of case’.855 Since this case concerned sex with boys and a 
man, the reader is unsure whether ‘this’ refers to paedophilia or homosexuality. The 
word ‘this’ is used several times more, all without specific reference to what is being 
discussed: ‘this is a biological condition’, ‘this kind of offence’, ‘away from this 
practice’, ‘the law regards this conduct as a serious crime’, ‘not yet reached the stage 
in this kind of conduct’.856
                                                          
852 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52. 
853 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52. 
854 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52. 
855 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52. 
856 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52-53. 
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 S v K was about a 52 year-old man who had non-consensual anal intercourse with a 21 
year-old man. He was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour, of 
which six months was suspended for three years on condition that he undergo 
psychiatric treatment and not commit a similar offence. 
 
Beadle CJ, ‘the complainant ... certainly was not fully co-operative in having this act 
perpetrated upon him, but was persuaded by the appellant to allow the appellant to do 
this to him. It must be remembered that the appellant was a European of some 52 
years of age, while the complainant was a humble African domestic servant of 21 
years of age, the sort of man who would be likely to yield easily to persuasion of this 
sort. This is the way I interpret the judgment of the magistrate, and this being so I do 
not think there has been any misdirection in this case’.857
 
Although in the quote above Beadle CJ refers to the 21-year-old as a man, he also 
refers to him as a ‘youth’ and specifically distinguishes him from an adult: ‘one of the 
aggravating features of this offence is the age of the complainant. Where the 
complainant is a youth the offence is more serious than if the complainant is an 
adult’.858
 
The presupposition is that 21-year-olds are not adults. There is a paternalistic tone 
                                                          
857 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 88. 
858 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA), 89. 
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which has a racial connotation. A 21-year-old black man can be persuaded to do 
something against his will because a 52-year-old white man forces him. The judge 
makes a point of stating how the complainant is ‘a humble African domestic servant’. 
Although not law in Rhodesia, until the South African Sexual Offences Act of 1957 
was changed in 1969, the age of consent for male homosexual acts was 16 years old, 
five years younger than the complainant. By his own words the judge admits that this 
is his interpretation. He first gives his interpretation of what the magistrate did, 
solidifies it (‘this being so’) and then states what he thinks. 
 
Beadle CJ has a history of manipulating age for his convenience. He turns 21 year-
olds into youths and turns girls under 12 into females. In a case he heard four years 
earlier, he referred to a girl under the age of 12 as a ‘female’ because the fact that she 
was so young inconveniently marred the point he was making that male-female 
sodomy was not illegal.859 These two treatments of age by the same judge 
demonstrate how malleable age can be when expedient. 
 
The paedophile-homosexual confusion finds its way back into law four decades later 
in cases concerning lesbian mothers and the best interests of the child. Whereas in the 
mid-1950s homosexuality consists of physical harm to children – ‘practising 
homosexuality with young children’860 – in the late 1990s there is the fear of a 
perceived mental and emotional harm to children living with a lesbian mother, ‘from 
                                                          
859 R v M 1969 (1) SA 328 (R). 
860 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 53. 
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an imagined enemy or monster in the shape of a lesbian relationship’.861 Just as 
‘incarceration would be the only option to safeguard children from a paedophile’s 
predations’,862 so preventing the children from being ‘exposed to a lesbian 
relationship in which the wife is involved’863 would be a similar safeguard. 
 
S14 of the Sexual Offences Act 
Wording 
Before the amendment, a man was guilty of an offence if he committed an immoral or 
indecent act with a boy or a girl under 16 years old. After the amendment, the age of 
the girl remains at 16 but the age of the boy is raised to 19. 
The wording of section 14 (1)(a) and (b)864 prior to amendment by Act No 57 of 1969 
read: 
14. Sexual offences with girls or boys under sixteen 
(1) Any male person who – 
(a) has or attempts to have unlawful carnal intercourse with a girl under the age of 
sixteen years; or 
(b) commits or attempts to commit with such a girl or with a boy under the age of 
sixteen years an immoral or indecent act; 
 
The wording of section 14 (1)(a) and (b) after the amendment reads: 
                                                          
861 V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), 186. 
862 S v D 1989 (4) SA 225 (C), 231. 
863 V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), 169. 
864 Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. 
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14. Sexual offences with girls under sixteen or boys under nineteen 
(1) Any male person who – 
(a) has or attempts to have unlawful carnal intercourse with a girl under the age of 
sixteen years; or 
(b) commits or attempts to commit with such a girl or with a boy under the age of 
nineteen years an immoral or indecent act; 
 
Analysis of all s14 cases 
A review of all the cases heard under section 14 show that there was no justification 
for making this amendment. There were seventeen cases heard in terms of s14(1). Ten 
are between adult males and girls,865 six are between adult males and boys866 and one 
is between a woman and a boy.867 This means that the majority of cases are between 
men and girls, with only thirty-five percent of the cases being between men and boys. 
This does not support the viewpoint that homosexual men prey on boys. Despite the 
preponderance of man-girl cases, Heher J in the 1998 National Coalition case still 
brackets heterosexual exploitation – ‘possible homosexual (and heterosexual) 
                                                          
865 R v M 1957 (3) SA 282 (N), R v H 1959 (1) SA 343 (C), R v H 1959 (3) SA 583 (C), R v V 
1960 (1) SA 117 (T), R v Z 1960 (1) SA 739 (A), R v T 1960 (4) SA 685 (T), S v D 1962 (2) 
SA 462 (N), S v M 1967 (1) SA 70 (N), S v F and others 1967 (4) SA 639 (W), S v M 1970 
(4) SA 647 (N). 
866 R v M 1959 (3) SA 332 (A), S v S 1965 (4) SA 405 (N), S v V 1967 (2) SA 17 (E), S v B 
1976 (2) SA 54 (C) (after the age limit increased to 19 years old, but dealing with ‘young 
boys’.), S v D 1989 (4) SA 225 (C) (after the age limit increased to 19 years old, but dealing 
with ‘young boys’.), S v R 1993 (1) SA 476 (A) (after the age limit increased to 19 years old, 
but dealing with ‘a 15-year-old-boy’.) 
867 S v A 1962 (4) SA 679 (E). 
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exploitation’.868 Man-girl cases cease in 1970 whereas the man-boy cases continue 
until 1993. 
 
In terms of the 1969 amendment, the boy’s age is increased to nineteen. The Act calls 
a 19-year-old male a ‘boy’. None of the man-boy cases after the age was increased 
from 16 to 19 involve males in the 16-19 year-old range. This section is meant to 
‘protect the vulnerable’869 but a 19-year-old male is not vulnerable and neither is he a 
boy. In several cases teenage boys were regarded as accomplices because they had 
received gifts in exchange for sex.870 Putting aside the questionable morality of men 
who enticed teenagers this way, the law regarded those males as able to give their 
consent. They accordingly move out of the vulnerable category into the streetwise. 
 
Looking back on these cases, there was no need to raise the age for males. The change 
was of no effect and yet it still remains as legislation in this form. 
 
Cases where s14 used 
R v M is the first male-male case heard since section 14 was promulgated in 1957. It 
went to the Appellate Division. This incident took place between two blacks in a 
                                                          
868 High Court National Coalition, 104. 
869 High Court National Coalition, 123 and S v D 1989 (4) SA 225 (C), 230 (‘the 
paedophile’s sickness ... leads to the commission of crimes against an extremely vulnerable 
segment of society, namely children’.) 
870 Thompson v K (HL) [1918] AC 221, R v Curtis 1926 CPD 385, R v Gough & Narroway 
1926 CPD, R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A). 
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remote area.871 An adult male had intercrural sex with a boy under the age of 16. He 
was sentenced to five years imprisonment with labour (because of proof of previous 
convictions), and six strokes. Except for the fact that the age of the boy was not 
mentioned in the charge, the conviction would have been enforceable. The conviction 
was accordingly set aside on this technicality. None of the appellate judges – Holmes 
AJA, Schreiner JA nor Beyers JA – mention the harsh sentence, even obiter. The 
implication is that they agreed with it. 
 
Another case describes a boy taking the first step to initiate a sexual act with a man. A 
man, whilst looking for a woman with whom to have sex, picked up a male, almost 
16, and had intercrural sex. He was charged in terms of s14 (1) (b) of the Sexual 
Offences Act. He was sentenced to six months, suspended for three years on condition 
that he did not commit an offence involving indecency or breach the Sexual Offences 
Act. 
 
The man was 47 years old. The other party was nearly 16 years old (part of ‘some 
Bantu males’, ‘a boy of between 15 and 16 years of age’, ‘not far short of sixteen 
years of age’).872 The youth was not part of the vulnerable group this section was 
intended to protect. He knew the man was looking for a woman, got in the car 
nonetheless and once they were driving he asked the appellant ‘whether he still 
                                                          
871 R v M 1959 (3) SA 332 (A), 332. 
872 S v S 1965 (4) SA 405 (N), 406, 409. 
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wanted a girl’.873 The youth initiated the sexual act, ‘the evidence shows that the 
appellant did not set out to pervert the morals of a young person. He accepted an 
invitation to commit the act which he did not even solicit’.874 In this context he is 
simply referred to as a ‘boy’.875
 
In 1989, a man was charged with indecent and immoral acts in contravention of 
s14(1)(b) of Sexual Offences Act. The boys were between the ages of 12 and 13. He 
was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment of which four and a half years were 
suspended for five years on certain conditions. This is the first case to mention 
paedophilia in its own right and separate from homosexuality. It is fitting that the 
charge was in terms of section 14. 
 
The psychiatrists and psychologists who gave evidence were ‘ad idem that the 
appellant is a paedophile’. A paedophile was described as an individual ‘who 
experiences sexual arousal in response to children. The requisite for diagnosis as a 
paedophile is that the conduct should present for at least six months, that it should be 
recurrent and that the subject should be older than 16 himself’.876 ‘A paedophile ... 
may be of the same or the opposite sex as his victims. In appellant’s case it is 
common cause that his paedophilia was entirely male-orientated’.877
                                                          
873 S v S 1965 (4) SA 405 (N), 406. 
874 S v S 1965 (4) SA 405 (N), 409. 
875 S v S 1965 (4) SA 405 (N), 409 – ‘in response to an invitation from the boy’. 
876 S v D 1989 (4) SA 225 (C), 229. 
877 S v D 1989 (4) SA 225 (C), 229. 
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 S v R also reached the Appellate Division. In this example a man persuaded a 15-year-
old boy to engage in fondling and masturbation. He was charged in terms of s14(1)(b) 
of the Sexual Offences Act. The defendant is classed as being neither a paedophile nor 
a homosexual: ‘The accused was ‘neither a homosexual nor a paedophile but that he 
suffered from an inferiority complex which led to his inability to form sexual 
relationships with people of his own age’.878
 
S14 not used when it could have been 
It appears to be arbitrary as to the circumstances in which section 14 was used. In two 
instances in the corpus this section was not used in circumstances where one would 
have thought it would have been. 
 
In what was surely a case about paedophilia, sodomy is introduced into the judgment 
along with the connotation of homosexuality.879 A 34 year-old man took boys 
between the ages of nine and fourteen on camping trips. He would then sexually 
interfere with them but there was no anal intercourse: ‘the method or system is always 
the same. The boys are at camp …, the accused gets a boy alone in a boat or in a 
room, sex talk and hand put into pants, private parts fondled’.880
 
                                                          
878 S v R 1993 (1) SA 476 (A), 479. 
879 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T). 
880 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 14. Nicholas J quoting the magistrate. 
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This case called for an interpretation of a rule of evidence which is not the main focus 
of this discussion.881 As part of this consideration, the judge refers to a precedent, R v 
Sims (1946) 1 All ER 697, which happens to be about sodomy (referred to as buggery 
in the actual case). The extract from the Sims case is: ‘Sodomy is a crime in a special 
category because, as Lord Sumner said in Thompson v R. [sic] (6), 1918 A.C. 221 at 
p. 235: “Persons ... who commit the offences now under consideration seek the 
habitual gratification of a particular perverted lust, which not only takes them out of 
the class of ordinary men gone wrong, but stamps them with the hall mark of a 
specialised and extraordinary class as much as if they carried on their bodies some 
physical peculiarity”’.882 The Sims case thus embeds Lord Sumner’s strong views on 
homosexuality. 
 
After introducing the Sims case, which introduces sodomy into the discourse, the 
judge now criticizes that case, but in doing so reinforces the notion that sodomy is 
applicable in this case. To support his criticism, he quotes from two more cases which 
also not only reinforce the notion of sodomy, but introduce homosexuality: 
‘The statement that “sodomy is a crime in a special category” has not been accepted: 
there is no special rule ... applicable to ... to homosexual offences’,883
and 
‘to suggest that an unnatural sexual crime such as sodomy should be an exception to 
                                                          
881 Concerning the exclusionary rule. 
882 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13. 
883 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13 – quoting R v Boardman 1975 AC 421, 450.  
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the exclusionary rule would be both novel and anomalous’.884
 
The latter case is indeed about sodomy and is therefore apposite in its context, but in 
the present context it gratuitously reinforces sodomy where none took place. Intent on 
justifying his rule of evidence, sodomy is now firmly embedded in the discourse: 
‘Ordinarily the “nature” of an act appears from the details of the act itself ... except in 
the case of equivocal acts ... and there is nothing equivocal about sodomy’.885
 
The charge was crimen injuria but sodomy is introduced via references to other cases. 
That the judge does not distinguish these cases leads to the supposition that he 
believed the present case to be about sodomy. However, the nearest and only 
reference to any kind of anal intercourse is: ‘he tried putting his wee-wee into my bum 
... Then that was all’.886 Given that the judge did not rely on the evidence of the boys, 
‘that the boys, through their talk, influenced one another, and that there was a real 
possibility that the similarities in their stories were due, not to the fact that they were 
true, but to the fact that they had a common source in talk and gossip among the 
boy’,887 even this allegation could have been conjecture. 
 
In 1984, a man was charged with ‘sodomising’ a 14 year old male.888 The charge was 
                                                          
884 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13 – quoting R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A), 622. 
885 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 13. 
886 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 10. 
887 S v R 1977 (1) SA 9 (T), 10. 
888 S v M 1984 (4) SA 111 (T). 
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not brought under s14(1)(b) of the Sexual Offences Act. In fact, the act was not 
sodomy but intercrural sex. In the magistrate’s court he was convicted as charged and 
sentenced to payment of a fine of R500 or to serve 12 months’ imprisonment of which 
the sum of R300 or a period of six months’ imprisonment was suspended for a period 
of five years on condition that he was not convicted of an offence of which indecency 
is an element during the period of suspension. On appeal, the conviction on the charge 
of sodomy was substituted for indecent assault. The sentence imposed by the 
magistrate remained unchanged. 
 
The cases heard in terms of S14 show that sixty-five percent of cases were not about 
men sexually abusing boys. Despite this, the section was amended to raise the age 
limit of boys to 19 in order to widen the net. In spite of that amendment, no cases 
were heard which involved a male within the 16 to 19 year range. A detailed look at 
all the cases involving younger males shows great latitude in the use of terms such as 
‘boy’ and ‘youth’ – school boys were often deemed old enough to be accomplices, 19-
year-old males are called boys, and a 21-year-old is called a youth. The homosexual 
and paedophile are conflated. All this indicates a contradiction to the popular belief 
that homosexual men are sexual predators of vulnerable boys. 
 
Male sodomy associated with bestiality 
In both legislation and court judgments, sodomy is almost always linked to bestiality. 
An example of this association is found in legislation where sodomy and bestiality 
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were collocated in the 1917 and 1955 Criminal Procedure Acts.889 In judgments we 
read ‘cognate to sodomy or bestiality’,890 and ‘where a divorce was granted for 
bestiality. The act of sodomy … is surely no less reprehensible’.891
 
Three cases which are about bestiality refer to cases dealing with male-male sexual 
acts as support. In 1961 an accused ‘did wrongfully and unlawfully and contrary to 
the order of nature have a venereal affair with a certain cow, and it [sic] the said cow 
did carnally know’. This bestiality case is then linked to gross indecency between 
males by reference to R v V 1953 (3) SA 314 (A) (‘male person of any act of gross 
indecency with another male person’).892
 
In a 1980 case homosexuals are associated with bestiality indirectly by way of 
discourse deixis. A man committed bestiality and was given a suspended sentence.893 
A third of the text of this case comprises quotes from S v Baptie 1963 (1) PH H96 (N). 
The reason for this is that the Baptie case followed a similar approach when passing 
                                                          
889 The First Schedule of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 collocated 
sodomy and bestiality. This Act was replaced with the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 
which had the same wording. This Act was replaced with the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 where Schedule 1 splits sodomy and bestiality. Although still on the statutes, the 
common law offence of sodomy in Schedule 1 has been declared inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution and invalid to the extent set out in the Constitutional Court 
Order published under Government Notice No R1354 in Government Gazette 19349 of 23 
October 1998 and Government Notice No R588 in Government Gazette 21266 of 15 June 
2000. 
890 R v S 1950 (2) SA 350 (SR), 350. 
891 Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C), 169. 
892 R v M 1961 (1) SA 534 (T), 534.  
893 S v P 1980 (3) SA 782 (NC). 
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sentence, that is, to consider the personal circumstances of the offender. 
 
The extracts from the Baptie case which are contained in the bestiality case are: 
‘offences of this kind, involving perversity’, ‘offenders of this type’, ‘offender of this 
type’, ‘this type of crime’, ‘offender of this type’, and ‘this and similar types of 
cases’.894
 
The flynote contains the word ‘bestiality’. The first sentence of the judgment contains 
the word ‘bestialiteit’. The second last sentence of the judgment contains the word 
‘bestialiteit’.895 It is therefore reasonable to expect the reader to think that the Baptie 
case was also about bestiality. In fact, Baptie was about ‘gross indecency’ between 
two men, but nowhere is this specifically stated in the bestiality case. The discourse 
relating to (human) male sexual acts is firmly embedded into bestiality discourse with 
no attempt to point out the difference. The ‘perversity’ applies alike to bestiality and 
male sexual acts. The phrase ‘this and similar types of cases’ also links the two. The 
behaviour of bestiality and homosexuality is therefore treated in the same way as: 
‘perversity’, ‘disordered mental condition of the perpetrators’, ‘dismay and disgust at 
the nature of the offence’, ‘perversion’, ‘society strongly disapproves of his conduct’, 
‘depraved practices’, and ‘depraved conduct’.896
 
                                                          
894 S v P 1980 (3) SA 782 (NC), 784 (all quotes are on 784). 
895 S v P 1980 (3) SA 782 (NC), 785. 
896 S v P 1980 (3) SA 782 (NC), 784 (all quotes are on 784). 
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In a third case a man was charged and convicted for bestiality. In reply to a request 
from the reviewing judge as to what the magistrate had meant by an ‘unnatural’ act, 
the magistrate replied that he had ‘contemplated in addition to bestiality multifarious 
acts of buggery’.897 The judge then explains that buggery is an English term not used 
in South African law: ‘At no time, however, to the best of my knowledge, has the 
word ‘buggery’ been employed in our law. In fact, the word used in early Roman-
Dutch law was ‘sodomy’ and this term, at that time, encompassed virtually any form 
of aberrant sexual behaviour.898
 
It could be argued that sodomy, bestiality and other ‘unnatural acts’ were 
indiscriminately lumped together by uncaring judges. It is telling, though, that at the 
same time the courts were still associating male sodomy with bestiality in 1980, in 
1979 the courts were making it ‘settled law’ that male-female sodomy was indecent 
assault if it was not consensual, and non-indictable if it was consensual.899
 
Lesbianism 
Introduction 
Lesbianism is portrayed in a few ways in the corpus but never in terms of a sexual act. 
In one case it was deemed defamatory to call a woman a lesbian. Mostly it is 
portrayed in the context of motherhood. There is also a case which could be termed 
                                                          
897 S v C 1988 (2) SA 398 (ZH), 399. 
898 S v C 1988 (2) SA 398 (ZH), 400. 
899 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 408. 
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‘lesbian porn’ where men watched a show where women danced naked and fondled 
each other, acting out a fantasy many heterosexual men have. From these cases 
lesbianism is constructed as bad: an insult to be called a lesbian, perverted mothers 
and naughty-but-nice girls. 
 
Lesbian a defamatory term 
C and vdM (respondent) had a conversation in which vdM called V (appellant) a 
lesbian – ‘die donderse lesbian’.900 The appeal from the magistrates court was 
successful and referred back to that court to determine damages. In this case it was 
expedient for the appellant’s counsel to agree that lesbian is a defamatory word: ‘It is 
common cause that it was defamatory of the appellant to refer to her as a lesbian’.901
 
Lesbian motherhood cases 
The negative construction of lesbian mothers is generated by attaching a particular 
significance to her sexuality which is in ‘sharp contrast to “traditional motherhood” 
where (heterosexual) women are perceived as non-sexual beings’.902 Lesbian mothers 
sexualize motherhood which some judges find problematic. Lesbianism is considered 
not in the interests of the child and incongruous with the construction of motherhood. 
There is a ‘perceived dissonance between “mother” and all that the word implies, and 
                                                          
900 Vermaak v Van Der Merwe 1981 (3) SA 78 (N), 79. 
901 Vermaak v Van Der Merwe 1981 (3) SA 78 (N), 79. 
902 Beresford, S., The lesbian mother, p. 60. 
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“lesbian” which carries a different set of resonances’.903
 
The legal construction of a lesbian mother is further complicated by her marital status 
where ‘married’ or ‘unmarried’ signify respectively ‘good mother’ or ‘bad mother’. 
Since the lesbian mothers who come before the court are in the process of divorce, 
attributable to their sexual orientation, they are ‘bad’ mothers. 
 
The identity of the woman is also constructed by enquiries into the mother’s lifestyle, 
with invasive questioning regarding her lifestyle and shows of physical affection in 
front of the children, and concern about the ‘minutiae of who was in which bedroom, 
whether or not the women slept in the same bed …. Questions such as “Will you have 
sex in front of the children?” or “Do you make a noise when you have sex?” are not 
uncommon’.904
 
There were two pre-constitution cases and one case heard in terms of the 1996 
constitution. These are compared and contrasted to consider how they construct 
motherhood in a lesbian context. 
 
The Marais905 case, heard in 1960, was about child custody and a lesbian mother. 
Encouragingly, the 1960 Marais case does not mention normality or abnormality 
                                                          
903 Ibid., p. 61. 
904 Ibid., p. 62 (footnotes omitted). 
905 Marais v Marais 1960 (1) SA 844 (C). 
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whereas the 1994 Van Rooyen case906 mentions it explicitly. De Villiers AJ’s 
comments in 1960 indicate that it is possible to approach homosexuality from a fair, 
unbiased point of view, even without constitutional backing. In fact the words 
‘lesbian’ and ‘homosexual’ are not referred to at all. Surprisingly, counsel for the 
mothers in both Van Rooyen and V v V907 did not use this precedent.908
 
Mrs Marais, divorced, sought permission to have her boy with her on at least one day 
in each week and for one long and one short holiday in each year. The father tried to 
use her lesbianism as a reason to deny this. She was granted the access rights she 
requested. The father was ordered to pay the mother’s costs. The Marais case was 
used in seven cases involving the right of access of the non-custodian parent.909 In all 
instances, the lesbian aspect is not mentioned and the case is not referred to in a 
derogatory or judgmental way. 
 
The mother’s sexual orientation is dealt with in this way by De Villiers AJ: 
‘The other major objection raised by respondent related to the presence in applicant’s 
home of a certain Miss du Toit, a person whom Beyers J [the judge in the divorce 
case], regarded as being really responsible for applicant’s final desertion of the 
                                                          
906 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W). 
907 V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C). 
908 Not using ‘lesbian’ or ‘homosexual’ may explain why it was missed by counsels. 
909 Mohaud v Mohaud 1964 (4) SA 348 (T) – applied; Ex parte Scott 1964 (4) SA 441 (E) – 
applied; Du Preez v Du Preez 1969 (3) SA 529 (D) – referred; Segal v Segal 1971 (4) SA 317 
(C) – referred; Botes v Daly and another 1976 (2) SA 215 (N) – referred; Schlebusch v 
Schlebusch 1988 (4) SA 548 (E) – referred; Allsop v McCann 2001 (2) SA 706 (C) – dictum, 
847 approved. 
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respondent. This objection may have been sound, had it not been for several 
discounting considerations. The first of these is that Miss du Toit’s presence was 
apparently not regarded as an objection during 1957 when week-end and holiday 
visits to applicant were freely permitted. The second is that it was not mentioned as an 
objection by respondent during the whole of the protracted correspondence to which I 
have referred. 
 
Applicant herself raised the subject in a letter dated 24th February, 1959, in which her 
attorneys informed respondent that Miss du Toit would move to other premises …. 
Although Miss du Toit did not move out soon after 24th February, 1959, for reasons 
which do not appear from the affidavits, she eventually moved out on 6th August, 
1959, and applicant states that she has nothing whatever to do with her and does not 
come into contact with her socially. This last factor is of course in itself sufficient to 
dispose of this objection on the merits. But I have mentioned the other considerations 
too, because they in my opinion dispose of any suggestion that costs are to be affected 
by the fact that Miss du Toit was still in applicant’s home when the proceedings were 
launched and when respondent filed his opposing affidavit …. I conclude that there is 
no sound objection to applicant being permitted to have the child with her during 
holiday times and also more frequently during week-ends in term-times, and that in all 
the circumstances it would be reasonable and desirable to allow her such facilities’.910
 
                                                          
910 Marais v Marais 1960 (1) SA 844 (C), 850-851. 
 262
The Van Rooyen911 case is the first time that a lesbian identity is scrutinized within a 
South African legal context. It constructs lesbian motherhood as bad and perverted 
compared to good, normal heterosexual mothers. In this ‘unnatural’ setting it falls on 
the father to show the children what normal sexuality is. It is also the most sustained 
instance of judicial bias in the corpus. This is regrettable because it is also one which, 
in 1994, occurred on the cusp of the interim constitution.912 The judge makes no 
reference to that constitution. In fairness, he need not have, but Ackermann J, who 
heard a case at the same time, does project forward to the constitution.913 The case 
attracted strong criticism from several academics.914
 
In this case, Flemming DJP presided over a divorce where a mother challenged the 
access rights to her children. The mother was in a lesbian relationship. In defining the 
mother’s rights of access, the court held that a lesbian lifestyle posed a danger to her 
minor children. Her right of access was defined so as to protect the children from 
being exposed to anything which might connote approval of homosexuality or 
lesbianism. It was ordered that when the children slept over at the mother’s residence, 
the mother was not to share her bedroom with a lesbian partner. This case shows 
several instances of judicial bias. The following extracts by Flemming DJP indicate 
                                                          
911 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W). 
912 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
913 S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C), 129 (‘The aforegoing suggests broad consensus on eliminating 
discrimination against homosexuality and the likelihood that this will be entrenched in a new 
constitutional dispensation’.) 
914 Pantazis, A., The problematic nature of gay identity; Viljoen, F., Signs of the times; Botha, 
K. & Cameron, E., South Africa; Bonthuys, E., Awarding access and custody to homosexual 
parents of minor children; Steyn, E., Women who love women. 
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his views on what is normal sexuality: 
 
‘The fact is that many people ... would frown upon the idea of calling the relationship 
created on the basis of two females a “family”. Quite clearly she regards what she is 
doing … as normal and acceptable’.915
 
‘With weekends one may well argue that if the child is with the father who introduces 
the child to normal sexuality or guides him in the correct way for 29 days of the 
month, a night with their mother, two nights with their mother, will do no harm. In 
fact, the contrasts will serve to underscore what the father’s example rightly is’.916
 
‘[T]he children know that, contrary to what they should be taught as normal or what 
they should be guided to as to be correct (that it is male and female who share a bed), 
one finds two females doing this and not obviously for reasons of lack of space on a 
particular night but as a matter of preference and a matter of mutual emotional 
attachment’.917
 
The judge’s statements indicates that, for him, only a male-female relationship is 
normal. His choice of words and tone indicate this, such as, ‘the fact is’, ‘frown upon 
the idea’, ‘two females a “family”’ (family in quotes), ‘she regards what she is doing’, 
                                                          
915 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 326. 
916 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 330-331. 
917 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329. 
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‘underscore what the father’s example rightly is’ (embedding rightly), ‘should be 
taught as normal … should be guided to as to be correct’ (the use of the modal 
‘should’ used twice in the same sentence). Examples from the corpus, however, show 
that it is not always easy to teach children what is ‘normal’ when oral sex between a 
male and female in a ‘sitting-room at an hotel in Port Elizabeth’,918 and intercourse 
from behind, standing up, in the kitchen919 have been ruled normal. 
 
‘The problem at this stage arises not with reference to the capability or the suitability 
of the applicant as such but with particular reference to the fact that she is a lesbian. 
Not only is she a lesbian but she lives in a lesbian relationship. She shares the house 
and the bedroom with her associate’.920  
and 
‘[T]he question of sexuality of the children will in the case of the boy only commence 
as from now at some stage. This is not the stage yet when one can see the scars. If 
some damage was done, it will show in due course’.921
 
If one prunes down the first sentence, it leaves: ‘The problem … she is a lesbian’. 
Lesbianism is a problem. He marks ‘lesbian’ by referring to it as ‘this lesbianism’ and 
                                                          
918 R v K & F 1932 EDL 71, 72. 
919 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR) , 278-279 – ‘complainant went into the kitchen .... accused 
joined her there and … pressed her against the wall, lifted up her dress and attempted to have 
intercourse with her from behind .... There is little doubt that he intended to have normal 
sexual intercourse with her but was hindered … by the awkwardness of the position’. 
920 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 326. 
921 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 328. 
 265
‘the lesbianism’.922 There is a presupposition that her lesbianism will scar the children 
– ‘This is not the stage yet when one can see the scars’ – but there will be scars, 
according to the judge. 
 
‘Not only is she a lesbian but she lives in a lesbian relationship’. The implication is 
that not only is it bad enough being a lesbian, yet alone acting out on it. He mentions 
that they share a house and then specifically mentions that they share a bedroom. The 
use of the term ‘associate’ is distancing and impersonal. 
 
‘[T]he issue simply comes down to the fact of the style of living, the attitude towards 
living, the activities, the behaviour or whatever else is involved in living from minute 
to minute, all that in the context of the lesbianism’.923
 
‘The fact is that many people ... would frown upon the idea of calling the relationship 
created on the basis of two females a “family”. Quite clearly she regards what she is 
doing or what she has been doing but also what she intends doing as normal and 
acceptable’.924 Without support, the judge asserts that it is a fact that many people 
would not consider two women living together with children a family. He makes this 
assertion in the mid-1990s when the nuclear family was already a widely disputed 
entity. The phrase ‘quite clearly’ can be read as ‘unbelievably’. 
                                                          
922 ‘the respondent has been concerned about this lesbianism for some time …. the role which 
the lesbianism’ - Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 327. 
923 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329. 
924 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 326. 
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 In the next extract, the judge uses a comment made by the applicant’s family advocate 
counselor as an opportunity to state his own opinion. The counselor stated that 
‘homosexuality is no longer regarded as a mental illness or as a sin. I [the judge] 
accept the former but nobody has brought that in issue so I do not know why she 
comments on that. As to whether it is a sin, I defer to her view but perhaps I would 
prefer to leave that to the Heavenly Father to decide’.925
 
Even though he says, ‘She has launched into an attack which is of no relevance to this 
issue’,926 he still uses the opportunity for sarcasm and to introduce his own religious 
beliefs. He does so whilst at the same time stating explicitly how subjective views do 
not count. The counsellor ‘has her own sense of values in the ascertainment of what 
should be dealt with or what should be ordered in regard to these parties. Her 
assessment is one which I think differs from my own view on certain things I but 
unfortunately neither her nor my subjective views are what count. I must assess 
according to what on prevailing views would be acceptable, desirable, preferable, and 
so forth’.927 He says he cannot make his subjective views count but in the way he 
expresses himself throughout the judgment, he does just that. The difference between 
the counselor and him is that as the judge he can instruct the reader to ignore or 
discount her view, but his views are entrenched in his judgment. 
                                                          
925 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 327. 
926 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 327. 
927 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 327. 
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 ‘[A]ny right-thinking person would say that it is important that the children stay away 
from confusing signals as to how the sexuality of the male and of the female should 
develop’.928 There are two presuppositions in this statement. Firstly, male and female 
sexuality should develop in the way the judge believes they should, and anyone who 
disagrees is wrong-thinking. Secondly, in Flemming DJP’s outlook ‘it is male and 
female who share a bed’.929 This is ‘normal’ and ‘correct’930 and anyone who does 
not do so ‘signals of a separate class of male or female typing’.931
 
‘The signals are given by the fact that the children know that, contrary to what they 
should be taught as normal or what they should be guided to as to be correct (that it is 
male and female who share a bed), one finds two females doing this and not obviously 
for reasons of lack of space on a particular night but as a matter of preference and a 
matter of mutual emotional attachment. That signal comes from the fact that they 
know the bedroom is shared. It is detrimental to the child because it is the wrong 
signal …. The wrong signals are given when, if that is true, the applicant wears male 
underclothes, apart from male apparel. The signals come when there are signs of 
emotional attachment, not only by kissing and hugging as counsel argues, but by the 
way of speaking, the words of endearment used, the manner in which there is a 
glance. It would take a very inexperienced person to be unable to recognise two young 
                                                          
928 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 328-329. 
929 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329. 
930 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329. 
931 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329. 
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people who are fond of each other or who do have a relationship’.932
 
‘The applicant is ordered to take all reasonable steps and do all things necessary in 
order to prevent the children being exposed to lesbianism or to have access to all 
videos, photographs, articles and personal clothing, including male clothing, which 
may connote homosexuality or approval of lesbianism’.933
 
The judge’s reference to a separate class of male or female typing is misguided, ‘as if 
sexual orientation had anything to do with gender; as if one is any less a woman for 
being a lesbian or any less a man for being gay’.934 The sentence, ‘It is detrimental to 
the child because it is the wrong signal’ has no modals to suggest uncertainty and as 
such could not be any more emphatic. 
 
As Elsje Bonthuys notes, ‘Nowhere does the court refer to any evidence that the 
applicant was in fact wearing male apparel. Similarly, no facts were stated which 
justify the fear that the applicant would expose or had in the past exposed the children 
to homosexual video or photographic material .... [These comments] serve no purpose 
other than to reflect the ignorance and homophobia of society’.935
 
To function properly as an ‘ideological litmus paper’, says Sarah Beresford, ‘the 
                                                          
932 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 329-330. 
933 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W), 332. 
934 Gevisser, M. & Cameron, E., Defiant desire, p. 93. 
935 Bonthuys, E., Awarding access and custody to homosexual parents, p. 303. 
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lesbian body must be instantly recognizable’.936 The more a lesbian conforms to the 
conventional construction of ‘woman’, or feminine, the more likely she is to be 
successful in her court application. This mother did not pass the litmus test according 
to Flemming DJP who appears more concerned with the so-called butch lesbian, than 
with the so-called feminine lesbian. The latter presents a ‘lesser threat to the dominant 
male ideology than the former. This is due to a greater sameness – the feminine 
lesbian body physically presents herself as visibly little different from her 
heterosexual counterpart. The butch lesbian body presents herself with a greater 
degree of difference’.937
 
The more she identifies her own construction of lesbianism outside the ‘feminine’ 
range, the greater the gap will be between her and the identity which law constructs 
for her. Correspondingly, the less likely she is to receive legal recognition of that 
lesbian construction and the greater will be the scrutiny, regulation and control. 
Viewed in this way, ‘control and ownership of the sexual body and the expression of 
identity are separated from self-determination and autonomy’.938
 
The case reflects a ‘reflexive condemnation of homosexuals’ with no scientific or 
social authority, or judicial precedent, for its findings and assumptions.939
 
                                                          
936 Beresford, S., The lesbian mother, p. 63. 
937 Beresford, S., The lesbian mother, p. 62 (footnotes omitted). 
938 Beresford, S., The lesbian mother, p. 65. 
939 Botha, K. & Cameron, E., South Africa, p. 29. 
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The V v V case940 was heard in terms of the 1996 Constitution and is a useful contrast 
to the Van Rooyen case because the facts are similar yet the treatment is different. 
This is also a child custody case where the father tried to limit the access of the 
mother because she was in a lesbian relationship. 
 
Here Foxcroft J states, ‘Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen ... where the Court made a moral 
judgment about what was normal and correct insofar as sexuality was concerned. It 
was clear that the Judge in that case had regarded homosexuality as being per se 
abnormal …. It was thus, in law, wrong to describe a homosexual orientation as 
abnormal (as had been done in the Van Rooyen case)’.941
 
This case also shows the strong association with motherhood and a domestic 
environment: ‘the lesbian mother’, ‘her mother was a lesbian’, ‘in the best interests of 
the child to discriminate against the lesbian mother’, ‘a relationship between their 
mother and her partner in a lesbian relationship’, ‘their mother openly lives with a 
lesbian partner’, ‘emotionally and spiritually harmed by the influence of the lifestyle 
of their mother and her companion’, and ‘visits to their mother when her lesbian 
companion is not physically present’.942
 
                                                          
940 V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C). 
941 V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), 171. 
942 V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C), 172, 174 & 181. 
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Lesbian fantasy 
One case reflects a common fantasy which some heterosexual men have of seeing two 
women perform intimate acts, a type of ‘lesbian porn’.943
 
A man had a house in a secluded spot at the edge of a forest in Tokai. In the mid-
1970s, billing himself as an entrepreneur, he converted his house into a makeshift 
theatre and staged shows. He put on regular shows where Coloured women performed 
for an all-White male audience. After the show the women would dance with the men. 
The men would ‘flock’ to the shows and there was a ‘crush’ on the door to pay their 
R10 admission fee. Up to 40 men would cram into the lounge. The stage was a metre 
from the front row. The room was ‘dimly-lit’ and ‘smoke-filled’. 
 
‘When the girls stripped and did something that was especially pleasing to the 
audience there was shouting, cat-calls and clapping. Some men jumped up and tried to 
touch the girls, but they were stopped by the accused. Incidentally, the accused even 
had his “bouncer”’.944
 
The women danced naked with each other and participated in various acts, such as the 
back-to-school act. One such act was the ‘lesbian’ act, ‘Here some of the girls – there 
were usually two – took off each other’s tops, their breasts were then bared, they 
                                                          
943 S v M 1977 (3) SA 379 (C), 380. 
944 S v M 1977 (3) SA 379 (C), 380. 
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fondled each other’s breasts, and even kissed them’.945
 
The words ‘girl’ or ‘girls’ is used twenty-three times in this four page judgment. They 
are never referred to as anything else. The women are referred to in the collective as a 
‘batch’ – ‘the first batch of girls’.946 This conforms to the metaphor that ‘girls’ are 
like tarts or cupcakes. 
 
This nude fantasy version of ‘pseudo-lesbians’ is contrasted to ‘real’ lesbians whom 
Flemming DJP clads in men’s apparel. 
                                                          
945 S v M 1977 (3) SA 379 (C), 380. 
946 S v M 1977 (3) SA 379 (C), 380. 
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Chapter 6: Commentary and conclusion 
Commentary 
The thrust of this study has been to locate rhetoric at work within a specific sphere of 
law, namely sexual orientation. In my attempt to analyse rhetoric at work, I have 
closely examined a number of judgments in such depth that at times the main purpose 
of the work was backgrounded. I redress that in this final chapter where I again 
foreground rhetoric. I begin with comments about the judge as rhetorician and then 
about the judgment as a rhetorical device. In both cases I draw on illustrations from 
the corpus. The main thinkers chosen as the theoretical basis are not experts in law – 
Michel Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin, Norman Fairclough and Hayden White, for 
example. The reason for this choice is to deliberately consider the language of law 
from insights outside of law.  
 
The word ‘rhetoric’ is too slippery to use with precision. Rhetoric calls for us to 
analyse the linguistic processes by which a speaker can shape issues. The starting 
point in rhetoric, then, is always with the language at hand, but one cannot idealize it. 
If rhetoric cannot be idealized, then it is necessary to situate both speaker and text 
within a context. In the context of this work, the speakers are the judges and their 
statements are the forty-four judgments I analysed throughout this study.  
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A judge within a court system exercises power. He947 can stipulate what finally 
appears in his judgment. If one subscribes to Foucault’s rules of formation, then in a 
legal context only a properly trained and authorized judge, sitting in a court room and 
occupying the subject position of judge can enunciate statements which find their way 
into the prevailing discourse. The judge as rhetorician is therefore an important part of 
this study.  
 
I began by placing the judge in a socio-legal context. Most of the cases occur between 
the mid-1920s and the mid-1990s, generally the period where the prevailing thinking 
of homosexuality centred around binary views of sexuality and perceptions of what 
was considered ‘natural’. The common law and statutes criminalized homosexual 
conduct under the offences of sodomy and unnatural acts. The cases I reviewed to 
give a sense of the socio-legal context concerned entrapment, sexual policing and 
police intolerance to sexual ‘deviance’.948 After 1996 this attitude softened under 
constitutional discourse. 
 
When the TRC reviewed the judiciary over almost this same period, they made some 
interesting comments about the language judge’s used. Judges were asked why they 
implemented unjust laws without protest. Given that they had some discretion as to 
how to interpret or apply the law, judges decided in a way that assisted the 
                                                          
947 Judges are only referred to in the masculine because all judges in the cases reviewed are 
males. 
948 R v V 1953 (3) SA 314 (A); R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T); S v C 1987 (2) SA 76 (W); S v 
Kola 1966 (4) SA 322 (A); Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W) 
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government. The submissions of ‘establishment-minded’ judges indicated that where 
there was room for manoeuvre, they had interpreted in favour of liberty and equity. A 
sample of the cases from my corpus, however, indicate otherwise. For example, a man 
who, looking for a woman, instead had sex with another man was sentenced to fifteen 
months’ imprisonment with hard labour.949 In another case a male, convicted of 
sodomy and attempted sodomy with youths deemed old enough to be accomplices, 
was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment with hard labour.950  
 
The TRC found that the inherent ambiguity of language and the diversity of factual 
circumstances allowed judges a degree of latitude in deciding cases but that this 
latitude was not exercised. Judges too easily made sense of the illogical and the unjust 
in language and too quickly accepted the word of the police or official witness in 
preference to that of the accused. In one police entrapment case, not only is there no 
judicial censure about entrapment, the judge commends the agent provocateur and 
wholly endorses his testimony: ‘The trap R created a favourable impression on the 
Court of his demeanour and the manner of answering the questions put to him …. R’s 
testimony … left the Court in no doubt as to his truthfulness’.951
 
The TRC criticized the judiciary for maintaining the status quo rather than exploiting 
ambiguity in language to effect change. This maintenance was due largely to the 
                                                          
949 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA). 
950 R v L 1951 (4) SA 614 (A). 
951 R v V 1953 (3) SA 314 (A), 323. 
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composition of the judiciary and the positivistic training such judges had. In the 
1960s, the International Commission of Jurists regarded the South African judiciary 
as as ‘establishment-minded’ as the executive, prepared to adopt an interpretation that 
favoured the executive. In most of the cases in my corpus there is no suggestion of 
deliberate bias but more an uncritical reliance on mechanical, positivistic methods of 
interpretation. There is a sprinkling of mean-spirited, fairly biased judges within the 
corpus, but not enough to justify a blanket condemnation. One case of outright 
judicial bias can be singled out: Flemming DJP in Van Rooyen952 ruling on a lesbian 
case. This bias is even more regrettable because occurred in 1994 on the cusp of the 
interim constitution. Generally, though, the language is neutral and objective and I 
had to consider other techniques in order to expose these inarticulate considerations.  
 
Judges mostly do not articulate their views and one has to surmise their views though 
what is not said. For example, in the 1997 case of S v Kampher,953 Farlam J does not 
use the term ‘gay’ in a judgment of over 16,000 words, knowing that was the 
preferred term of the day. Similarly, in the High Court National Coalition case, the 
only time the word ‘gay’ is used is because it happens to form part of the name of the 
applicant. Like Farlam J, Heher J does not use it once in a judgment of some 16,500 
words. It is up to the judge to choose his words but this sustained effort not to use the 
word ‘gay’ indicates a conscious effort by both judges not to appropriate a term in 
wide use and thereby give their endorsement to it. In contrast, Sachs J uses the term 
                                                          
952 Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen 1994 (2) SA 325 (W). 
953 1997 (4) SA 460 (C). 
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‘straights’ for heterosexuals.954 Dictionaries still flag ‘straight’ as informal which 
shows his willingness to be the first judge in South Africa to incorporate this word in 
a judgment. Because of the uncontested, privileged position the judge holds, he can 
choose the words that comprise his judgment.  
 
Judges write their judgments in the form of a closed discourse, as monologues 
justifying a result. He must appear to be restricted and forced to an inevitable 
conclusion by the facts and the law. In doing so, he hides how the judging process 
entails hard choices among multiple perspectives. But just how restricted were these 
judges?  
 
All judges are restricted in what they write. They must keep to the facts of the case, 
they can only rule in terms of the law, and, to a certain extent, they have to rule in 
keeping with the customs and behaviour of society. They are also restricted by their 
training. The judges of the period under review had a strong positivistic grounding. 
They were taught that knowledge about law is gained by the application of reason to 
observable phenomena, such as previously decided cases and the common law, rather 
than by reference to moral values. However, even within this seemingly tight structure 
and the mechanical method of interpretation positivism gave rise to, there were many 
choices they could have made. 
 
                                                          
954 Constitutional Court National Coalition, 65 & 67. 
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They chose to manipulate facts. For example, all the cases used to decriminalise male-
female anal intercourse were in fact cases about non-consensual sex in the form of 
rape or sex with underage girls. These facts are forced to the background. They chose 
what legal principle they wanted to base their ruling on. For example, male sodomy 
was based on Dutch common law which was genderless. Male-female cases should 
have been based on the same law, therefore, but instead were based on a variety of 
other principles such as abrogation by disuse and indecent assault. Judges should have 
followed similar precedents, but they chose not to. None of the male-female cases 
refer to previous male sodomy cases which dealt with the same sexual act. 
 
Within the same area of common law, they could choose which jurists to rely on. The 
Dutch jurists did not speak with one accord on the law of sodomy. A judge could 
choose a jurist who most suited his viewpoint. He could choose to ignore counsels’ 
arguments and rely on independent research, as happened in Gough. He had the 
choice to interpret in favour of the defendant if the language was ambiguous but chose 
not to. There were so many variations amongst the Dutch jurists as to what constituted 
sodomy, for example, that judges could easily have ruled in favour of the defendant, if 
only to grant absolution from the instance on the grounds of ambiguity. This never 
happened. 
 
Judges had the choice of being more polyphonic in their judgments. They could have 
included the arguments of the defendants but these are absent in their judgments. 
Bakhtin called this an expropriation of voices. They had the choice as to how far to 
test the boundaries of a society’s acceptance. There is no evidence in the corpus of 
even the slightest probing. They had the choice of speaking out, either on or off the 
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bench, against the gender and sexual minority discrimination that was taking place. In 
judicial submissions to the TRC, certain judges admitted that they should have been 
more outspoken. These judges were restricted in what they could write, but they were 
not in a strait-jacket. 
 
Part of the reason why judges could write in this way is because, in my view, they 
existed within an interpretive community that condoned it, perhaps even encouraged 
it. All the judges in the corpus were of similar backgrounds. They were a small elite, 
mostly white, male, Protestant, privileged and political.955 And so, (very) generally, 
were the readers. This group of closely affiliated writers and readers shared 
assumptions which identified them as a group that could claim interpretive authority 
yet at the same time certain voices were entirely excluded from the community. I find 
Stanley Fish’s view pertinent. He holds that the source of interpretive authority 
derives from the writer: the shared interpretive strategies are for writing texts. This 
determines the shape of what is read. This suggests that judges write their judgments 
with a specific kind of reader in mind who would agree with what has been written.  
 
Not every reader of a judgment will agree with the judge’s findings, however, and, as 
this number grows, change must inevitably occur within such communities. An 
interpretive community is created through language; it is no more than a way of 
organizing experience. As such, it is permeable and cannot protect its status quo 
                                                          
955 Swart, M., The Carfinian curse, p. 540. 
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indefinitely. In terms of Foucault’s views on power, it does not follow that subjects 
who are authorized to introduce objects of knowledge into discourse – judges – also 
have the power to maintain the status quo. Presently-held beliefs can be redrawn from 
the inside when challenged by a source external to it.  
 
A significant change to the interpretive community occurred when South Africa began 
to take human rights seriously in the 1990s. At that time sexual orientation was placed 
on the agenda by some influential, vocal outsiders. I see the softening in attitudes 
towards sexual minorities as being inevitable in the long run, but hastened by a 
convergence of personalities. Interpretive communities are indeed permeable. Judges 
already with the ability to introduce statements which could find their way into the 
prevailing discourse – authorized judges occupying the subject position of judge, such 
as Ackermann and Sachs JJ – were prepared to incorporate the views of outsiders with 
whom they had sympathy; particularly Edwin Cameron. One way they did this was to 
quote extensively in their judgments from Cameron’s journal articles. This is an 
example of how intertextuality assisted in changing the nature of an interpretive 
community. 
 
This concludes my commentary on judges as rhetoricians. I now provide a 
commentary on the judgment as a rhetorical device. Judgments are definitely 
rhetorical constructions and in this next section I review some of the specific 
techniques I found in the corpus to support this claim.  
 
Words, especially adjectives, carry the subjective feelings of the speaker. From 1926 
through to 1990, judges used a number of pejorative words to refer to homosexuality: 
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abhorrent, depraved, disapproval, disgust(ing), filthy, horrible, odious, perversity, 
profoundly repulsive, reprehensible, repugnant to nature, revulsion, sexually 
perverted, shame, and unacceptable. 
 
The use of metaphors in non-fiction texts such as judgments show that metaphors are 
not limited to fiction. Certain metaphors in the corpus reveal the distaste some judges 
had for homosexuality. It was seen as an uncontrollable appetite. The phrase ‘gratify 
sexual lust’ and associated adjectives (‘perverted’, ‘depraved’ and ‘unnatural’), 
together with the word ‘carnal’, form a metaphor that homosexual sex is a purely 
physical, strong, uncontrollable sexual appetite. The appetite is in need of constant 
gratification.956 Homosexuality is likened to a disease in need of curing, sometimes 
biological sometimes mental. Another metaphor likens homosexuality to something 
contagious. It is also ‘the canker that afflicted the Biblical Sodom’, and something 
with which one is branded, like Hester’s scarlet letter. 
 
In two cases deixis is used to associate homosexuals with paedophilia and 
bestiality.957 In terms of discourse deixis, ‘this’ is used as a demonstrative pronoun to 
refer back to a person or idea expressed or implied in a previous part of the text. 
Taking only the paedophilia case as an illustration here, Ramsbottom J opens with the 
word ‘This’: ‘This is a very difficult type of case’.958 Since this case concerned sex 
                                                          
956 A full discussion and references start on p. 132. 
957 S v P 1980 (3) SA 782 (NC) – discussed fully on p. 255. 
958 R v C 1955 (2) SA 51 (T), 52. 
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with boys and a man, the reader is unsure whether ‘this’ refers to paedophilia or 
homosexuality. My analysis of this case proves that this was definitely a case about 
paedophilia but this was never made explicit. 
 
The ubiquitous association between paedophilia and homosexuality led me on a 
lengthy detour.959 I analysed every case (26 of them) concerning sex with an underage 
child – male or female and whether in terms of the Sexual Offences Act or common 
law. Statistically, the cases heard in terms of Act show that sixty-five percent of cases 
were not about men sexually abusing boys. Despite this, the section was amended to 
raise the age limit of boys to 19 in order to widen the net. In spite of that amendment, 
no case arose which involved a male within the 16 to 19 year range. A detailed look at 
all the cases involving younger males shows great latitude in the use of terms such as 
‘boy’ and ‘youth’ – males referred to as ‘school boys’ were often deemed by judges to 
be old enough to be classed as accomplices, 19-year-old males are called ‘boys’, and a 
21-year-old is called a ‘youth’. Despite this empirical evidence, the homosexual and 
paedophile are conflated through a (deliberate?) misuse of language. 
 
This concludes my main commentary on the actual techniques used in the text of the 
judgment. Scattered throughout the study are other instances of particular techniques, 
such as speech acts and the use of private verbs and public verbs,960 and transitivity of 
                                                          
959 Starting on p. 235. 
960 p. 161 ff. 
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verbs,961 which I mention here only for the sake of completeness. I turn now to a 
consideration of the judge as a narrator.  
 
Apart from being a rhetorician, a judge is also a narrator and this role enables him to 
shape a judgment just how he wants. He is the narrator of an ostensibly factual 
sequence of events but he can fashion these story elements in ways similar to a writer 
of fiction. The views of Hayden White on historiography are used to support this 
assertion.  
 
To speak of a court judgment as a narrative is nearly a contradiction in terms. That it 
is not perceived as fiction reflects the extent to which the idea of ‘Natural Law’ 
presupposes a reified, extra-narrative concept of law. This is demonstrated in the 
sodomy cases. To the extent that the vague, unarticulated law pertaining to sodomy 
was regarded as natural law, then in that natural law many judges’ dilemmas were 
appeased. They could just as well suppose that it contained the elements of the crime 
of sodomy upon which they could base their ruling. According to natural law, the 
moral standards that govern human behavior are objectively derived from the nature 
of human beings. The authority of legal standards derives from considerations having 
to do with the moral merit of those standards. Natural law is believed to exist 
independently of positive law or society. Some things are as they are, because that is 
how they are. Natural law is particularly influential in the law relating to sodomy 
                                                          
961 p. 81. 
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because of the moral connotations. 
 
If, as some judges believe, the law is a reified object located extra-textually, then their 
judgments, as factual narratives containing this unchanging law, should aggregate. 
Insofar as judgments are supposed to make objective truth-claims about a selected 
segment of the law, they must surely be compatible with similar judgments which 
preceded them. Yet while court cases ought to aggregate into a more comprehensive 
narrative, in fact they do not. Judgments should combine into a comprehensive whole 
to the extent that they are completely objective about the law. However, judges as 
rhetoricians write their cases in distinctly different ways. It is because of the 
differences in these subjective elements that one judge’s judgment does not fit with 
another’s. 
 
Objective truth-claims should, then, result in a seamless stare decisis. However, a 
judgment has a unity of its own – a beginning, middle, and an end. And the reason 
why two judgments cannot be additively combined – as one can do with a chronicle – 
is that in the earlier judgment of such an aggregate the end would no longer be an end, 
and therefore the beginning of the next judgment would no longer be a beginning. The 
reality is that each judgment has its own unity which does not lend itself to 
aggregation. Sophocles’ trilogy is not itself a play, Mink explains by way of 
analogy.962 If it were, its constituents would be not plays but acts. 
                                                          
962 Mink, L. O., Narrative form as a cognitive instrument, p. 213. 
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 Judges would object to their work being called fiction because their writing is 
supposed to correspond point by point to some extra-textual domain of occurrence or 
happening, to confirmable existential statements. The question whether there can be a 
reality outside of text is highly contestable. Non-fiction writers believe that they are 
doing something fundamentally different from the novelist, by virtue of their dealing 
with ‘real’ events, while the novelist deals with ‘imagined’ events. But neither the 
form nor the explanatory power of narrative derives from the different contents it is 
presumed to be able to accommodate. Both fiction and non-fiction writers use 
narrative to make experience comprehensible. 
 
The referential level of non-fiction narrative – the incorporation of pre-existing 
material – is always contestable as writers endow it with meaning expedient to their 
ideology. Writers of non-fiction can select what to include and exclude, and where to 
begin and end. We see this happening when judges decided which Dutch jurists they 
should rely on, and over what period, in order to support the criminalisation of 
homosexuality. A verifiable document, then, does not make the event it speaks of any 
more objective. In fact, the introduction of such texts can make the issue less clear. 
Again, the Dutch jurists illustrate this point. Their views on sodomy vary to such an 
extent that there is no certainty as what gender sodomy relates to, or even whether the 
act needs to be between humans. My detailed analysis of the sodomy cases illustrates 
in detail how it is impossible to regard the cases as anything but fiction, and how 
reliance upon the Dutch jurists to justify factuality is not possible. 
 
Both fiction and factual narrative, such as judgments, are forms of narrative because 
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they both tell of events. Judgments purport to represent actual events, specific time-
space events – X and Y performed a sexual act at this time in this place. Unlike a 
novelist using his imagination, a judge claims to give a true representation of the facts 
as presented. However, a closer look at the sodomy cases show a great deal of 
imagination at play, for example with the male-female sodomy cases where 
acknowledged rapes and sex with underage girls are redescribed as consensual. It is 
itself a fiction that these judges could believe they were ruling on actual or real events 
pertaining to sodomy alone. 
 
When a judge treats a rape case, for example, as a sodomy case there has to be an 
acknowledgement that the ‘same’ event can be told differently. Events, then, are not 
the raw material out of which judgments are constructed; rather they are a function of 
particular narrative structure. The cases concerning underage girls, for example, 
should have been brought under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act. Instead, they 
were narrated as justifications for legalizing male-female sodomy. These particular 
sexual acts, then, were not part of an untold story yet to be told. They were facts not 
yet described in the context of a certain narrative. 
 
Fourteen cases construct the history of sodomy between 1926 and 1999.963 If merely 
                                                          
963 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159; Cunningham v Cunningham 1952 (1) SA 167 (C); 
R v V 1953 (3) SA 314 (A); R v N 1961 (3) SA 147 (T); R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR); R v M 
1969 (1) SA 328 (R); S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA); S v M 1977 (2) SA 357 (TkS); S v M 1979 
(2) SA 406 (RA); S v M 1984 (4) SA 111 (T); S v H 1995 (1) SA 120 (C); S v Kampher 1997 
(4) SA 460 (C); High Court National Coalition; Constitutional Court National Coalition. 
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listed in date order, we are referring to a chronicle of events – this case was heard in 
this year, that case was heard the year after etc. Any continuity is based purely on the 
order of the dates. Within each of those judgments, however, judges have to make 
sense of the particular facts of each case. They do this by using the narrative form. 
 
The form of a story is ‘this happened, then that’ whereby events, situations, or actions 
are presented as succeeding each other in such a manner as to appear to follow on. 
Whereas a chronicle is structured in terms of ‘this (then) that’, the judgment is 
structured in terms of ‘this then that’. In the narrative form, ‘then’ is significant 
because it transforms a succession of events into a meaningful sequence. It is as if 
putting events into a story can of itself construct meaning. When two males perform 
the same sexual act as a male and female, different meanings are constructed; illegal 
for the former, legal for the latter. 
 
The facts presented to the judge by counsels do not in themselves constitute the story. 
They cannot, because each party will present the same facts in ways more favourable 
to their own argument. The most that counsels might offer to the judge are story 
elements which he then makes into a story by the suppression or subordination of 
certain facts and the highlighting of others; techniques no different to the novelist. 
The definition of narrative lend itself nicely to the cycle of a court case. When a case 
comes before a court the status quo has been disturbed by humans. In the sodomy 
cases in particular, a non-permissible sexual act has taken place between two people. 
After hearing the case a judge (sometimes more) rules in an effort to redress the 
situation. In criminal cases the redress is punishment. Court cases are, in effect, two 
narratives in one – a telling of the facts of the case and then the judge’s opinion. 
 288
 No sexual act is intrinsically criminal; it can only be conceived as such from a 
particular point of view. The sodomy cases show that it was never certain what act 
actually counted as a crime. Judicial evidence in itself is value-neutral but whether the 
evidence is placed in a narrative that make the acts legal or illegal depends on how the 
judge as narrator will narrate them. This suggests that a judge brings to his 
deliberations an idea of the types of configurations of events that can be recognized as 
within a permissible range acceptable to the audience for which he is writing. As 
history has shown, it was permissible for judges to take cases which lent themselves 
far more to being governed by the law pertaining to rape and sex with underage girls 
and use them to justify legalizing male-female sodomy cases. 
 
Judges wanted to tell the story that male sodomy was unacceptable to society and 
should remain a crime. Just as S v Kampher (sodomy between prison inmates) was not 
an ideal case to use to decriminalize male sodomy in 1997, in the 1960s and 1970s the 
cases used to decriminalize male-female sodomy were not ideal. It seems that the 
court wanted to settle the matter once and for all and so they used cases which arose at 
the time to drive home their preference. This emphasizes how judges use 
circumstances as they find them and fashion their opinions from them. Judges work 
with what they have at hand. Several rhetorical devices are used to differentiate the 
male-female sodomy cases, such as using different legal principles compared to male 
sodomy, posing questions which, when answered in a certain way, do not require the 
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judge to go further (such as determining whether mens rea was present),964 
deliberately distancing themselves by not using the term sodomy, using archaic 
nomenclature, and all but ignoring the real issues of the cases such as non-consensual 
sex in the form of rape and sex with underage girls. Judges wanted male-female 
sodomy decriminalized and they wanted that to become ‘settled law’. The ‘rightness’ 
of these decisions are derived from an imaginative and intuitive process within the 
judge’s thought process. The way in which the judge employs rhetoric determines the 
decision.  
 
Proponents of historical narrative consider how something might be perceived to 
change over time or how it might be something completely different. To illustrate, I 
use two cases from the corpus. A man performed anal intercourse with another 
man.965 He was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment with hard labour, partially 
suspended provided that he undergo psychiatric treatment and not commit a similar 
offence. In another case a man had anal intercourse with a young girl.966 Both cases 
were brought under a charge of sodomy. The first case remained a sodomy charge but 
in the second case the sodomy charge was changed to indecent assault because the 
court held that sodomy only applied to male-male anal intercourse. The wording in 
the second case makes it clear that it is not sodomy – ‘Male having intercourse per 
                                                          
964 R v H 1962 (1) SA 278 (SR), 280 (‘If a man has no intention of having intercourse per 
anum, I do not think he can be convicted of sodomy if while attempting to rape a woman he 
by mischance penetrates her anus’.) 
965 S v K 1973 (1) SA 87 (RA). 
966 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA) – ‘in addition to raping the complainant, a young African 
girl, the appellant had also forcibly effected penetration of the complainant per anum’. 
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anum with a female - Such not sodomy ... - Conviction of indecent assault 
substituted’.967 In this example, is the first incident of anal penetration the same as the 
second case or has it changed? In the absence of any further information we should 
conclude it is the same. The question, then, is: is male-male anal penetration the same 
as male-female, or is it a changed act? This is important to consider because if it is a 
changed act then there is justification for using a different legal basis. It should be the 
same act because the Dutch jurists who judges relied on so heavily to criminalize 
male-male sodomy viewed male-female anal penetration in the same way.968
 
A thing changes when it now differs from what it was. The definition of sodomy – 
‘that particular kind of unnatural offence where there is penetration per anum’969 – 
should apply to both cases because the definition is silent regarding gender. In some 
respects it is different because there are different genders, but according to the legal 
definition which the judges should have applied, it is not different because both 
involved the same act. If anything, the cases should have been differentiated on the 
basis of consent. The male-male case involves consenting adults whereas the male-
female case involves rape and with a girl who could never be deemed to give consent. 
These cases have clearly been treated as different but not because of this blatant 
suppression of non-consent. The reason for the difference is gender alone. The act has 
                                                          
967 S v M 1979 (2) SA 406 (RA), 406. 
968According to Hunt et al, ‘some jurists regarded ordinary sexual relations between Jews and 
Christians as “sodomie”’ – Hunt, P. & Milton, J. (2nd ed.), South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure Vol. II, p. 268, and sodomy could even be committed with pictures and statues 
according to Von Quistorp. 
969 R v Gough & Narroway 1926 CPD 159, 163. 
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changed so much that it has become a different act in the mind of the judge because 
gender is viewed as so dominant or essential that the same act is rendered different 
rather than changed. 
 
The sodomy cases start in the 1920s with male-male cases which are always tried as 
sodomy throughout the period. In the 1960s three male-female cases are brought to 
court as sodomy cases but ruled to be indecent assault. The fourth and final male-
female case in 1979 confirms this. This means that the male-female cases were 
different. The judges are careful not to use the word sodomy and they do not refer to 
previous male-male cases. Instead, they rely on previous cases of male-female sexual 
acts which do not involve anal penetration to rule that what they are dealing with is 
not sodomy. Sodomy could not change itself nor make itself different from how it 
was. As a (merely) physical act it could not effect nor do anything. It could only 
suffer being acted upon. What the factual narrative of sodomy required, then, was a 
human agent – a judge – who effected the change. 
 
Pierre de Vos holds the view that the language in a legal text does not have a single 
‘objective’ meaning and cannot always produce one absolute or fixed meaning. The 
South African Constitution, for example, does not have a single ‘objective’ meaning 
and cannot always produce one absolute or fixed meaning.970 Judges are 
uncomfortable with the idea that they are not merely discovering a ‘true’, ‘objective’ 
                                                          
970 de Vos, P., A bridge too far?, pp. 2 & 3. 
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or ‘original’ meaning of the text. If texts as varied as the Dutch jurists’ treatises and 
the Constitution do not have one objectively determinable meaning, the risk is that the 
judicial process will be open to criticism of arbitrariness and bias. In order to try and 
curtail the effect of the indeterminacy of a text de Vos suggests that judges rule in 
terms of a grand narrative. The grand narrative of sodomy seems to be that male 
sodomy has been a sin and a crime for millennia whereas male-female sodomy came 
to be accommodated as a modern sexual variation. 
 
These grand narratives, however, rely on a rather naïve and outdated view of history. 
Those presently in power get to write their version of history. However, power is 
always contestable and there is no guarantee that those who adopt a particular 
metaphor will always be in power. The story of sodomy is messy, disjointed, 
contrived and forced. It provides a good illustration that grand narratives and 
teleology do exist in the lived world. 
 
Conclusion 
I have presented a small slice of rhetoric at work over a period of time and about a 
specific subject. A definitive conclusion is impossible and presumptuous. My hope is 
that the theorists that I have relied on and the exercise of analyzing legal texts that I 
have undertaken can convince us that legal texts are simply a subset of texts generally.  
 
Judges would probably not have wanted to rule on homosexuality if they had had the 
choice. It was an offensive area of law. Cases of this kind are about a minority and, 
statistically, they form a small part of reported cases. Why then the effort? 
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‘Our law has never treated lesbians and gays kindly,’ says Edwin Cameron.971 The 
extent to which the law is kind to minorities is an indication of the overall legal health 
of a society. And lesbians and gays are not the only minority. 
 
                                                          
971 Cameron, E., Sexual orientation and the constitution, p. 453. 
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